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Abstract
This study aims to explore George Eliot’s early fiction in terms of her 
response to the two competing philosophical traditions of Spinoza and Kant. 
The dispute between these two traditions begins from differing claims 
regarding the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, and this of course will 
have important consequences for both ethics and aesthetics. I argue that Eliot, 
through her fiction, contributed powerfully to this debate, and my central 
concern will be her choice of the novel genre as a medium for these ethical 
and philosophical interventions.
The first part of this study sets out the terms of this historical debate, and 
considers Eliot’s distinctive philosophical, ethical and literary programme, 
which I describe as a ‘religion of immanence’. I offer readings of Scenes o f  
Clerical Life and Adam Bede in relation to various philosophical issues such 
as Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge, Kantian ethics and aesthetics, 
hermeneutics and biblical criticism, and the literary theory of the early 
Romantics.
The second part of this study draws together these various historical 
strands, and In a sustained reading of The Mill on the Floss attempts to place 
Eliot within a post-Romantic paradigm, which is seen as a way of unifying the 
two traditions with which Eliot engages. I show how Eliot’s fiction interacts 
with the literary theory of the Jena Romantics, and most importantly their 
conception of music as a paradigm for a non-representational approach to 
language and literature. I also discuss Eliot’s use of the Bildungsroman model, 
which throws up surprising connections between hermeneutics and that other 
intense search for origins, Darwinism. I argue that George Eliot’s negotiation 
of these philosophical issues is played out through narrative, which is at the 
heart of a distinctive ethical and literary project that draws upon the rich 
resources of the Aristotelian tradition.
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Preface
This study aims to explore George Eliot’s early fiction in terms of her 
response to the two competing philosophical traditions of Spinoza and Kant. I 
need to say at the outset that this is not primarily an influence study, although 
it will have to identify and explicate the elements of the thought of these two 
major philosophical figures with which Eliot engages. Indeed, it is precisely as 
an engagement with the philosophical and ethical questions raised by these 
two thinkers that I would prefer to characterise the present work, although I do 
not pretend that any conclusions I draw will be definitive from a philosophical 
point of view. I will be considering these philosophers in relation to Eliot’s 
work, and will therefore be working with standard interpretations of Kant and 
Spinoza, rather than offering original interpretations. I have the more modest 
aim of demonstrating that Eliot, far fiom being the enthusiastic amateur 
philosopher of the biographies— incorporating philosophical ‘ideas’ into her 
fiction which nonetheless did not contribute materially to her art—was on the 
contrary eminently qualified philosophically for the task that she set herself, 
and that her ethical and aesthetic concerns (and towering achievements) are 
meaningless unless considered against the background of her philosophical 
position. I will argue that a forceful and coherent philosophical and ethical 
position underpins her entire narrative quest, and my central concern will be 
her choice of the novel genre as a vehicle for these philosophical and ethical 
interventions.
For reasons of clarity, I have divided this study into two distinct but 
related parts. Broadly speaking, the first part sets the philosophical framework 
for the whole study, while the second part picks up major themes introduced in 
the first part, and tries to locate Eliot within a post-Romantic paradigm. In 
using the term post-Romantic I am referring to Eliot’s critique of Romantic 
individualism, as well as to her debt to Romanticism’s critique of the
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Enlightenment. Eliot’s post-Romanticism can be seen in some way as an 
attempt to unify the two historical strands of Spinoza and Kant through an 
Aristotelian approach to narrative and ethics.
The first chapter is an introduction to my argument, and tries to explicate 
the philosophical background to Eliot’s project, which I describe as a ‘religion 
of immanence’. I begin by exploring Spinoza’s philosophical and political 
project, and in particular his doctrine of the three kinds of knowledge. I also 
discuss the reception of Spinoza’s ideas by three of Eliot’s contemporaries 
who assumed the task of introducing Spinoza to an English-speaking 
audience: George Henry Lewes (whose impact on Eliot’s fiction should not be 
underestimated), Matthew Arnold, and J. A. Fronde. The discussion then 
broadens out to set out the terms of the debate to which Eliot was a powerful 
contributor, albeit through the oblique medium of fiction.
This chapter is followed by a rather ambitious attempt to read Eliot’s first 
fictional work. Scenes o f  Clerical Life, against the backdrop of Spinoza’s three 
kinds of knowledge. This is a necessary preliminary to the rest of the study, as 
it clearly shows Eliot’s Spinozistic antecedents, as well as her response to 
Kantianism, while at the same time pointing us towards the conclusion that, 
ultimately, Eliot reformulates Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge as a way of 
negotiating the dispute between Spinoza and Kant about the possibility of 
metaphysical knowledge. I hasten to add that I do not offer the Scenes as an 
analogy for the three types of knowledge—I merely wish to suggest that 
Eliot’s engagement with Spinoza and Kant is ultimately a literary one, and 
that this dispute, if it can be decided at all, will be decided— or at any rate 
approached—through narrative.
The third and final chapter o f the first part of this study presents a wide- 
ranging and detailed reading of Eliot’s first full-length novel, Adam Bede, In 
this chapter I firmly establish the nature of Eliot’s narrative project, which is 
also a hermeneutic quest for meaning, and a search for a philosophical and
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ethical gi'ounding for knowledge. I shall begin to locate Eliot as a post- 
Romantic by introducing the work of the Jena Romantics (those key figures at 
the historical juncture of modernity and Classicism), and in particular the 
founding father of hermeneutics, Schleiermacher.
The second part of this study continues to situate Eliot within a post- 
Romantic framework, and develops a reading of The Mill on the Floss over 
three chapters, each devoted to different philosophical and ethical concerns. 
Chapter four shows in a more sustained way how Eliof s work interacts with 
the philosophy and literary theory of the Jena Romantics, and suggests that her 
turn to their ideas can be seen as an attempt at unifying the two competing 
traditions with which we have been concerned. This chapter also discusses the 
concept of music as a paradigm for a non-representational approach to 
language and literature, one which characterises the work of the Jena 
Romantics, and which will be seen to have important philosophical 
implications.
Chapter five discusses E liof s use of the Bildungsroman, and explores 
how Eliot adapted the model in The Mill on the Floss. While ultimately it was 
unsuited to her needs in the form bequeathed by Goethe, it will nonetheless 
throw up surprising connections between hermeneutics and that other intense 
search for origins, Darwinism.
The sixth and final chapter shows that Eliot’s attempt to unify the. 
competing traditions of Spinoza and Kant is predicated on a narrative and 
ethical approach derived from Greek philosophy, and Aristotle in particular. 
We shall see that Eliot was able to overcome what we take to be the Romantic 
impasse of the sublime by rendering ethics in a more Aristotelian way, in 
which we find ethics redefined as socially concretised practice, and where an 
awareness of the fragility of the other person engenders pity. It is this, together 
with her distinctive narrative and literary project, which ultimately sets George 
Eliot apart from the philosophical systems of both Spinoza and Kant.
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Part One:George Eliot’s Religion of Immanence
I
Introduction: The Philosophical Background
In July 1842, the young scholar Mary Ann Evans wrote to the Reverend James 
Watt in connection with her offer to undertake a ‘silent’ translation of Vinet’s 
Mémoire} For reasons which are not clear, the project did not come to 
fruition, and in February 1843 she returned the book, excusing the delay on 
account ‘of being engaged in a translation of part of Spinoza’s works for a 
friend’.2 It appears that the work in question was the Ethics, a few sentences 
of which appeared in Charles Bray’s Autobiography} The following year 
Evans embarked on the arduous task of translating Strauss’s Das Leben JesuA 
She returned to Spinoza in 1849, not however to the Ethics, but to his 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,^ the effect of which Evans found soothing as 
she watched her father’s health deteriorate.^ In the years that followed, Evans
i Gordon Haight, George Eliot, A Biography (1968; London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 52. 
Hereafter referred to as Haight.
^ The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon Haight, 9 vols. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954-78), I, 157-8. Hereafter referred to as Letters.
3 Haight, p. 52. Haight does not mention the possibility, previously alluded to by him in the 
Letters (I, 158n.), that it may have been Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus which 
Evans began to translate, before moving on to the Ethics. It is certainly probable that Evans 
immersed herself deeply in Spinoza at this time as, contrary to the impression given by 
Haight (p. 52), it was a full year before Evans embarked on the translation o f Strauss’s Das 
Leben Jesu. In January 1844, Sara Hennell wrote to Mrs G. H. Hennell: ‘Your proposition 
to deliver up the Strauss to Mary Ann has been very cordially received, and I am sure will 
be a great benefit. I think she will do it admirably’ {Letters I, 171). Also, in a letter o f 9 
October, 1843 to Sara Hennell {Letters, I, 161-3), Evans writes in very Spinozistic terms, 
echoing his Tractatus. Thomas Deegan also observes a Spinozistic influence in Evans’s 
letters to Sara Hennell, including a letter dated as early as 3 November, 1842. Deegan 
provides strong evidence that Evans did indeed start translating the Tractatus at least as 
early as 1843. See Thomas Deegan, ‘George Eliot, George Henry Lewes, and Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus’, George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Studies 22 (September, 
1993), pp. 4-5.
4 D. F. Strauss, The Life o f  Jesus, Critically Examined, trans. by George Eliot, 4th ed. 
(London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1902).
5 Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, trans. by Samuel Shirley (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1989). Hereafter referred to as Tractatus.
^ Haight, p. 69.
translated Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christenthums (1854),^ and returned to 
Spinoza’s Ethics (1856).^ The effect of this translation work on the 
development of George Eliot, the name Evans adopted for her fictional works, 
has been fairly adequately dealt with in respect of Feuerbach and Strauss,^ but 
not in respect of Spinoza, whose philosophical, religious and political 
concerns inform much of her work.^f^ In particular, Eliot’s translation of the 
Tractatus (which has never been found) has been very insufficiently remarked 
upon; any studies that have been made on the relation between Eliot and 
Spinoza tend to concentrate on the Ethics. 11
Spinoza’s philosophical and political programme is underpinned by a 
comprehensive and codifying ‘philosophy of i m m a n e n c e ’ . U  it is an 
unyielding deterministic system, challenging Cartesian dualism in its 
conception of a single unifying substance, all things being modes of that 
substance. In his identification of God with nature, Spinoza does not imply a 
deified nature substituted for the creative God of theism, but simply an 
immanent cause. Far from deifying nature, he is deifying reason. Spinoza’s
7 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o f  Christianity, trans. by George Eliot (New York; 
Flarper & Row, 1957).
 ^ Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. by George Eliot, ed. by Thomas Deegan (Salzburg: 
Institut fur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universitat Salzburg, 1981). This translation is 
cited throughout in the main text, and referred to hereafter as Ethics.
9 See especially E. S. Shaffer, 'Kubla Khan ' and ‘The Fall o f  Jerusalem The M ythological 
School in Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975).
Notable exceptions are Dorothy J. Atkins, George Eliot and Spinoza (Salzburg: 
Universitat Salzburg, 1978); P. BourPhonne, George Eliot: Essai de Biographie Intellectual 
et Morale (Paris: Libraire Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1993); and Rosemary Ashton, The 
German Idea: Four English Writers and the Reception o f  German Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980). Hilda M. Hulme suggests that much o f ‘Dorothea’s 
progress in self-knowledge’ in Middlemarch  relies on Spinoza’s distinction between ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ modes o f thought. ‘The Language o f The Novel; Imagery’, in Barbara Hardy, 
ed., 'Middlemarch': Critical Approaches to the Novel (London: Athlone Press, 1967), 87- 
124, pp. 118-24.
11 For example, Atkins, George E liot and Spinoza. Atkins hardly mentions the Tractatus.
12 Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, 2 vols. (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1989; rpt. 1992), I, ix. Yovel prefers ‘immanence’ to both ‘pantheism’ and 
‘naturalism’ as being ‘better suited to capturing thefundamentalSfmoTÀsiic idea that other 
philosophers have adapted or interpreted’ (x-xi). Yovel traces the history o f ‘immanence’ as 
a philosophical concept, arguing that the idea o f  immanence is far more pervasive than one 
imagines (xii). My interpretation o f  Spinoza’s philosophical, religious and political 
programme is greatly indebted to Y ovel’s excellent and important study.
philosophy of immanence ‘views this worldly existence as all there is, as the 
only actual being and the sole source of ethical value. God himself is identical 
with the totality of nature, and God’s decrees are written not in the Bible but 
in the laws of nature and reason’. 13 Thus, it is an anti-transcendent 
philosophy, in direct opposition to the Platonic tradition, the modern epitome 
of which is Kant, and which has been for the most part dominant in the history 
of Western philosophy. 14 Immanence stresses an Aristotelian ethical 
naturalism, and argues for an alternative ethics to that of the duty-based ethics 
of the Enlightenment. 15 In a sense, both Eliot and Spinoza could be said to 
challenge the Hellenistic tradition. 1^  Spinoza did so philosophically, but by 
necessity with a similar discourse to that of the tradition with which he wished 
to take issue; Eliot turned to fiction. While their concerns are essentially the 
same, I will be arguing that Eliot, using as a basis Spinoza’s philosophy of 
immanence, transformed it into a unique ‘religion of immanence’, which in
13 Yovel, Spinoza, I, ix. The question is then raised as to why Spinoza kept the term ‘God’, 
when he might just as well have said ‘nature’. We will see below that his retention o f these 
anthropomorphic appellations was part o f  a rhetorical strategy, and also related to his 
doctrine o f  alternative salvation.
14 A. N. Whitehead famously commented that all European philosophy is a series o f  
footnotes to Plato. Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 39. I should 
make clear at this juncture that although Kant’s anti-naturalistic ( ‘critical’) approach to 
knowledge and ethics can be characterised as occupying an ultimate position o f  
‘transcendence’, it is more properly ‘transcendental’, because he asks how knowledge and 
ethics are possible and refuses the validity o f  metaphysics, i.e., what lies outside human 
spatio-temporal perception. For Kant, we can only approach transcendence (what lies 
outside ‘experience’) because there are transcendental conditions for the possibilities o f  
experience. The noumenal can only be approached via the sublime, that is, indications o f  an 
unknowable ‘beyond’. From a Kantian perspective, Spinoza’s would be attacked 
because o f its metaphysical posturing, and similarly Plato’s metaphysics would be attacked 
because o f Kant’s dislike o f any external authority.
U  Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’, for example, seeks to provide an objective basis for 
moralify; a ‘universal law’ that appeals to all rational beings. The fact o f  our having these 
moral imperatives does not, for Kant, prove  the existence o f God, but nevertheless leads us 
to some inkling, however shadowy, o f  transcendence. Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  
Judgement, Part II, Critique o f  Teleological Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1911), p. 113.
Matthew Arnold, who affords an interesting comparison with Eliot, regarded conduct 
(‘Hebraism’) as ‘three-fourths o f  life’, while science and art ( ‘Hellenism’) accounted only 
for one-fourth. See his Literature and Dogm a  (1873), in The Complete Prose Works o f  
Malcolm Arnold, 11 vols., ed. by R. H. Super (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan 
Press, 1968), VI, 139-411, pp. 170-201. As we shall see below, Spinoza, even though he 
rejects all historical religions, builds his programme for a ‘universal religion’ on basic 
‘Hebraic’ rules o f conduct, in opposition to the ‘transcendent’ ethics o f  the Hellenistic 
tradition. See Yovel, Spinoza, I, 198.
some ways can be seen as an attempt to reconcile these two historical 
philosophical strands, roughly characterised as Spinozistic and Kantian.
Thomas McFarland, in Coleridge and the Pantheist T radition^  charts 
the Pantheismusstreit, or the controversy over pantheism, which dominated 
the age of the Romantics and beyond, such that only two ontological schemes 
seemed possible: the T am’ of the Platonists, Descartes, and an uneasy 
alliance of Kant and Christianity; and the ‘it is’ of the Aristotelians, Spinoza 
and the Pantheists. On the whole, ‘the age turned against K a n t’, 18 even though 
the consequences of Spinozism, which left no room for personal immortality 
or free will (at least not in the traditional theistic sense), caused ‘a 
philosophical and emotional schizophrenia that saturated both literature and 
p h ilo so p h y ’. 19 Spinoza was felt to be ‘right’, and Kantianism, which tried to 
establish free will, immortality and indeed God, became marginalised as a 
ph ilo sophy .20 For the Romantics and beyond, Spinozism became not only the 
only philosophy, but for many of them, a new religion. For this reason we 
must examine that philosophy in order to begin to understand what might have 
drawn Eliot and many of her contemporaries to Spinoza as a determining 
influence. Of course, I do not mean to neglect the Kantian side of the 
dichotomy, and we shall return to it below once we have examined this 
remarkable philosophy of immanence.
For Spinoza, rational understanding consists entirely of knowledge of 
causal relationships as they inhere in God-nature.2i We can in theory trace 
back any event to an ultimate cause, that is, the single underlying unity, or
i7  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). See especially chapter 2, ‘The Spinozistic 
Crescendo’, pp. 53-106.
McFarland, Coleridge, pp. 62, 71, 101.
19 McFarland, Coleridge, p. 88.
20 Conceptions o f  free will and immortality were necessary Ideas for Kant’s principles o f  
practical reason. See McFarland, Coleridge, p. 196. They could, o f  course, only be known 
negatively.
21 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza: An Introduction to his Philosophical Thought (London: 
Penguin Group, 1951; rpt. 1988), p. 41. I rely primarily on Hampshire in the subsequent 
discussion o f  the Ethics.
substance, which is the ‘cause of itself. This positing of one unifying 
substance is not only in tension with Cartesian dualism, but also both the 
materialist and the idealist answer to the problem of the necessary relations 
between mind and body. Spinoza views mind and body as two different 
attributes of the one substance; mental events and physical events are only 
qualitatively different, in essence being two different aspects of the same 
reality. The traditional distinction between mind and body, is related to the 
similar distinction between God and His creation. This anthropomorphic 
conception of God has resulted in the misconceptions of theologians and 
philosophers through the ages.22 For Spinoza, arguments about free will, 
immortality and the problem of evil are incoherent—there is no problem if we 
conceive God and Nature as indistinguishable; and to deny this is to put a 
limit on God’s perfection {Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. IV), which is a contradiction. 
God is the only free cause, by which Spinoza does not mean ‘free’ in the 
everyday human sense. God is free in the sense that he is ‘self-creating’, and 
entirely unaffected hy other modes; whatever happens is simply an unfolding 
of God’s essence. Spinoza makes it clear that even God is not free in the sense 
of His choosing one action over another: ‘There is nothing contingent in 
nature: everything is determined by the necessity of the divine nature to a 
certain mode of existence and 2iQXion\Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. XXIX). If  we cannot 
admit contingency, then it is clear that ‘things could not have been produced 
by God in any other manner or in any other order than that in which they have 
been produced’ {Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. XXXIII).
So, in what sense could Spinoza still claim some limited freedom for 
humans, and even some sort o f emancipation or salvation? The answer is in 
Spinoza’s special sense of the word ‘free’, and his insistence that to be free is 
not to be wwdetermined, because that concept involves a contradiction. Rather,
22 See Karen Armstrong, A H istory o f  G od  (London: Heinemann, 1993). Spinoza 
emphasises this continuity between God and Nature; indeed, they are identical according to 
his monistic philosophy. Kant, in contrast, stresses human fmitude which means that the 
distance between knowledge and divinity is insurmountable.
to be free is to be 6-e//-determined: T call that thing^ee which exists solely by 
the necessity of its nature and is determined to action by itself alone. I call a 
thing necessary, when it is determined by another to exist and act according to 
a certain and definite law’ {Ethics, Pt. I, Def. 7). In a sense, only God can be 
completely free, but a limited form of freedom is made possible for some 
human beings through Spinoza’s concept of the conatus, which he uses to 
explain purposive activity. The conatus is an individual’s endeavour to 
preserve in his or her own being, that is, to resist as far as possible, external 
causes to which we are all to some extent in bondage. A human being can be 
free in so far as his or her conatus manifests itself and masters the ‘passions’, 
which is the name Spinoza gives to these external forces or modes. For 
Spinoza:
Human power is extremely limited and is infinitely surpassed by 
the power of external causes; and therefore we have not absolute 
power of adapting external things to our use. But whatever may 
happen to us in opposition to our interest, we shall bear with 
equanimity if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that our 
power does not extend so far as to enable us to avoid these evils, 
and that we are part o f Nature, whose order we obey. If  we 
distinctly and clearly understand this, that part of us which is called 
our intelligence, i.e., the better part of us, will fully acquiesce in it and will strive to persevere in that acquiescence. For so far as we 
possess intelligence, we desire nothing but what necessarily is, and 
we can acquiesce in nothing but what is true; and thus in so far as 
we rightly understand what is true, the effort of the better part of 
our own nature is in unison with the common order o f universal nature {Ethics, Pt. IV, App. §32).
This freedom is still relative— only God is completely self-determined—but
freedom worthy of the name is possible, and even a form of alternative
salvation, made possible to those who can enter the esoteric realm of the third
kind of knowledge.
It is with Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge that we come to a
controversial aspect of his system. Spinoza illustrates all three kinds by way of
a famous example of finding a fourth proportional:
Let there be given three numbers in order to obtain a fourth, which 
shall be to the third what the second is to the first. Merchants are in 
no doubt as to the necessity o f multiplying the second by the third
and dividing the product by the first, because they have not yet 
forgotten what they heard from their tutor without any 
demonstration or because they have often tried the same process 
with the simplest numbers, or on the ground of prop. 19, Book 7 of Euclid, that is to say, on the ground of a common property of 
proportionals. But in the simplest numbers there is no need for this 
demonstration. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails 
to see, that the fourth proportional number is 6, and this kind of cognition is much clearer than the others, because from the ratio 
which we intuitively see the first to have to the second, we 
conclude the fourth {Ethics, Pt. II, Prop. XL, Schol. 2).
The first kind of knowledge is the domain of the masses—the ignorant
multitude who live in the realm of the imagination {imaginato). It is confused
knowledge, or ‘cognition from vague experience’ such as that gained from the
senses, as well as gossip and calumny. It can have as its basis subservience to
authority: the tradesman in the example accepts his schoolmaster’s general
rule, and proceeds to make an inference in the particular case. The multitude
have for the most part little access to the realm of ‘clear and distinct’ or
‘adequate’ ideas which constitute the second and third kinds of knowledge.
The second kind is reason {ratio), and consists of ‘adequate common notions
and ideas which we possess of the properties of things’, and is illustrated in
the example by the merchant knowing the truths of geometry. He still uses the
same rule as the merchant who accepts the authority of the schoolmaster, but
he can appreciate that the truth o f the rule can be deduced logically from
certain basic Euclidean a x i o m s . 23 Yet another merchant has an ‘intuitive’
grasp of the self-evident nature of the rule as applied in a particular instance.
This rather obscure doctrine of the third kind of knowledge is contrasted with
the second kind in that we now no longer infer from the general to the
particular, but we have ‘a synoptic grasp of some particular thing as it inheres
in God-nature: essence through an immanent chain of c a u s e s ’ . 2 4  This elevated
and sublime kind of knowledge is what has been seen as the semi-mystical
aspect of Spinoza’s system; indeed, it is nothing less than salvation itself, for
23 Ethics, trans. & ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1989 & 1992), p. 
240n.
24 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 21 On.
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Spinoza a true salvation, a secular equivalent of what the mystics had always 
sought but failed to attain. As Yovel remarks:
Spinoza was not a mystic, but he recognised in mysticism a 
misguided form of yearning and endeavour which, correctly 
transformed by reason and the third kind of knowledge, would 
become the rational philosopher’s way of salvation, a reward as 
high in achievement as that which the mystics have been trying to 
attain by irrational means. In other words, it will be a secular and 
truly universal form of salvation.25
Thus we see that Spinoza has elevated reason to the place previously occupied
by religion—in fact, he has proclaimed a ‘religion of reason’.26
The masses certainly cannot as a rule aspire to the third kind of
knowledge, and realistically very few of them will even reach the second kind,
as they are constrained by their inadequate ideas of the relations of things—
they cannot see the totality of the web.2? Spinoza is nothing if not a practical
philosopher, and at the heart of his Tractatus is the problem of how to live
with the multitude, given that the majority will never rise to the level of
reason, and will live in the irrational and confused domain of the imaginato.
We have seen above that Spinoza was rehabilitated during the Romantic
era, and his philosophy embraced, particularly in Germany, where it remained
fundamental to that country’s thought for much of the nineteenth century.
Eliot’s German reading helped to effect her shift from Evangelicalism to free-
thinking.28 Her translations of Feuerbach and Strauss have been shown to
inform her work, and while she may have found Strauss too ‘mythological’,
she was very receptive to Feuerbach, whose reformulation of the ‘essence of
Christianity as the essence of human feeling and imagination’, established ‘a
25 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 168.
26 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 152.
27 This is a constant image in Middlemarch, at the same time one o f  creativity and 
constraint. It is a suitably ‘ambiguous’ image. See Marilyn Lewis Hemminger, ‘George 
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda: A Study o f  Vision and Form’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University 
o f Pittsburgh, 1976), pp. 1-2.
28 Howard R. Murphy, however, argues that Eliot’s views had started to shift 
fundamentally well before she encountered the German ‘higher critics’. ‘The Ethical Revolt 
Against Christian Orthodoxy in Victorian EngXmd’, American H istorical Review  60 (1955), 
800-17, p. 801.
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psychological basis to the study of Biblical texts’.29 Spinoza was, of course, 
one of the forefathers of the ‘higher’ critics. His Tractatus is a radical critique 
of the historical religions, and a precursor of the later rationalist approach to 
the Bible.30 But at the same time as Spinoza exposed the illusions of religious 
myth, he was aeutely aware of the hold these illusions had on the domain of 
the imaginato, and he sought to use this fact constructively, given that the 
multitude, by definition, will always exist, and will always be guided by 
revelation and not reason.31 Spinoza could thus be seen as philosophically 
radical, while at the same time politically conservative.
I will argue that Eliot assimilated Spinoza’s ideas of the social value of 
myth, and the need—for reasons of social cohesion and politieal order—for a 
universal religion, based on certain nuclear Biblical precepts, in order to 
reshape the imaginato, ‘so as to transform and institutionalise the latter’s 
effects in semirational patterns’.32 It will of course only be an imitation of 
reason, and the realm of the imaginato will still be dominated by confused and 
inadequate ideas, and live in bondage to the passions, but social order will be 
maintained and anarchy avoided by this semirational paradigm. O f course, 
what motivates the philosopher—reason—will not motivate the multitude, 
which will still need to be subservient to the power of the State, in order that 
its conduct conforms to that of the philosopher. The learned few will not try 
and disabuse the multitude from its belief in transcendental concepts and the 
authority of the Bible; there would be no point, and it would more suit the 
purposes of the philosopher to use the fact o f the irrationality of the multitude 
constructively. As a result:
these two radically different types [i.e., the learned and the
multitude] will manifest little or no difference in their external
conduct, for each in his way will act in accordance with the rules of
29 Ashton, The German Idea, p. 156.
30 See Hampshire, Spinoza, p. 151.
31 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 133.
32 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 130.
justice and mutual social benefit. Purified religion and the 
rationalized state are thus designed to engender in the multitude the 
same conduct that the rational model requires, even though it will 
be motivated by nonrational powers and by inadequate i d e a s . 33
Eliot’s emphasis on piety, duty, sympathy, and the ‘Divine Law’ will be
related to Spinoza’s political programme as outlined in the Tractatus (see
below, chapter two). However, we first need to explore the response to
Spinoza by some of Eliot’s contemporaries, in order to justify the claim that
the influence on Eliot of her translation of the Tractatus has been undervalued,
and that it is perhaps the most important aspect of her reformulation of
Spinoza’s ‘philosophy of immanence’ into a distinctive ‘religion of
immanence’.
G. H. Lewes always maintained that Spinoza was not an atheist, and not 
even a pantheist in the ‘common acceptation of the term’.34 He notes that 
‘Spinoza did not deny the existence of God; he denied the existence of the 
world: he was consequently an Acosmist, not an atheist’.35 This would seem 
to the theists, ‘that logically there is but a trivial distinction between his 
Acosmism, which makes God the one universal being, and Atheism, which 
makes the cosmos the one universal existence. Observe, I say “logically” there 
is but little difference; spiritually, the difference is profound’.36 Lewes
33 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 130..
34 ‘Spinoza, Spinozism’, Penny Cyclopedia fo r  the Diffusion o f  Useful Knowledge, 22 
(1842), p. 353.
35 Biographical History o f  Philosophy (London, 1857), p. 405n. This.is a reworked version 
o f his earlier article, ‘Spinoza’s Life and Works’, Westminster Review  39 (May, 1843), 372- 
407. See also his ‘Spinoza’, The Fortnightly Review  4 (April, 1866), 385-406.
36 Lewes, ‘Spinoza’, p. 398. Henry Hal lam, in \\\s Introduction to the H istory o f  Europe, in 
the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 4 vols., (1837-39), IV, 251, asserts that 
Spinoza’s ‘Deity could at most be but a cold passive intelligence, lost to our understandings 
and feelings in his metaphysical infinity’. Lewes, in his own copy, held at Dr W illiams’s 
Library, has written in the margin: ‘It is all very well to talk aboutcoW and passive, but why 
use these terms o f contempt? If you understand Spinoza you know you are falsifying him 
by them, for can anything be more grand than or onmiactise than his Deity? Whether cold or 
hot is another question and abundantly superfluous. Spinoza’s Pantheism is in truth the 
grandest and most religious o f  all philosophies & as such it is recognised by Gothe [sic] & 
the German philosophers who all embrace his creed. If you are bent upon having a God who 
made the world (as well as himself) & then ‘let it turn round his finger’ as Gothe said, well 
& good, only don’t imagine that [your] ‘faint possible theism’ is the only possible credo for 
the religious philosopher— being indeed a puzzle to every philosopher.’ On p. 252, Hal lam 
suggests that Spinoza’s ‘propositions [...]  annihilate every possible hypothesis in which the 
being o f a God can be intelligibly stated’. Lewes writes: ‘pooh! every hypothesis possible to 
be reconciled to Thirty nine Articles— no further.’ See William Baker, The George Eliot-
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bemoans the fact that everywhere Spinoza has been branded as an atheist— 
except, of course, in Germany. He reminds us of Novalis’s assessment of 
Spinoza as ‘a God-intoxicated man’,37 and quotes the ‘pious’ Schleiermacher 
from his Speeches on Religion:
Offer up with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy but 
repudiated Spinoza! [...] The great spirit of the world penetrated 
him; the Infinite was his beginning and his end; the universe his 
only and eternal love. He was filled with religion and religious feeling; and therefore it is that he stands alone, unapproachable; the 
master in his art, but elevated above the profane world, without 
adherents, and without citizenship.38
Lewes was at this stage a thoroughgoing empiricist, and could not accept 
Spinoza’s ‘initial error’, namely that ‘the subjective idea is the actual image or 
complete expression of the objective fact. [...] The order and connection of 
ideas is precisely the order and connection of things.’ While this can be 
deduced from the premises, ‘it is a position which is emphatically contradicted 
by all sound psychology. Nevertheless without it Metaphysics has no basis.’39 
According to Lewes, Spinoza was misled by the high claims Descartes made 
for geometry, and was wrong to suggest that ‘metaphysical truths could be 
attained in the same way’.40 The problem for modern philosophy, and in fact 
its ‘first crisis’, is that the only escape from Spinozism at the same time denies 
‘the possibility of all philosophy’.41 So the choice for modern philosophy 
(until, of course, Kant) was one between ‘Spinozism and Scepticism’. Lewes 
himself chose scepticism, but he acknowledges that Spinoza has ‘become the
George Henry Lewes Library: An Annotated Catalogue o f  Their Books at Dr W illiams’s 
Library, London (New York & London; Garland Publishing, 1977), item no. 927. All the 
known letters o f Lewes, with the exception o f those already published in Haight, have now 
been published, and they are full o f interest to scholars interested in Eliot and Lewes and 
their circle. See The Letters o f  George Henry Lewes, ed. by Williaip Baker, 2 vols. 
(Victoria, B. C.; University o f  Victoria, 1995).
37 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 391.
38 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 394. Lewes does not indicate which edition o f the 
Speeches, simpTy giving it as Rede fiber die Religion, p. 47. There is some evidence that 
Eliot read Schleiermacher, but which book is not certain (see below, chapter three).
39 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 411 
49 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 412.
41 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 411.
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acknowledged parent of a whole nation’s philosophy. [...] The ribald atheist 
turns out, on nearer acquaintance, to be “a God-intoxicated man” ’.42
Lewes’s assessment of the Tractatus stresses Spinoza’s insistence on the 
need for a state religion, but only in respect of ‘outward observances’.43 The 
church will be subservient to State, which will regulate the religious 
observances ‘for the sake of public tranquillity’.44 He notes that the doctrine 
taught by ‘the late orthodox and estimable Dr Arnold’, is ‘precisely similar to 
that taught by the heretical and persecuted Spinoza’ (my italics).45 He 
describes Spinoza’s rationalist critique of the Bible, and his antagonism 
towards historical religion, in the shape of the priesthood, which he saw ‘as 
injurious to the general welfare’.46 it is clear that Lewes understood Spinoza’s 
programme for a universal religion based on a certain key nuclear concepts 
laid down by the state, as part of the answer to the problem of the multitude.47 
Lewes quotes an anecdote which not only illuminates the prevailing 
sentimental notions of Spinoza, his humanity and his calm ‘blessedness’, but 
also illustrates the metaphorical and rhetorical nature o f his whole 
programme:
One day his hostess asked him if he believed that she would be 
saved by her religion. He answered, ‘Your religion is a good one; 
you ought not to seek another, nor doubt that yours will procure
42 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 413.
43 Judaism has arguably always been more a matter o f  observance than dogma, the latter o f  
which has preoccupied the Christian tradition.
44 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 392.
45 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 391. Lewes refers us to the Appendix to the first lecture 
o f Thomas Arnold’s Introductory Lectures on Modern History.
46 Lewes, Biographical History, p. 392.
47 These ideas could not have escaped Eliot. Thomas Deegan points out that the full extent 
o f the intellectual partnership between Lewes and Eliot has been underestimated. They 
probably worked on some translations o f the Ethics and the Tractatus as per Lewes’s 
agreement with the publisher Bohn. See ‘George Henry Lewes’s Collaboration With George 
Eliot on Her Translation o f  Spinoza’s Ethics’, The George Eliot-Henry Lewes Newsletter 6 
(September, 1982), 1-3. Also see Haight, pp. 199-200, for the story o f  the dispute with Bohn 
over this work. John Beer also notes the importance o f  Eliot’s relationship with Lewes, and 
in particular his knowledge o f  German letters and science, to her fiction. Beer points out that 
it was through Lewes’s scientific acquaintances that Eliot was introduced to many leading 
Oxford and Cambridge academics. See ‘George Eliot and the Cambridge Ethos’, in John 
Beer, Providence and Love: Studies in Wordsworth, Channing, Myers, George Eliot, and  
Ruskin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 189-232, pp. 189-91.
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your salvation, provided that you add to your piety the tranquil 
virtues of domestic life’.48
It is clear that Spinoza’s assurances regarding her ‘salvation’, and his 
insistence on the value of her religion are at the same time rhetorical and 
‘true’ in a philosophical sense. Given that she is one of the multitude, and that 
she cannot have ‘clear and distinct’ ideas about the nature of things, her idea 
of salvation will encourage her to live a good life, which she would manifestly 
not do by virtue of reason alone; she, like the rest of the ignorant multitude, 
requires promises of reward and threats of punishment to live in imitation of 
how the learned (those who have reached the second and third kinds of 
knowledge) live, that is, according to the dictates of reason. And, of course, 
Spinoza’s advice to his hostess was ‘true’ in a philosophical sense: ‘salvation’ 
is possible, but salvation of a very different kind, one related to the life of 
reason and the third kind of knowledge. Spinoza chose his words carefully; he 
encouraged his hostess simply to believe in the truth of her religion, its actual 
veracity or otherwise being a different issue. His hostess believes in her 
religion because she is guided by revelation and not reason.
In a letter of 9 October, 1843, two years after she refused to go to church, 
Eliot wrote to Sara Hennell on the problem of reconciling the two groups of 
society guided by faith and reason respectively:
Ought we not on every opportunity to seek to have our feelings in 
harmony with those who are often richer in the fruits of faith 
though not in reasons, than ourselves? The results of non­conformity in a family are just an epitome of what happens in a 
larger scale in the world. An influential member chooses to omit an 
observance [e.g. Eliot’s refusal to go to church!] which in the 
minds of all the rest is associated with what is highest and most 
venerable. He cannot make his reasons intelligible, and so his 
conduct is regarded as a relaxation of the hold that moral ties had 
on him previously. The rest are infected with the disease they 
imagine in him; all the screws by which order was maintained are 
loosened, and in more than one case a person’s happiness may be
48 Lewes, ‘Spinoza’, p. 405.
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ruined by the confusion of ideas which took the form of
principles.49
Just like Eliot’s family members, Spinoza’s hostess will in all probability 
never be guided by reason, but Spinoza uses this fact constructively, not 
disabusing her of these beliefs based on inadequate ideas when they result in 
outward conformity to those of the philosopher; indeed, those very beliefs can 
be unwitting expressions of higher philosophical ‘truths’, which the 
philosopher has had to express equivocally.
Yovel convincingly argues that a major influence on Spinoza in his use 
of rhetorical, metaphorical, and dual language can be traced to his Marrano 
inheritance. The Marranos were Spanish and Portuguese Jews, converted to 
Christianity against their will, who had to practice a covert Judaism in the face 
of constant suspicion and harassment from the Inquisition. This need for 
prudence (Spinoza wore a signet ring with the inscription ‘caute’) and 
esotericism is partly reflected in Spinoza’s frequent use of non-literal and even 
dissembling language. O f course, the main function of this technique is related 
to Spinoza’s programme for the multitude, and to add a semi-religious 
dimension for those who ean attain Spinoza’s alternative, secular salvation.
Spinoza insists that it is obvious to the true philosopher, that the realms 
of philosophical truth and religious authority are quite distinct. Lewes’s essay 
makes it clear that he understood this distinction between truth on a 
philosophical level, and rhetorical ‘truths’ on a lower level, that of the
49 Letters, I, 162-3. This is so Spinozistic as to make further comment superfluous at this 
stage, but we can mention in passing that it provides further evidence that Eliot was deeply 
immersed in Spinoza in these formative years.
See ‘Spinoza, the Multitude, and Dual Language’, in Yovel, Spinoza, I, ch. 5. Yovel 
writes: ‘Spinoza’s programme for the multitude cannot utilize clear and distinct ideas and 
their verbal correspondents as its vehicle. To have the desired effect upon its target group, it 
must be suited to the latter’s mental powers and tendencies. This requires the philosopher to 
use language rhetorically, so that his discourse might trigger the desired effects in his 
audience. The rhetorical use o f  language has a social and cultural role that, far from being 
undignified, acquires philosophical import for Spinoza as part o f  his general theory o f  
discourse. Just as people are divided into those led by the imagination and those guided by 
reason, so there must be different types o f  discourse suited to each group— and also 
discourse that will fit an eventual transition by allowing the rational model to inspire and 
externally reshape the imagination’ (I, 130-1).
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multitude and the realm of inadequate ideas. Lewes also approved of 
Spinoza’s method of revealing the kernel of religion, distinguishing between 
philosophical truth and political expediency:
Read the fourteenth chapter of the Theological-Political Treatise, 
and see how he distinguishes between what is essential and what 
collateral in religion; how faith in God and love of God, with the 
consequent love of mankind, are in his eyes the sum of all religion; how, even, regarding religious dogmas, it is not essential that they 
should be true, so that they be truly believed; and how it by no 
means follows that those who can give the best reasons for their 
faith are truly the most faithful, but, on the contrary, those who live 
most according to justice and charity. He knew his hostess was not 
wise, but he saw that she was virtuous.5 i
Matthew Arnold reviewed the Tractatus soon after its appearance in 
translation.52 Spinoza, he says, wrote his Tractatus to show people the ‘real 
teaching of the Bible, instead of the phantom with which they have so long 
been cheated’.53 Arnold explains that Spinoza had managed, by his 
construction of a set of exegetical principles, to abstract out the Bible’s ethical 
core, its divine revelation, which ‘was simply: Believe in God, and lead a 
good life \ There is a distinction between the ‘divine law’ and ‘human law’: 
the former is universal, indifferent to nationhood, and inscribed in the heart, 
being no less than the road to ‘blessedness’; the latter is temporal, and framed 
for the ‘security and prosperity’ of individual nations. 54 The human law of the 
Jews— obedience to God and the commandments—was only divine in the 
sense that it was ‘dictated, by revelation, through the prophets’.55 The 
prophets represented God’s decrees as ‘commands’, because they had 
inadequate ideas as to the real nature of these ‘eternal truths’. Christ 
announced them ‘as commands, only because of the ignorance of the 
multitude: to those to whom it was “given to know the mysteries of the
51 Lewes, ‘Spinoza’, p. 405.
52 Matthew Arnold, ‘Spinoza and the Bible’, Essays in Criticism  (1865), rpt. in Essays 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), pp. 192-216.
53 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 195.
54 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 197.
55 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, pp. 197-8,
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kingdom of God”, he announced them, as he himself perceived them, as 
eternal truths’. The Apostles evidently understood the problem of the ignorant 
multitude, speaking to their respective audiences ‘as unto carnal not spiritual’. 
However, in contrast to the prophets, whose message was fundamentally 
dogmatic, the Apostles ‘wrote their Epistles as doctors and reasoners’. And 
because each of them conveyed his message differently, according to his own 
nature and with a specific audience in mind, we find we have an inconsistent 
and flawed account o f the fundamental doctrines of religion, ‘each apostle 
[having] built essential religion on a non-essential foundation of his o w n . ’56 
These ‘non-essentials’ of religion, elsewhere described by Arnold as 
Aberglaube,^^ have obscured the ‘essentials’ of religion, those simple and 
basic moral precepts, the true substance of divine revelation.
Arnold refleets that, for Spinoza, theology and philosophy do not and 
should not conflict: the former only requires obedience; the latter, ‘perfect 
knowledge’. Adherents of both can be ‘saved’, because to be saved is to be 
‘obedient’; and the speculations of theology are ‘pious and impious, not as 
they are true or false, but as they confirm or shake the believer in the practice 
of o b e d i e n c e ’.58 Accordingly, Spinoza insists on the subjugation of the 
Church to State; and, further, the national church is to be remodelled and 
regulated so that it is not used as a platform for ‘metaphysical Article-makers’, 
and promotes only the central tenets of r e l i g i o n .  59
Spinoza’s system has captured the imagination of many great minds, 
notably Goethe, and for Arnold this can be located in its ‘denial of final 
causes, and his stoicism, a stoicism active, not passive’.60 At this point, 
Spinoza diverges most from the traditional Hebrew and Christian modes of 
thought, leaving no room for the notion of a transcendent or an interventionist
56 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, pp. 198-9.
52 See his Literature and Dogma (1873), in The Complete Prose Works, VI, pp. 202-13.
58 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 201.
59 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 205.
60 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 210.
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God, or for passive resignation to the vicissitudes of life. Arnold stresses the 
great gulf between the Spinozistic conception of the ‘love of God’ and its 
Christian equivalent; one is rooted in immanence, the other in transcendence: 
‘Spinoza’s ideal is the intellectual life; the Christian’s ideal is the religious 
life.’ Yet, despite this:
by thus crowning the intellectual life with a sacred transport, by 
thus retaining in philosophy, amid the discontented murmurs of all 
the army of atheism, the name of God, Spinoza maintains a 
profound affinity with that which is truest in religion, and inspires 
an indestructible interest.61
J. A. Froude, whose The Nemesis o f  Faith was the subject of one of 
Marian Evans’s earliest book r e v i e w s , 6 2  earned her admiration once again for 
his Westminster Review article on S p i n o z a . 6 3  After dismissing Spinoza’s 
claim for the third kind of knowledge as the repository of simple, ‘true ideas’ 
on which all notions of certainty are f o u n d e d , 6 4  he proceeds to criticise the 
geometric method of the Ethics, questioning whether, along with Lewes, 
Spinoza manages ‘to bridge over the gulf between existing things and the 
abstract conception of them’. Fronde’s estimation is that Spinoza’s 
demonstrations are not convincing, but in the sense that his system appeals 
‘not to the logical intellect but the imagination’, he feels there might still be 
something gained by an examination of the overall shape of Spinoza’s 
o n t o l o g y . 6 5  Froude gives short shrift to Spinoza’s argument for the existence
61 Arnold, ‘Spinoza’, p. 212. In a letter o f  Dec. 8, 1875, Arnold wrote to T. H. Huxley: 
‘Your letter [concerning criticisms o f  Arnold’s G od and the Bible] gave me great pleasure. 
First, because it put the saddle on the right horse, and made me indebted to Spinoza and not 
the Germans. It makes me rather angry to be affiliated to the German Biblical critics; I have 
had to read masses o f them, and they would have drowned me if  it had not been for the 
corks I had brought from the study o f  Spinoza. To him I owe more than I can say.’ 
Microfilm copy o f  letter held in the A. K. Davis Collection, Alderman Library, University 
o f Virginia. See also, Nicholas Murray, A Life o f  M atthew Arnold  (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1996), pp. 279, 379n.
62 In the Coventry H erald and Examiner (March, 1849).
63 ‘Spinoza’, Westminster Review, 64 (July, 1855), 1-37. Also sq g  Letters, II, 211. Eliot 
wrote to Sara Hennell (21 July, 1855): ‘You hardly do justice to Froude’s article on Spinoza 
[Sara Hennell had reviewed it in the Coventry Herald, saying that it was ‘less excellent’ 
than George Henry Lewes’s Westminster Review  article o f 1843]. I don’t agree at all with 
Fronde’s own views, but I think his account o f  Spinoza’s doctrines admirable.’
64 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, pp. 5-6.
65 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 8.
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of substance, finding it ‘astonishing that Spinoza should not have seen that he 
assumes the fact that substance does exist to prove that it must’.66 fje then 
goes on to Spinoza’s ontological argument for the existence of God, which 
enables Spinoza to claim this God as a being one and the same as the single 
self-caused Substance already established. Froude points out that Spinoza’s 
ontological demonstrations were ‘characteristic of the period’, and the fact 
that Descartes, Berkeley and others also used similar arguments, but ended up 
with ‘strangely opposite conceptions [...] of that Being whose existence they 
nevertheless agreed’, only adds to ‘the inconclusiveness of their r e a s o n i n g ’ .67 
For Froude, these questions are not to be determined by metaphysics or 
geometrical demonstrations, and he rejects intellectually what he knows to be 
true intuitively:
The truth which is to be proved is one which we already believe; 
and if, as we believe also, our conviction of God’s existence is, like 
that of our own existence, intuitive and immediate, the grounds of 
it can never adequately be analysed. [...] We ourselves believe that 
God is, because we experience the control of a ‘power’ which is 
stronger than we.68
Froude responds in a similar vein to Spinoza’s arguments for freedom in
a rigorously determined universe, and also the related problem of evil in such
a universe. In the final analysis, conscience will dictate the truth or otherwise
of these speculations, and for Froude, conscience dictates that Spinoza is
wrong, although we should ‘designedly avoid’ these ‘painful’ speculations. He
points out that while ‘Pantheism is not Atheism, [...] the Infinite Positive and
the Infinite Negative are not so remote from one another in their practical
bearings’, although we would do well to remember
that we are far indeed from the truth if we think that God to 
Spinoza was nothing else but that world which we experience. It is 
but one of infinite expressions of Him, a conception which makes 
us giddy in effort to realise it.69
66 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 9.
67 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 10.
68 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, pp. 11-2.
69 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 26.
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The conclusions Spinoza reaches are simply the disguised conclusions of 
theology; indeed Spinozism retains ‘all that is beautiful in Christianity’, while 
at the same time shedding ‘the more fearful features of the general creed’. 
Froude insists that questions such as free will and evil will not be answered by 
‘judiciously arranged demonstrations’;70 and ‘practical instinct’ will guide us 
in our conviction that at some point men determine their actions outwith the 
constraints of necessitarianism, thereby earning moral praise or censure. 
Similarly, the chain of causes can only operate so far, at which point there is 
freedom, which is ‘fatal to necessitarianism’.71
However, Froude does seem to acknowledge, along with Lewes, that 
Spinozism is not a mere pantheism. The difference seems to lie in those 
Christian elements and associations, ‘which in the system of Pantheism have 
no proper abiding place’.72 He is even surprised to find in Spinoza a kind of 
salvation—that which is related to the third kind of knowledge, where ‘the 
mind is raised above what is perishable in the phenomena to the idea or law 
which lies beyond them’. This idea or law is, of course, the knowledge of 
God, and the more knowledge of God we have, the more we are active rather 
than passive agents. We also come closer to achieving some sort of limited 
emancipation from the bondage of duration, seeing the world under the aspect 
of eternity (sub species aeternitas).73 Spinoza describes this semi-religious 
and esoteric doctrine in Book V of the Ethics, where he explains
that death is less hurtful in proportion as the mind possesses clear 
and distinct knowledge, and consequently in proportion as it loves 
God. Further, since (by Prop. 27, Pt. V) from the third kind of 
cognition arises the highest possible repose of mind, it follows that 
the human mind can be of such a nature that that portion of which 
we have shown to perish with the body (see Prop. 21, Pt. V) is of 
no moment compared with what remains of it {Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. 
XXXVIII, SchoL).
70 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 30.
71 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, pp. 36-7.
72 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 30.
73 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 32.
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Even though, for Froude, the conclusions of Spinozism are to be resisted, 
he is not surprised that such a ‘powerful’ system has been so pervasive in 
European thought, one ‘which has stolen over the minds even of thinkers who 
imagine themselves most opposed to it’. Schelling and Hegel’s ‘absolute 
pantheism’, Herder and Schleiermacher’s ‘Pantheistic Christianity’, Goethe’s 
‘strong shrewd judgement’ and Wordsworth’s poetry all have a Spinozistic
substratum.74
To his list of Spinozists, Froude might well have added Eliot; indeed, I 
will be arguing that not only was her Weltanschauung formed and informed 
by her absorption of Spinoza’s philosophical works, but further that in the way 
that she thematises and problematises Spinoza’s philosophical concerns in her 
novels, she becomes, in a sense, more Spinozistic than Spinoza himself.
In December, 1860, Eliot wrote an often quoted letter to Barbara Leigh 
Smith (Mme Bodichon), in which she shows herself to be sympathetic to the 
outward observances of religion, while recognising its intellectual limitations:
As for the ‘forms and ceremonies’ [of the Catholic religion], I feel 
no regret that any should turn to them for comfort, if  they can find 
comfort in them: sympathetically, I enjoy them myself. But I have 
faith in the working-out of higher possibilities than the Catholic or 
any other church has presented, and those who have the strength to 
wait and endure, are bound to accept no formula which their whole souls—their intellect as well as their emotions— do not embrace 
with entire reverence. The highest ‘calling and election’ is to do 
without opium and live through all our pain with conscious, clear­
eyed e n d u r a n c e . 7 5
Basil Willey finds in Eliot ‘the religious temperament cut off by the 
Zeitgeist from the traditional objects of veneration, and the traditional 
intellectual formations’. The tensions in her ‘middle position of conservative- 
liberalism’, were such as to make for a life of ‘terrible earnestness’, and for a 
heart ill at ease with the intellectual conclusions of her h e a d . 7 6  This is the 
somewhat romantic view of Eliot, and as we shall see, I do not think it can be
74 Froude, ‘Spinoza’, p. 33.
75 Letters, III, 366.
76 Basil Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies (London: Chatto & Windus, 1949), p. 238.
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sustained.77 i will argue that Eliot was not a woman of contradictions, and 
that her religious and philosophical position remained more or less consistent, 
as we will see from her novels, essays and letters. She was not simply like the 
other Victorian agnostics, hoping to replace the theological God with some 
kind of ‘transcendent postulate’ in an effort ‘to maintain external moral 
sanctions’.78 Nietzsche called this ‘transcendent postulate’ a ‘shadow of the 
dead God’. However, in her notes on The Spanish Gypsy, Eliot maintained 
that
there is really no moral ‘sanction’ but this inward impulse. The will 
of God is the same thing as the will of other men, compelling us to 
work and avoid what they have seen to be harmftil to social 
existence. Disjoined from any perceived good, the divine will is 
simply so much as we have ascertained of the facts o f existence 
which compel obedience at our peril. Any other notion comes from 
the supposition of arbitrary revelation.79
Nevertheless, Nietzsche could not understand why the Victorian agnostics
were clinging even more resolutely to a morality very much in a Christian
framework once they had discarded their Christian beliefs. He even refers to
Eliot, presumably thinking her representative of this repugnant class of
English freethinkers:
They have got rid o f the Christian God, arid now feel obliged to 
cling all the more firmly to Christian morality: that is English 
consistency, let us not blame it on little blue-stockings à la Eliot. In 
England, in response to every little emancipation from theology 
one has to reassert one’s position in a fear-inspiring manner as a 
moral fanatic. That is the penance one pays there. With us it is 
different. When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives 
oneself of the right to Christian morality. For the latter is
77 See also, E. S. Shaffer, ‘K u blaK h an ’. She writes: ‘W illey’s view leads him to the feeble 
conclusion that the effect o f  George Eliot’s conversion to disbelief and the ensuing years o f  
intellectual labour (so far from a mechanical work o f translation) was that in her novels she 
‘preferred her heart to her head’. Nothing could be more characteristic o f  the 
impoverishment which passes for “history o f  ideas” in literary criticism, than this series o f  
unfounded and inconsistent arguments and the vacuous conclusion which implicitly denies 
the value o f the critic’s own enterprise’(pp. 232-3).
78 Kerry McSweeny, George Eliot(Marian Evans): A Literary Life (Hampshire & London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 37.
79 George Eliot's Life as R elated in Her Letters and Journals, Arranged and Edited by Her 
Husband, J. W. Cross, Cabinet Edition, 3 vols. (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & 
Sons, [1886]), III, 39. Hereafter referred to as Cross.
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absolutely not self-evident: one must make this point clear again
and  again, in spite o f  E nglish  shallow pates.80
Does Eliot postulate some sort of transcendent entity, something akin to 
Matthew Arnold’s consciousness of the "not ourselves\^^ a shady area of our 
experience of which we are only dimly aware, but which nevertheless defines 
our moral imperatives? Did she simply believe that ‘God, immortality, 
providence may not exist: yet man must therefore act as is if they do?’82 
Critics have found it difficult to reconcile Eliot’s determinism with the fact 
that the characters in her novels do seem to be causal agents, with narratorial 
praise or censure attached to their actions. One possible solution is offered by 
George Levine, who insists that Eliot ‘was a consistent determinist, and that 
this is in no way incongruous with her continuous emphasis on moral 
responsibility and duty’.83 He claims that Eliot basically adopts J. S. Mill’s 
position, which is that the universe is completely determined, yet humans are 
still responsible for their actions.84 in fact, for Eliot, a determined world is the 
only world where morality would have a basis; in an ‘undetermined universe, 
every act would be capricious, because it need not be the result of one’s own 
past thinking and experience or of one’s consciousness of its possible effects’. 
The resolution of this ‘determinist-freedom paradox’, according to Levine, ‘is 
essentially linguistic’. Mill effects a ‘semantic shift’ from ‘free’ meaning 
‘uncaused’ to ‘free’ meaning ‘capable of reasonable choice in accordance with 
our motives’, which resolves the conflict between ‘determinism’ and 
‘freedom’.85 Perhaps Mill is betraying himself as a root-Spinozist. The 
Spinozistic view of ‘freedom’, that of a human being ‘free’ not by being
80 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight o f  the Idols (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 69.
81 See his Literature and Dogma  (1873), The Complete Prose Works, VI, pp. 182-3.
82 U. C. Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism in the Victorian Novel (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), pp. 112-3.
83 George Levine, ‘Determinism and Responsibility in the Works o f  George VA\oX\PMLA 
77 (March, 1962), 268.
84 Levine, ‘Determinism’, p. 269.
85 Levine, ‘Determinism’, pp. 277-8.
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‘MMdetermined’, but by virtue of being ‘.yeÿ'-determined’, is not so far away 
from Mill’s ‘semantic shift’. Of course, Spinoza does not need to allow any, 
even limited choice in his ontological scheme, because the very idea of 
freedom in the conventional sense is incoherent and involves a contradiction. 
The free man understands the relations of cause and effect, and does not feel 
them as a constraint; on the contrary, this understanding is a form of 
emancipation from our fmitude.
Nevertheless, the accepted wisdom seems to be that Eliot had a divided 
self, and that she was not ultimately concerned ‘with the resolution of 
metaphysical inconsistencies’.86 I shall be arguing that these inconsistencies 
and contradictions are more apparent than real, and when viewed against a 
backdrop of Eliot’s ‘religion of immanence’, can be seen to resolve 
themselves. Indeed, it is no surprise that this view of Eliot as ‘divided’ has 
come to hold sway, given that it is precisely her allegiance to the competing 
philosophical traditions of Spinoza and Kant that has resulted in these 
misconceptions. I shall argue that far from merely living with these 
inconsistencies, Eliot’s project is an attempt to reconcile and unify these two 
competing philosophical strands.
Broadly speaking, we can identify what is at stake by referring to the 
individualistic project o f Kant and the Enlightenment, characterised by 
freedom from external authority and the assertion of self-determination and 
law. Against this there is what Kant would regard as the metaphysical 
pretensions of Spinoza, whereby some law is able to be intuited outside the 
self, and where we have the possibility of metaphysical knowledge and a 
sense of the totality beyond the self. Eliot, through narrative and ethics, 
negotiates between these two positions, and rather than assuming how we can
86 Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism, p. 113. He feels that ‘Middlemarch thrives on 
paradox. It is a m ystic’s rejection o f  religion and a rationalist’s plea for irrationality’(p. 
114). ‘But in its over-all compromise, its “middle” march between religious despair and 
religious affirmation, George Eliot’s masterpiece implies a confidence in man’s ability to 
surmount his enslavement to time and change’ (p. 115).
23
know the totality, explores ways in which individuals might extend their 
intuition of that totality, which nevertheless is subject to the question of 
conditions. Whereas Spinoza had simply asserted a ‘third’ kind of 
metaphysical knowledge, Eliot insists that any such knowledge begins from 
the finite human subject. For Eliot, the Kantian categories are given through 
other people and through aesthetic experience, so on the one hand she is 
asking along with Kant how the Absolute is given or apprehended, but at the 
same time along with Spinoza she is affirming the ethical value of that striving 
to intuit the Absolute. However, rather than negotiate between these positions 
through philosophy, George Eliot explores the possibilities for a reconciliation 
through narrative. This is where she draws upon the rich resources of the 
Aristotelian tradition, where ethics and philosophy are primarily forms of life 
and practice, rather than abstract argument and theoretical dispute.
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II
Bondage, Acquiescence, and Blessedness: Spinoza’s Three Kinds of Knowledge and 
S c e n e s  o f  C l e r i c a l  L i f e
As we have seen, at the heart o f Spinoza’s Tractatus is the philosophical
problem of the multitude. In formulating his political program, Spinoza
assumes that there will always be a multitude, since it would be unrealistic to
think that a majority of people could reach the second kind of knowledge—
reason— let alone the esoteric third kind, reserved for a few rare individuals;
those chosen few who can achieve that Spinozistic transmutation of the soul,
an equipoise which is a oneness with Substance, or God.
Early in 1860, George Eliot, who had gained almost overnight fame
owing to the reception of Adam Bede, wrote to her publisher in connection
with the issue of a ‘cheaper edition’ of the Scenes'.
I am very anxious that the ‘Scenes of Clerical Life’ should have 
every chance of impressing the public with its existence: first, 
because I think it of importance to the estimate of me as a writer 
that ‘Adam Bede’ should not be counted as my only book; and 
secondly, because there are ideas presented in these stories about 
which I care a good deal, and am not sure I can ever embody 
again. 1
Thomas Noble suggests that these ‘ideas’ are related to Eliot’s ‘doctrine 
of sympathy’.2 However, this doctrine is an important part of all her works, so 
it seems doubtful that she would suggest that she might not be able to embody 
these ideas again. Derek and Sybil Oldfield, while recognising that the Scenes 
emphasise the need for sympathy, attribute its dominant philosophical tone to 
the unique influence of Feuerbach.3 U. C. Knoepflmacher also finds the 
influence of Feuerbach profound in this early work, in which Eliot ‘wanted to
 ^ Letters, III, 240.
2 George E lio t’s ‘Scenes o f  Clerical L ife ’ (New Haven & London: Yale University Press,
1965), p. 55,
3 ‘Scenes o f  Clerical Life: The Diagram and the Picture’, in Barbara Hardy, ed., Critical 
Essays on George Eliot (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 1-18, p. 2. 1
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demolish the theological aspects of religion’, while regarding ‘this destruction
as necessary to advance her humanist fundamentals’ 4 Feuerbach was, of
course, a root-Spinozist—he regarded Spinoza as ‘the Moses of modern
freethinkers and materialists’5— so it is hardly surprising that the source of the
Scenes is often identified as The Essence o f  Christianity.^ There is more than
Feuerbachian religion-as-anthropology going on here, however.7 The
fundamental ‘ideas’ referred to in Eliot’s letter, I would suggest, are connected
with her vision of a universal religion, a true religion divorced of
anthropomorphism, but at the same time one that retains the mystical, esoteric
and semi-religious overtones which are related to a Spinozistic ideal of secular
salvation. This philosophical and political programme will need to reinterpret
the role of the clergy, and I should like to offer a reading which places the
principal clerical characters in the Scenes, respectively, broadly within the
realms of the three kinds o f knowledge which inform Spinoza’s schema.8
When introducing his prospective author, George Henry Lewes informed
John Blackwood that the Scenes
consist of tales and sketches illustrative of the actual life of our 
country clergy about a quarter of a century ago; but solely in its human and not at all in its theological aspect; the object being to do 
what has never yet been done in our Literature, for we have had
4 George E lio t’s Early Novels (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 
1968), p. 42.
5 Quoted in Yovel, Spinoza, II, 51.
6 Eliot’s translation o f this work appeared in 1854, but she did not finish translating the 
Ethics until February 19, 1856, only six months before she started to write ‘Amos Barton’. 
See Haight, p. 199. George Henry Lewes wrote the entry on Spinoza in the Penny 
Cyclopedia fo r  the Diffusion o f  Useful Knowledge { \M 2) ,  and a major article on Spinoza’s 
Life and Works’ in the Westminster Review  the following year. His Biographical H istory o f  
Philosophy was published in a revised edition in 1857, so he must have been revising the 
work as Eliot started the Scenes.
7 Dorothy J. Atkins argues that Feuerbach, for example, posits an individual basis for ethics, 
whereas Spinoza ‘recognises a universal moral order on which human values may be 
based’. Further, Eliot was free to change from literature to philosophy, because through 
Spinoza, she was able to synthesise determinism with freedom and a ‘doctrine for human 
morality’. George Eliot and Spinoza, pp. 12-13.
8 This reading was suggested by Dorothy J. Atkins, but not developed. See George Eliot 
and Spinoza, p. 1 6 4 .1 am not suggesting that Scenes o f  Clerical Life is an allegory, or that 
there is a direct schematic connection between the three clergymen and Spinoza’s three 
kinds o f knowledge. However, a reading informed by Spinoza’s epistemology may be 
instructive, and help address some problems o f  the interpretation o f  Eliot’s philosophical 
and religious position.
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abundant religious stories polemical and doctrinal, but since the 
‘Vicar’ and Miss Austen, no stories representing the clergy like any 
other class with the humours, sorrows, and troubles of other men.He begged me particularly to add that—as the specimen sent will 
sufficiently prove—the tone throughout will be sympathetic and 
not at all antagonistic.^
Eliot in the Scenes is promulgating a purified religion, based on certain key
nuclear concepts of human solidarity, and which seeks to use constructively
the hold that religious doctrine has on the multitude. This universal religion is
made more incarnate in the later novels, and in particular Silas Marner, but
the groundwork for it is apparent in the Scenes. In 1853, Eliot told Charles
Bray: ‘Heaven help us! said the old religions—the new one, from its very lack
of that faith, will teach us all the more to help one another.’10 The Scenes
represent both a critique of, and a reformulation of the traditional role of the
clergy, and the interaction of the three clergymen with their respective
communities allows Eliot to lay the groundwork for the constructive
hermeneutic exercise which characterises her first full length novel, Adam
Bede. But it is in what F. R. Leavis calls the ‘prentice-work’H of the Scenes,
that Eliot can feel free to embody so concretely certain philosophical ideas
even at the expense of artistic coherence. 12
The series starts with the story of Amos Barton, who is representative of
the domain of the multitude and the inadequate and confused ideas of the first
kind of knowledge. We then proceed to Mr Gilfil, who, through a painful
process of tragedy, comes to the acquiescent state of the second kind of
knowledge, which relies on clear and distinct ideas, and who represents the
ideal type of clergyman, whose flock by his encouragement act in an imitation
of reason, even though they are inspired by the dubious grounding of the first
9 Letters, II, 269.
19 Letters, II, 82.
11 Gordon Haight, ed., A Century o f  George Eliot Criticism  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1965), p. 238.
12 Henry James thought it ‘contains [ ...]  only a small number o f the germs o f her future 
power’. ‘Am os’, ‘is much the best’; ‘Gilfil’, ‘a failure’; and ‘Janet’ is unrealistic. Haight, 
ed., A Century o f  George Eliot Criticism, pp. 45-6.
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kind of knowledge. The narrative of his painful past also contains a searching 
critique of Kantianism, and by extension the dubious alliance between 
Christianity and Kantianism which sought to use Kantianism as a focus for 
Christian apologetics.G This appropriation of Kantianism was achieved by 
superimposing a body of transcendent and externally motivated ethics on what 
was essentially a negative philosophy: Kant circumscribed the extent of our 
knowledge, and did not allow for anything more than intimations of a state 
beyond our ‘common plane of immanence’. 14 The series is finished by the 
portrait of the Reverend Edgar Try an, one of the rare individuals who reaches 
the ‘blessed’ state of the third kind of knowledge, an intuitive knowledge of 
the relations of cause and effect, which opens up the possibility of a truly 
secular salvation.
Eliot’s critique of anthropomorphism in the shape of the egoistic Amos 
Barton, her critique of Kantianism, and the backdrop of Spinozistic 
immanence can help us to define her humanism as one which rejects human 
finitude in favour of an intersubjective humanism which can extend beyond its 
worldly capacity. Kantianism insists that human knowledge is finite and does 
not extend to the noumenal, all such claims for ‘positive’ human knowledge 
being illegitimate and ‘metaphysical’. Eliot stresses the ability of immediate 
psychology to replace such human or finite authority, and rejects Kant’s 
postulation of the noumenal in favour of a reformulated Spinozism that 
translates the second and third kinds o f knowledge into a language of feeling 
and sympathy.
Mr Barton
‘The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton’ opens with the image 
of Shepperton church, which ‘was a very different-looking building five-and-
13 See above, chapter one, for a discussion o f the Pantheismusstreit.
14 This phrase is D eleuze’s. See his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), p. 122.
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twenty years ago’.15 The narrator ‘recall[s] with a fond sadness Shepperton 
Church as it was in the old days’ (42), where ‘the innovation of hymn-books 
was as yet undreamed o f , and ‘even the New Version was regarded with a 
melancholy tolerance’ (43).
The importance of custom and tradition for Eliot cannot be 
overestimated. In the summer of 1856, not long before she started the Scenes, 
Eliot, in a long review of Riehl’s Land und Leute, shows her sympathy with 
his conservatism in respect of his wishing to retain the customs and traditions 
of the peasant class, which she regards as a class analogous ‘in mental culture 
and habits, with that of the English farmers who were beginning to be thought 
old-fashioned nearly fifty years ago’, together with ‘farm seiwants and 
labou re rs’.16 To the collective consciousness of this class, ‘law presents itself 
as “the custom of the county”, and it is his pride to be versed in all customs. 
Custom with him holds the place o f  sentiment, o f  theory, and in many cases o f  
affection'
Mr Amos is immediately contrasted unfavourably with ‘Mr Gilfil, an 
excellent old gentleman, who smoked very long pipes and preached very short 
sermons’. Mr Gilfil is, of course, the subject of the next Scene, but his merits 
are immediately juxtaposed against Barton’s demerits. Barton is ‘quite another 
sort of clergyman’ (43), who breaks with tradition and custom with his plan to 
rebuild Shepperton Church, with his disruption of the arrangements for the 
music at the services, and his doctrinal and exegetical excursions. It is 
significant that we are introduced to Barton by virtue of our ‘eavesdropping’ 
on a conversation about him by some of his parishioners. Mrs Patten— a 
survivor from the retrospective ‘Mr Gilfil’s Love Story’—articulates the 
alienation and loss of community associated with Barton’s curacy:
15 Scenes o f  Clerical Life, ed. by David Lodge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 41. 
Hereafter page nos. are cited in the text.
16 ‘The Natural History o f  German L ife’, m Essays o f  George Eliot, ed. by Thomas Pinney 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 266-99, p. 274. Hereafter referred to as Essays.
Essays, p. 279.
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‘Eh, dear’, said Mrs Patten, falling back in her chair, and lifting up 
her little withered hands, ‘what ’ud Mr Gilfil say, if he was worthy 
to know the changes as have come about i ’ the Church these last 
ten years? I don’t understand these new sort o’ doctrines. When Mr 
Barton comes to see me, he talks about nothing but my sins and my 
need o ’ marcy. Now, Mr Hackit, I ’ve never been a sinner. From the 
fust beginning, when I went into service, I al’ys did my duty by my 
emplyers. I was a good wife as any in the county—never 
aggravated my husband, [...] If  I ’m not to be saved, I know a many 
as are in a bad way. But it’s well for me as I can’t go to church any 
longer, for if th’ old singers are to be done away with, there’ll be 
nothing left as it was in Mr Patten’s time; and what’s more, I hear 
you’ve settled to pull the church down and build it up new?’ (48)
Barton’s preoccupation with doctrine and exegesis is totally out of
harmony with the needs of the community. He is the wrong type of clergyman
to guide the multitude constructively into an imitation of reason which will
make for social cohesion and help avoid disintegration. The community is rife
with gossip and calumny, which are two of the insidious and debilitating
elements of the first kind of knowledge, and which characterise the level of
apprehension of the multitude. Indeed, Barton is no different from his
parishioners in this respect: for all his university education, he is just as much
influenced by the vicissitudes of public opinion, as the scandal with the
Countess demonstrates.
As Eliot stated in her exposition of Riehl’s views, any ‘system which
disregards the traditions and hereditary attachments o f the peasant, and
appeals only to a logical understanding which is not yet developed in him, is
simply disintegrating and ruinous to the peasant character’ (my italics). 18
Barton’s appeals to logic are ineffective, as the workhouse scene illustrates.
We are reminded that:
to have any chance of success, short of miraculous intervention, he 
must bring his geographical, chronological, exegetical mind pretty 
nearly to the pauper point o f view, or of no view; he must have 
some approximate conception of the mode in which the doctrines 
that have so much vitality in the plenum of his own brain will 
comport themselves in vacuo—that is to say, in a brain that is 
neither geographical, chronological, nor exegetical. It is a flexible
18 Essays, p. 282.
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imagination that can take such a leap as that, and an adroit tongue 
that can adapt its speech to so unfamiliar a position. The Rev.
Amos Barton had neither that flexible imagination, nor that adroit 
tongue (63).
Barton goes beyond the fundamental concepts of justice, mutual help and 
solidarity, and invokes transcendent and supernatural images (not to mention 
faulty syllogisms) which are not conducive to a reshaping of the pauper 
mentality. Barton reveals himself to be as materially and spiritually 
impoverished as his parishioners:
‘Do you like being beaten?’
‘No-a’.‘Then what a silly boy you are to be naughty. If  you were not 
naughty, you wouldn’t be beaten. But if you are naughty, God will 
be angry, as well as Mr Spratt; and God can bum you for ever. That 
will be worse than being beaten’.Master Podge’s countenance was neither affirmative nor negative 
of this proposition.
‘But’, continued Mr Barton, ‘if you will be a good boy, God will 
love you, and you will grow up to be a good man.’ (65)
Barton, for all his having ‘gone through the Eleusinian mysteries of a
university education’ (59), is firmly part of the climate of inadequate ideas
which characterises the multitude in its reliance on the first kind of
know ledge. 19 This first kind of knowledge can take many forms, some of
which can facilitate social cohesion by encouraging the multitude to act in an
imitation of reason, which we shall see in relation to ‘Mr Gilfil’s Love Story’.
Barton is not qualified for the second kind of knowledge—reason—which
relies on clear and distinct ideas; Barton is even more confused than his
parishioners. He simply adds to the inconstancy and confusion with his
incoherent doctrines, part Tractarian, part Low Church,20 which Eliot seeks to
satirise and demythologise. Barton, as Mr Bond observes, is ‘too high learnt to
have much common-sense’ (85), while Mr Cleves ‘is the true parish priest, the
19 Yovel describes ‘two sorts o f  multitude: the crude and the educated’. Spinoza envisaged 
the latter group ‘both as a target in itself and as the medium by which reformed ideas should 
eventually reach the uneducated multitude’. Spinoza, I, 136-37.
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pastor beloved, consulted, relied on by his flock; a clergyman who is not
associated with the undertaker’, one who
has the wonderful art of preaching sermons which the wheelwright 
and the blacksmith can understand; not because he talks 
condescending twaddle, but because he can call a spade a spade, 
and knows how to disencumber ideas of their wordy frippery (93).
But Cleves is no less educated than Barton; indeed, at the monthly
Clerical Meeting, ‘he is perhaps the best Grecian of the party’(94). Barton’s
education is superficial, and not socially useful: he has ‘a natural incapacity
for teaching’; he is able to carry the ‘the pauper imagination to the dough-tub,
but was not able to carry it upwards from that well-known object to the
unknown truths which it was intended to shadow forth’(63).
It is significant that Cleves cultivates his own land, while Barton does
not. Mr Cleves is a man of the people, in tune with their needs, who ‘gets
together the working men in the parish on a Monday evening and gives them a
sort of conversational lecture on useful practical matters’(93-4). In the article
on Riehl, one is again reminded of the treatment of Barton:
Another questionable plan for elevating the peasant, is the supposed elevation of the clerical character by preventing the 
clergyman from cultivating more than a trifling part of the land 
attached to his benefice; that he may be as much as possible of a 
scientific theologian, and as little as possible of a peasant.21
Far from being an elevated personage in Eliot’s estimation. Barton is no
more than a Philistine, in what in the same article, is one of the earlier uses in
English of the term.22 In fact, Eliot gives the term a ‘wider meaning’ than
Riehl admits:
We imagine the Philister is the personification of the spirit which 
judges everything from a lower point of view than the subject 
demands—which judges the affairs of the parish from the egotistic 
or purely personal point of view—which judges the affairs of the
29 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 47.
21 Essays, p. 282.
22 Essays, p. 296 and note.
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nation from the parochial point of view, and does not hesitate to 
measure the merits of the universe from the human point of view.23
Barton is representative o f this type. He interprets everything according
to expediency and in terms of his advancement. He fails to see that in her
extended stay at the Vicarage, the Countess is manipulating him, even though
he is aware ‘of the strong disapprobation it drew on him, and the change of
feeling towards him it was producing in his kindest parishioners’. Barton ‘still
believed in the Countess as a charming and influential woman’ (98),
notwithstanding the strain on his finances, and the consequent effect on the
health of Milly, his own ‘Angel in the House’, whose death, ironically, partly
humanises him.24
The poet Edward Young is afforded very similar treatment to that meted 
out to Amos Barton, in an essay which Eliot started in April 1856, but was not 
able to finish until the following December, after the completion of ‘Amos 
Barton’.25 u . C. Knoepflmacher observes that both Young and Barton ‘are 
incapable of reconciling the worldliness of their personal ambitions with the 
otherworldliness of their professed religious teachings’.26 Although Eliot is 
more heavy-handed in respect o f Young, whose ‘Night Thoughts’ to her 
showed ‘the reflex of a mind in which the higher human sympathies were 
inactive’,27 both clergymen are not representatives of true religion, but of 
‘egoism turned heavenward’.28 Both men, by virtue of their ‘adherence to 
abstractions’, and their ‘want of genuine emotion’, are lacking in the 
sensibilities which will respond to the ‘details of ordinary life’.29 a  passage 
omitted in the 1884 version of this article deals with what Eliot refers to as
23 Essays, p. 297
24 For an interesting discussion o f  the deathbed scene in ‘Amos Barton’ and other Victorian 
novels, see Walter E. Houghton’s The Victorian Frame o f  M ind  (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press, 1957), p. 277 and note.
25 ‘Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young’, Essays, 335-85.
26 George Eliot's Early Novels, p. 4L
27 Essays, p. 358.
28 Essays, p. 378.
29 Essays, p. 371.
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‘the true source of the emotion’, and also corresponds with Spinoza’s
epistemological scheme:
Wherever abstractions appear to excite strong emotion, this occurs 
in men of active intellect and imagination, in whom the abstract 
term rapidly and vividly calls up the particulars it represents, these 
particulars being the true source of the emotion; and such men, if 
they wish to express their feeling, would be infallibly prompted to 
the presentation of details. Strong emotion can no more be directed 
to generalities apart from particulars, than can skill in figures can 
be directed to arithmetic apart from numbers. Generalities are the 
refuge at once of deficient intellectual activity and deficient
feeling.39
Just like Mr Ely, whose speech to Mr Pilgrim ‘was a generality which
represented no particulars to his mind’ (50), Barton’s sermons deal with these
abstractions, and do not have— in a Spinozistic sense— a ‘constructive
hermeneutical function’,31 tending merely to disabuse the multitude from their
beliefs that they have previously held on the basis of authority. Barton is a
representative of the historical religion with which Eliot wishes to take issue,
and his doctrinal excursions do more harm than good:
The sermon in question, by the by, was an extremely argumentative 
one on the Incarnation; which, as it was preached to a congregation 
not one of whom had any doubt of that doctrine, and to whom the 
Socinians therein confuted were as unknown as the Arimaspians, 
was exceedingly well adapted to trouble and confuse the 
Sheppertonian mind. (73)
Eliot had made an earlier attack in a similar vein on the writings of the 
Evangelical preacher. Dr Gumming. According to Eliot:
39 Essays, p. 381. It is interesting that Eliot uses the term ‘active’. Spinoza uses the terms 
‘passive’ and ‘active’ to characterise those who respectively are in bondage to, and 
comparatively resistant to the effect o f  external modes. The former group is typically the 
multitude who are determined by these external modes; the latter groups are representative 
o f the second and third types o f  knowledge, and are ‘free’, or ‘active’, in so far as they are 
5e^determined. Those in the realm o f  the first kind o f knowledge only have recourse to 
generalities; those in the realm o f  the second kind may deduce from generalities to 
particulars; while those rare individuals who reach the third kind o f  knowledge have an 
intuitive grasp o f  particulars without the need to infer from generalities. We may also note 
in passing that this is evidence which is in tension with Peter Jones’s dismissal, in 
Philosophy and the Novel, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 51, o f Spinoza as a major 
influence on Eliot. Charles W esley Schaefer points out that Jones is ‘thinking o f  Spinoza 
solely as a metaphysician and forgetting Spinoza the ethicist’. 'M iddlemarch  Sub-Species: 
An Ethical Study o f Mr Casaubon’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, State University o f  N ew  York 
at Binghampton, 1988).
31 This phrase is Y ovel’s. See Spinoza, I, 145.
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Dr Gumming’s Ghristian pays his debts for the glory of God; were 
it not for the coercion of that supreme motive, it would be evil to 
pay them. A man is not to be just from a feeling of injustice; he is not to help his fellow men out of good-will to his fellow men; he is 
not to be a tender husband and father out of affection; all these 
natural muscles and fibers are to be torn away and replaced by a 
patent steel-spring—anxiety for the ‘glory of God’.32
‘Happily’, for Eliot,
the constitution of human nature forbids the complete prevalence of 
such a theory. Fatally powerful as religious systems have been, 
human nature is stronger and wider than religious systems, and 
though d o ^ a s  may hamper, they can not absolutely repress its 
growth: build walls round the living tree as you will, the bricks and 
mortar have by and bye to give way before the slow and sure 
operation of the sap. But next to that hatred of the enemies of God 
which is the principle of persecution, there perhaps has been no perversion more obstructive of true moral development than this 
substitution of a reference to the Glory of God for the direct 
promptings of the sympathetic f e e l i n g s . 33
Similarly, Barton’s theology is religion peiwerted; but while Eliot seeks
to criticise its transcendent aspect, she, following Spinoza, is aware of its
powerful influence on minds capable of vacillation. Barton’s is one such
mind: ‘He would march very determinedly along the road he thought best; but
then it was wonderfully easy to convince him which was the right road’ (67).
Still, Eliot’s publisher thought the characterisation of Barton was too harsh:
I hate anything like a sneer at real religious feeling as cordially as I 
despise anything like cant, and I should think this author is of the 
same way of thinking although his clergymen with one exception 
are not very attractive specimens of the body. The revulsion of 
feeling towards poor Amos is capitally drawn although the asinine 
stupidity of his conduct about the Gountess had disposed one to 
kick him.34
There certainly is a sneer at Barton, but precisely because he lacks the ‘real 
religious feeling’ present in other more exceptional clergymen. As U. G, 
Knoepflmacher obseiwes. Barton’s ‘supernatural religion’, and his ‘doctrines 
about salvation obstruct his efforts to ease the burdens of the p r e s e n t ’ .3 5
32 ‘Evangelical Teaching: Dr Gumming’, Essays, 158-89, p. 187.
33 Essays, p. 187.
34 Letters, II, 272.
35 George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 48.
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Perhaps in response to her editor’s remonstrations, the Epilogue has a 
chastened and autumnal tone, which underlines a degree of narrative 
sympathy for Barton. His tragic situation is heightened in that he seems to 
have a sense of what lies beyond the multitude, but is unable to progi'ess 
beyond that level of understanding. Mr Barton does not transcend his worldly 
fmitude, but he uses a language of transcendence as though he had, with the 
result that his ‘ideas’ divorce him—literally and metaphorically— from the 
community. Perhaps that is the real tragedy of his situation.
Mr Gilfil
When old Mr Gilfil died, thirty years ago, there was general sorrow 
in Shepperton; and if black cloth had not been hung round the 
pulpit and reading-desk, by order o f his nephew and principal legatee, the parishioners would certainly have subscribed the 
necessary sum out of their own pockets, rather than allow such a 
tribute of respect to be wanting (119).
Mr Gilfil enjoyed this respect because he represented the true parish priest;
one who, unlike Mr Barton, preached sermons which
made no unreasonable demand on the Shepperton in te llec t- amounting, indeed, to little more than an expansion of the concise 
thesis, that those who do wrong will find it the worse for them, and 
those who do well will find it the better for them; the nature of 
wrong-doing being exposed in special sermons against lying, 
backbiting, anger, slothfulness, and the like; and well-doing being 
interpreted as honesty, truthfhlness, charity, industry, and other 
common virtues, lying quite on the surface of life, and having very 
little to do with deep spiritual doctrine (126).
Indeed, at this time in the religious history of Shepperton, ‘to find fault 
with the sermon was regarded as almost equivalent to finding fault with 
religion itself (126). It is also suggested that the parishioners were ‘perhaps 
almost as much the better for this simple weekly tribute to what they knew of 
good and right, as many a more wakeful and critical congregation of the 
present day’ (122). Gilfil is a man of the people, and it is pointed out that ‘a 
superficial observer might have seen little difference, beyond his superior 
shrewdness, between the Vicar and his bucolic parishioners’. In contrast to the 
egoistic and anthropomorphic Barton, Gilfil speaks the language of the
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multitude; he has a ‘constructive hermeneutical function’, ‘for it was his habit 
to approximate his accent and mode of speech to theirs’ (125). In terms of 
Spinoza’s political and religious programme, Gilfil represents the ideal 
clergyman, one who by promulgating nuclear doctrines of justice and 
solidarity, encourages the multitude to act in an imitation of the dictates of 
reason, which in turn helps to achieve social cohesion, and to pave the way for 
the purification of r e l i g i o n . 3 6  This universal religion will be divorced of its 
historical antecedents and theological baggage; it will be a true religion, with 
one brand of piety for the multitude, and another for those who use as their 
common currency the adequate ideas which characterise the realms of the 
second and third kinds of knowledge. Thus the rhetorical and metaphorical 
aspects take on great importance, and in the case of sermons, it is form, as 
much as content, which is significant. Even young Master Stokes, ‘a flippant 
town youth’ (126), was able to write a sermon ‘so astonishingly like a sermon, 
having a text, three divisions, and a concluding exhortation beginning “And 
now, my brethren”’(127). The multitude is still subservient to authority, and is 
‘perfectly aware of the distinction between them and the parson, and had not 
at all the less belief in him as a gentleman and a clergyman for his easy speech 
and familiar manners’. However, they are still in bondage to the inadequate 
ideas of the first kind of knowledge, and have metaphysical and theological 
notions which realistically cannot be expunged from their collective 
imagination:
The benefits of baptism were supposed to be somehow bound up 
with Mr Gilfil’s personality, so metaphysical a distinction as that 
between a man and his office being, as yet, quite foreign to the 
mind of a good Shepperton Churchman, savouring, he would have 
thought, of Dissent on the very face of it. (125)
However, according to Spinoza’s programme, while the multitude is 
acting in an imitation of the behaviour of those, like Gilfil, who rely on 
reason, this will be used constructively, and they will not be disabused of their
36 Yovel, Spinoza, I, 130.
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inadequate ideas. While it is to be hoped that some of these purified ideas will 
filter down to the realm of the imaginato, and enable some members to live 
according to the dictates of reason, it is enough for the multitude (which by 
definition will always exist) to live in an approximation of these dictates, even 
though the dubious grounding of their apprehensions is the first kind of 
knowledge.
After this introductory chapter, we proceed back in time to the Cheverel
Manor of 1788, presided over by the pre-Romantic figure o f Sir Christopher
Cheverel. These retrospective chapters are in part a searching critique of
Kantianism. The particular focus of Eliot’s attention seems to be Kant’s
Critique o f  Judgement, which sought to apply something of the ‘universality’
of the categorical imperative to aesthetics, and making use of the sublime, to
suggest further that we can gain intimations of a transcendent realm, ‘on the
mere recommendation of a pure practical reason that legislates for itself
alone’. Although Kant admits ‘that such a disposition of the mind is but a rare
occurrence’, he insists that
the source of this disposition is unmistakable. It is the original moral bent of our nature, as a subjective principal, that will not let 
us be satisfied, in our review of the world, with the finality which it 
derives through natural causes, but lead us to introduce into it an 
underlying supreme Cause governing nature according to moral 
l a w s . 3 7
Accordingly, the narrator uses the discourse of art criticism to underline 
the sterility and artificiality of this historical moment which marks the end of 
classicism:
And a charming picture Cheverel Manor would have made that 
evening, if some English Watteau had been there to paint it: the 
castellated house of grey-tinted stone, with the flickering sunbeams 
sending dashes of golden light across the many-shaped panes in the 
mullioned windows, and a great beech leaning athwart one of the 
flanking towers, and breaking, with its dark flattened boughs, the 
too formal symmetry of the front (133).
37 Critique o f  Judgement, Part I, Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgement, trans. by James Creed 
Meredith (London: Oxford University Press, 1911), p. 51; Critique o f  Judgement, II, 113.
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The description of the dining room has resonances of a Kantian
aesthetic, with the latter’s emphasis on the pure frame of the work of art which
delineates it from any function of use. It was
less like a place to dine in than a piece o f  space enclosed simply for  the sake o f beautiful outline; and the small dining-table, with the 
party round it, seemed an odd and insignificant accident, rather 
than anything connected with the original purpose of the apartment 
(my italics, 134).
In her essay ‘The Natural History of German Life’, Eliot remarks on the
‘falsification’ of art in a discussion of realism, which points to her sympathy
with the Dutch school o f genre painting, and a Wordsworthian concern for
‘the extension of our sympathies’:
This perversion is not the less fatal because the misrepresentation 
which gives rise to it has what the artist considers a moral end. The 
thing for mankind to know is, not what are the motives and 
influences which the moralist thinks ought to act on the labourer or 
the artisan, but what are the motives and influences which do act on 
him.3^
This dismissal of the categorical imperative (or ought) is followed by a
little observed criticism of Dickens, who is characterised as a ‘great novelist’
in respect of his descriptions of the ‘external traits’ of his characters, but seen
as deficient in his being unable to ‘give us their psychological character’.
When he does attempt a move into the psychological realm, he becomes ‘as
transcendent in his unreality as he was a moment before in his artistic
truthfulness’.39 Eliot also levels this type of charge at writers of the ‘oracular’
species in her article ‘Silly Novels by Lady Novelists’, which was completed
shortly before she commenced writing the Scenes. Eliot observes that
the ability of a lady novelist to describe actual life and her fellow- 
men, is in inverse proportion to her confident eloquence about God 
and the other world, and the means by which she chooses to 
conduct you to true ideas of the invisible is a totally false picture of 
the visible.40
38 Essays, p. 271.
39 Essays, p. 27,1.
'^ 9 Essays, p. 311.
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We can also note an oblique attack on Kantianism in Eliot’s discussion
of the ‘ mind-and-millinery ’ species of writers:
Lady novelists, it appears, can see something else besides matter; 
they are not limited to phenomena, but can relieve their eyesight by 
occasional glimpses of the noumenon, and are, therefore, naturally 
better able than any one else to confound sceptics, even of that 
remarkable, but to us unknown school, which maintains that the 
soul of man is of the same texture as the polypus
Eliot herself was charged with ‘unreality’ in respect of her 
characterisation of Sir Christopher and Lady Cheverei, who, according to a 
contemporary reviewer, ‘strike us as old acquaintances whom we have known 
not in real life, but in books’,42 i would suggest that several of the characters 
in this story are ‘unrealistic’, simply because they are in the first instance 
philosophical vehicles, rather than fully realised characters.43
Sir Christopher Cheverei represents the Kantian concept o f a good will, 
which
is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its 
aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by 
virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by 
itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought 
about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum-total 
of all inclinations.44
41 Essays, p. 310. Eliot’s views on Kant and Kantianism were probably influenced by 
George Henry Lewes, whose Biographical History o f  Philosophy 'WdiS published in a revised 
edition in 1857. He must have been revising the work as Eliot started Scenes. Lewes (at 
this stage, at any rate) was a thorough-going empiricist, and claimed that because 
experience is ‘the source o f all ideas’, and a priori ideas non-existent, ‘Scepticism is 
inevitable’. He claims that ‘the veracity o f Consciousness, which he [Kant] had so 
laboriously striven to establish, and on which his Practical Reason was based, is only a 
relative, subjective veracity. Experience is the only basis o f  Knowledge: and Experience 
leads to Scepticism’. Biographical History o f  Philosophy, p. 565.
42 Quarterly Review  108 (October 1860), 469-99, p. 478.
43 Thomas A. Noble argues that Eliot’s depiction o f  Cheverei Manor is not realistic, 
because it does not issue from experience, and that her characterisations o f  Sir Christopher, 
Lady Cheverei, Miss Assher, and Captain Wybrow reflect a ‘lack o f  familiarity with her 
material’. He notices ‘the painted backdrop, the flat crowded surface which reminds one o f  
certain Pre-Raphaelite paintings, which share with this description the mid-nineteenth 
century predilection for meticulously detailed representation’. George E lio t’s ‘Scenes o f  
Clerical L ife’, p. 127. In criticising Eliot on artistic grounds,Noble fails to appreciate that 
the representation o f  Cheverei Manor, and the characterisation o f  some o f  her characters in 
this fashion, is a conscious decision to give form to her philosophical ideas.
44 Fundamental Principles o f  the M etaphysic o f  Ethics, trans. by T. K. Abbott (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), p. 11.
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Sir Christopher has an ‘inflexibility of will’, but also ‘some of that
sublime spirit which distinguishes art from luxury, and worships beauty apart
from self-indulgence’ (159). In Kantian fashion, he has a pure aesthetic, free
from all determination and interest. He demonstrates his Kantian detachment
and rational adherence to a law for its own sake as he dismisses the entreaties
of the widow Mrs Hartropp: “ But it is useless to talk arid cry. I have good
reasons for my plans, and never alter them” (139). In fact, Sir Christopher
‘had gone through life a little flushed with the power of his will’ (167), and
does not see why his plan for the marriage of Captain Wybrow and Miss
Assher should not come to fruition:
‘Yes Maynard’, said Sir Chiistopher, chatting with Mr Gilfil in the 
library, ‘it really is a remarkable thing that I never in my life laid a plan, and failed to carry it out. I lay my plans well, and I never 
swerve from them—that’s it. A strong will is the only magic’.
(213)
Sir Christopher’s plans seem to have the authority and absoluteness of 
the Kantian formulation of the autonomous will:
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to 
itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The 
principle of autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same 
volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal 
law.45
For Kant, the rational man as ‘legislator’, achieves ‘a certain dignity and 
sublimity’, and is able to perform actions which have ‘a moral worth’. The 
autonomous will is the starting point of all true morality:
Morality, then, is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the 
will, that is, to the potential universal legislation by its maxims. An 
action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted; 
one that does not agree therewith is forbidden. A will whose 
maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy 
will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not absolutely 
good on the principal o f autonomy (moral necessitation) is 
obligation. This cannot be applied to the holy being. The objective 
necessity of actions from obligation is called dutyA^
45 Kant, Metaphysic, p. 71. Compare Barton, who shows a rule-following which is 
determined by external motivations rather than rational adherence to a law for its own sake.
46 Kant, Metaphysic, p. 70.
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Captain Wybrow, who also has a strong will (and a weak heart), is a
grotesque caricature of this Kantian concept of duty. It is his raison d'être, to
which all feeling must be subordinated:
‘Why do you push me away, Tina?’ said Captain Wybrow in a 
half-whisper; ‘are you angry with me for what a hard fate puts 
upon me? Would you have me cross my uncle.—who has done so 
much for us both—in his dearest wish? You know I have duties— 
we both have duties—before which feeling must be sacrificed’
(145).
Captain Wybrow ‘was a young man of calm passions, who was rarely led into 
any conduct of which he could not give a plausible account to him self. While 
nature ‘had given him an admirable figure, the whitest of hands, the most 
delicate of nostrils, and a large amount o f serene self-satisfaction’, she had 
also, on account of his weak heart, ‘guarded him fi*om the liability to a strong 
emotion’. He lacks genuine emotion and sympathy, this relation to self being 
characteristic of the Kantian doctrine of autonomy, which conflicts with 
Eliot’s intersubjective humanism, and which manifests itself in his 
unswerving devotion to his self-serving conception of duty:
Sir Christopher and Lady Cheverei thought him the best of 
nephews, the most satisfactory of heirs, full of grateful deference to 
themselves, and, above all things, guided by a sense of duty. 
Captain Wybrow always did the thing easiest and most agreeable to 
him from a sense of duty: he dressed expensively, because it was a duty he owed to his position; from a sense of duty he adapted 
himself to Sir Christopher’s inflexible will, which it would have 
been troublesome as well as useless to resist; and, being of a 
delicate constitution, he took care of his health from a sense of duty 
(164).
Indeed, Captain Wybrow is only too willing to submit to Sir
Christopher’s will in the matter of his match with Miss Assher, ‘from a sense
of duty’ (165). And as Captain Wybrow becomes the accepted lover, and the
courtship commences. Sir Christopher
seemed every day more radiant. Accustomed to view people who 
entered into his plans by the pleasant light which his own strong 
will and bright hopefulness were always casting on the future, he 
saw nothing but personal charms and promising domestic qualities
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in Miss Assher, whose quickness of eye and taste in externals 
formed a real ground of sympathy between her and Sir Christopher 
(193).
Sir Christopher’s acknowledgement of Miss Assher is dominated by the 
aesthetic rather than the ethical, the aesthetic for Kant being a detachment 
from purposiveness and sympathy, and hence the irony of the false sympathy 
between them.
This story also has an hermeneutic aspect: Sir Christopher and Captain 
Wybrow cannot read and understand people. They simply look for externals, 
and are as sterile as the ‘picture’ of the manor itself. Miss Assher is described 
as though she were a painting; she ‘produced an impression of splendid 
beauty’. Her dress was ‘relieved here and there by jet ornaments, gave the 
fullest effect to her complexion. [...] The first coup d'œil was dazzling’ (169). 
Caterina, in contrast, is described in natural images (she doesn’t wear 
powder!), usually assoeiated with animals.47 To . Sir Christopher she is ‘a 
clever black-eyed monkey’ (143); to Captain Wybrow she is his ‘little 
singing-bird’ (146); and at times of crisis she is ‘a poor wounded leveret’ 
(184). Caterina is unable to master her feelings, whieh issue forth in 
‘ungovernable impulses’ (198). She is one of those ‘emotional natures whose 
thoughts are no more than the fleeting shadows cast by feeling’ (185). The 
only times when she ceases to be in bondage to this ‘conflict of emotions’ 
(169) is when she sings, which is when she is able to enter ‘one of those 
moods of self-possession and indifference which come as the ebb-tide 
between the struggles of passion’ (168). When she sings, she breaks free of 
the constraints of external modes, and becomes ‘active’ in the Spinozistic 
sense; that is, she has a glimpse of the freedom that comes with self- 
determination, and recovers some sort of equilibrium in the face of life’s 
vicissitudes:
47 See Barbara Hardy, The Novels o f  George Eliot (London: The Athlone Press, 1959), pp. 
202-204.
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And her singing—the one thing in which she ceased to be passive, 
and became prominent—lost none of its energy. She herself 
sometimes wondered how it was that, whether she felt sad or angry, 
crushed with the sense of Anthony’s indifference, or burning with 
impatience under Miss Assher’s attentions, it was always a relief to 
her to sing. (195)48
Miss Assher, significantly, has ‘no ear’, and even though she claims to 
like music, is more interested in style than substance:
‘O, I assure you, 1 doat on it; and Anthony is so fond of it; it would 
be so delightful if 1 could play and sing to him; though he says he 
likes me best not to sing, because it doesn’t belong to his idea of 
me. What style of music do you like best?’ (172)
Similarly, Anthony, ‘whose perceptions were not acute enough for him to
notice the difference of a semitone’ (171), is in diametric opposition to the
elemental and sensual world of Caterina. Caterina has an ‘unconscious beauty’
(133), and is associated with the seasons, with the ebb and flow of nature,
which carries on in its course in this determined world:
The inexorable ticking of the clock is like the throb of pain to 
sensations made keen by a sickening fear. And so it is with the 
great clockwork of nature. Daisies and buttercups give way to the 
brown waving grasses, tinged with the warm red sorrel; the waving 
grasses are swept away, and the meadows lie like emeralds set in 
the bushy hedgerows; the tawny-tipped corn begins to bow with the weight of the full ear; the reapers are bending amongst it, and it 
soon stands in sheaves; then, presently, the patches of yellow 
stubble lie side by side with streaks of dark-red earth, which the 
plough is turning up in preparation for the new-thrashed seed. And 
this passage from beauty to beauty, which to the happy is like the 
flow of a melody, measures for many a human heart the approach 
of foreseen anguish—seems hurrying on the moment when the 
shadow of dread will be followed up by the reality of despair (165).
In the middle of this dichotomy of will and feeling, and somewhat open
to attack from both sides, stands Mr Gilfil, himself in love with Caterina. But
Gilfil, in contrast with Sir Christopher and Captain Wybrow, can read and
understand people. He ‘did not deceive himself in his inteipretation of
Caterina’s feelings’ (162). Gilfil can master his feelings, and control his
passions, so that they become, in a Spinozistic sense, genuine emotions. His
48 Hence the importance o f  art in its immediate impassioned experience, and not in Kantian 
aesthetic detachment.
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intersubjective sensibility is in direct opposition both to Sir Christopher’s 
‘autonomy’, Captain Wybrow’s lack of genuine emotion, and to the egoism 
displayed by Barton in the previous story. When he comes to tell Caterina that 
the situation between her and Captain Wybrow ‘may lead to very bad 
consequences’ (190), he shows that he understands the relations of cause and 
effect that constitute the web on which their lives are spun. He appears to 
understand that for the sake of social cohesion he must encourage Caterina to 
follow the dictates of reason, even though her inspiration to follow these 
dictates might be grounded in the first kind of knowledge, her sense of wrong, 
for example, being ‘rather instinctive than reflective’ (198). Even though he 
feels for Caterina in her torment, he also realises the effects such ruptures 
would have on the community of the manor: ‘Remember, I entreat you, that 
the peace of the whole family depends on your power of governing yourself 
(191).
Gilfil’s prescriptions are grounded in his understanding and reason, and 
on the ‘adequate’ ideas of the second kind of knowledge; Captain Wybrow, 
who gives Caterina similar advice (‘My dear Caterina, let me beg of you to 
exercise more control of your feelings’ [197]), does so because her behaviour 
impinges on his own plans and ends. Lady Cheveral, who, significantly, only 
notices the ‘slight outward changes’ of Caterina’s physiognomy, gives her 
‘Tillotson’s Sermons’. This volume, by a representative of the historical 
religion which Eliot is trying to reformulate is, as a ‘means of edification’, 
singularly inappropriate: ‘Excellent medicine for the mind are the good 
Archbishop’s sermons, but a medicine, unhappily, not suited to Tina’s case’ 
(195). She has the added inconvenience of missing Gilfil’s sermon, which is 
pronounced ‘excellent’ by Lady Assher. Gilfil fulfils his hermeneutic task: to 
speak to the multitude in their own language, so that they may absorb certain 
nuclear doctrines which make for social cohesion, while at the same time 
reshaping the realm of the imaginato so that these purified ideas will be
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assimilated, and for some, to be observed on the grounding of reason and not 
authority. However, while Lady Assher is certainly conducive to part of 
GilfiLs hermeneutic project, it seems doubtful that she will ever reach his 
level on the epistemological scale:
‘But I wish you could have heard the sermon this morning. Such an 
excellent sermon! It was about the ten virgins: five of them were 
foolish, and five were clever, you know; and Mr Gilfil explained all 
that. What a very pleasant young man he is! so very quiet and 
agreeable, and such a good hand at whisf (197).
Even at Gilfil’s darkest hour, when he fears for Caterina’s life, he still 
thinks ‘of the sad consequences for others as well as him self (223). His 
‘human’ ministrations, and ‘unspoken sympathy’ help to humanise Sir 
Christopher as he tries to cope with the tragedy: ‘The first tears he had shed 
since boyhood were for Anthony’ (224). We may note that while both men in 
this interview are using religious discourse, Sir Christopher’s use is 
theological, while Gilfil’s is rhetorical and metaphorical—they may speak in 
the same way, but Gilfil uses the language of transcendence to stress the 
immanence of our ethical realm:
At last the Baronet mastered himself enough to say, ‘I ’m very 
weak, Maynard— God help me! I didn’t think anything would 
unman me in this way; but I ’d built everything on this lad. Perhaps 
I ’ve been wrong in not forgiving my sister. She lost one of her sons 
a little while ago. I ’ve been too proud and obstinate’.
‘We can hardly learn humility and tenderness enough except 
by suffering’, said Maynard; ‘and God sees we are in need of 
suffering, for it is falling more and more heavily on us’ (224).
The realisation that the missing Caterina might indeed have loved
Anthony, and Gilfil’s revelations regarding the indelicacy of Captain
Wybrow’s behaviour towards Caterina, represent something of an epiphany
for Sir Christopher, who is drawn out of his Kantian detachment:
Sir Christopher relaxed his hold of Maynard’s arm, and looked 
away from him. He was silent for some minutes, evidently 
attempting to master himself, so as to be able to speak calmly.
‘I must see Henrietta immediately’, he said at last, with something 
of his old sharp decision; ‘she must know all; but we must keep it from every one else as far as possible. My dear boy’, he continued 
in a kinder tone, ‘the heaviest burthen has fallen on you. But we
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may find her yet; we must not despair: there has not been time 
enough for us to be certain. Poor dear little one! God help me! I 
thought I saw everything, and was stone-blind all the while’ (225).
Caterina, too, needs to be integrated into a common humanity—her pure
‘naturalism’ is seen to be just as inadequate as Sir Christopher’s pure
‘rationalism’. Again, Mr Gilfil uses religious language rhetorically and
metaphorically as he attempts to persuade Caterina that in ascribing blame to
herself over her putative intention to kill Wybrow, she is judging events from
a very limited perspective:
‘Tina, my loved one, you would never have done it. God saw your 
whole heart; He knows you would never harm a living thing. He 
watches over His children, and will not let them do things they 
would pray with their whole hearts not to do. It was the angry 
thought of a moment, and he forgives you’ (234).
Gilfil’s implicit position is close to Spinoza’s: that God, or Nature, is the 
only free cause, and everything that happens is an emanation from his divine 
nature, and could not have happened in any other way.49 We are free in so far 
as we are self-determined, ‘active’ individuals who are able to master the 
passions, and tap the source of genuine emotion.50 Tina herself locates the 
cause of her misery: she ‘was so full of bad passions’ (234). Gilfil is not in 
bondage to these inadequate ideas: ‘They do not master me so’. He uses 
language that has a religious aura, but is firmly rooted in immanence:
We are always doing each other injustice, and thinking better or 
worse of each other than we deserve, because we only hear and see 
separate words and actions. We don’t see each other’s whole 
nature. But God sees that you couldn’t have committed that crime’ 
(235).
Gilfil’s ministrations and Caterina’s confessions cement their love and make 
for ‘a new consecration’ (236), but it is music, significantly, which transforms 
her state from a passive to an ‘active’ agent, allowing the shackles of fmitude 
to be loosened:
49 Ethics, Ft. I, Prop. XVII, Cor. 2 and Scliol.; Ft. I, Prop. XXXIII; Ft. I, Prop. XXIX. 
59 Ethics, Ft. I, Def. 7; Ft. IV, App. §32.
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The vibration rushed through Caterina like an electric shock: it 
seemed as if that instant a new soul were entering into her, and 
filling her with a deeper, more significant life. [...] Maynard 
thanked God. An active power was reawakened, and must make a 
new epoch in Caterina’s recovery (240).
U. C. Knoepflmacher argues that ‘Gilfil’ has a more negative ending 
than ‘Amos’,51 but from a Spinozistic perspective this view cannot be 
sustained. Amos Barton remained in thi all to the appetites and passions of the 
first kind of knowledge, and is effectively banished from his community after 
Milly’s death. Gilfil achieves the fairly rare state of the second kind of 
knowledge, which relies on clear and distinct ideas, and is ‘rewarded’ at least 
by being able to taste ‘a few months of perfect happiness’ (243) with Tina, 
who however must die for the ethical and philosophical impulse of the story to 
be fulfilled. The same author goes on to suggest that ‘both stories attack those 
who would escape the limits of ordinary existence: Amos Barton’s 
Christianity and Tina’s Romanticism are checked by the realities of the 
temporal w o r l d ’ . 5 2  This might well be true, but manifestly it is Barton’s kind 
of Christianity which is found to be inadequate. Gilfil is fully aware of the 
vicissitudes of our immanent realm, and it is in his understanding of the 
determined nature of the world that enables him to be ‘active’ in the 
philosophical sense, gaining some sort of limited freedom from external 
modes.
The short epilogue shows Mr Gilfil, ‘the old gentleman of caustic 
tongue, and bucolic tastes’, who has reached ‘the unexpectant quiescence of 
old age’ (243).53 Even though he is ‘a man whose best limb is withered’, he 
has nonetheless ‘been sketched out by nature as a noble tree. The heart of him 
was sound, and the grain was of the finest’. He is the clergyman who can
51 George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 72.
52 George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 72,
53 According to Gordon Haight, this was ‘intended to soften the ending o f  the story with a 
picture o f Mr Gilfil in his cheerful old age’. Letters, II, 324n. Rather, I would suggest it 
reinforces his achieving the level o f  reason (ratio), as well as giving the reader a final 
glimpse o f the organic Shepperton community.
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mould and shape the realm of the imaginato; a clergyman ‘who, with all his 
social pipes and slipshod talk, never sank below the highest level of his 
parishioners’ respect’ (244).
How might we begin to assess Eliot’s distribution of the Kantian schema 
according to the way her characters relate to the world, in what seems to be a 
deliberate juxtaposition with the Spinozistic mode of apprehension and ethical 
awareness displayed by Gilfil? I have already suggested that it makes little 
sense to criticise the ‘unrealistic’ nature of Eliot’s characters. Indeed, that 
seems to be just the point. Confronted with a discourse of ethics and aesthetics 
that is concerned with arguments and rational justification, Eliot demonstrates 
the absurdity of such a way of thinking in terms of lived experience.
It is hard to realise the implicit character of Kantian philosophy and 
Eliot’s parody of rationalism provides some salutary insight for current ethical 
concerns. As Andrew Bowie and others have observed, current post­
structuralist versions of ethics are heavily indebted to Kantianism and the 
focus on pure formal structures (and Kantian approaches also dominate liberal 
theory, in particular the work of John R a w l s ) .54 What Eliot’s style 
demonstrates is that ethics and aesthetics are not argumentative forms but 
ways o f  life. Kantianism has often been described as an empty formalism, but 
Eliot’s story fleshes out the character of that formalism: its way of viewing the 
world, the social relations it effects and, ultimately, its highly implausible 
character as a possible way of life.
Mr Try an
As we enter the Red Lion hostelry, we enter once again the domain of 
the first kind of knowledge, presided over by the lawyer Dempster, who is 
sounding off against ‘the introduction of demoralising, methodistical doctrine
54 See Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy o f  German 
Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997); and John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971).
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into this parish’ (247). The hermeneutic aspect is again important—Dempster 
and his followers cannot interpret their world correctly, this failure even 
extending to the derivations of words themselves.55 Evangelicals are ‘no 
better than Presbyterians’, who according to Dempster, ‘are a sect founded in 
the reign of Charles I, by a man named John Presbyter’ (248). Luke Byles 
knows the correct derivation of the word, but he is branded ‘an insolvent 
atheist’ and ‘a deistical prater’, and his ‘Encyclopaedia [...] a farrago of false 
information’ (248-49). For Mr Dempster and his followers, Evangelicalism in 
the shape of Mr Tryan means that he ‘preaches without book’, and is ‘against 
good works’ (251). Mr Pilgrim the doctor, who ‘looked with great tolerance 
on all shades of religion that did not include a belief in cures by miracle’ 
(259), defends Mr Tryan, pronouncing his sermon ‘capital’, being as it was 
‘addressed to those void of understanding’ (251). But Dempster maintains that 
to ‘tell a man that he is not to be saved by his works, and you open the flood­
gates of all immorality’ (251). Edward Young’s Night Thoughts contains a 
very similar argument:
As in the dying parent dies the child.
Virtue with Immortality expires.
Who tells me he denies his soul immortal,
Whate 'er his boast, has told me h e ’s a knave.
His duty ’tis to love himself alone.
Nor care though mankind perish, if  he smiles.
Eliot quoted the above lines in her essay on Young, and replied in no
uncertain terms:
We can imagine the man who ‘denies his soul immortal’, replying,
‘It is quite possible that you would be a knave, and love yourself 
alone, if it were not for your belief in immortality; but you are not 
to force upon me what would result from your own utter want of 
moral emotion. I am just and honest, not because I expect to live in 
another world, but because, having felt the pain of injustice and 
dishonesty towards myself, I have a fellow-feeling with other men, 
who would suffer the same pain if  I were unjust or dishonest 
towards them. [...] And in opposition to your theory that a belief in 
immortality is the only source of virtue, I maintain that, so far as 
moral action is dependent on that belief, so far the emotion which
55 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 79.
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prompts it is not truly moral— is still in the stage of egoism, and 
has not yet attained the higher development of s y m p a t h y . 56
Milby is the very essence of mediocrity,3 7 a place where the different
varieties of religion are brought into juxtaposition, and none is found to be
adequate, and where ‘even the Dissent [...] was then of a lax and indifferent
kind’ (258). Even the sound Churchman Mr Crewe is not venerated in the
same way as Mr Gilfil of the preceding story. Although Mr Crewe is part of
the landscape, a parson whose ‘inaudible sermons [...] had been part of Milby
life for half a century’ (253 & 258), it is illustrative of the degeneracy and
moral laxity of Milby (as opposed to Gilfil’s organic Shepperton) that ‘the
parishioners saw no reason why it should be desirable to venerate the parson
or anyone else: they were much more comfortable to look down a little on
their fellow creatures’ (258). We do however see the potential for ‘some
purity, gentleness, and unselfishness’, underlined here by natural images
which are superimposed on the inorganic, and which seem to transcend the
limitations of Milby’s temporal realm:
To a superficial glance, Milby was nothing but dreary prose: a 
dingy town, surrounded by flat fields, lopped elms, and sprawling 
manufacturing villages, which crept on and on with their weaving- 
shops, till they threatened to grasp themselves on the town. But the 
sweet spring came to Milby notwithstanding: the elm-tops were red 
with buds; the churchyard was starred with daisies; the lark 
showered his love-music on the flat fields; the rainbows hung over 
the dingy town, clothing the very roofs and chimneys in a strange 
transfiguring beauty. (262)
56 Essays, pp. 373-74. Eliot finally completed this article between the completion o f ‘Amos 
Barton’ and ‘Mr G ilfil’s Love Story’. Some critics have found it difficult to reconcile the 
tone o f  this article with the sympathetic portrayal ofMr Tryan in ‘Janet’s Repentance’. This 
contradiction is more apparent than real; it is Mr Tryan’s individual qualities which are 
important, and that the fact o f  his being an Evangelical preacher is incidental. See Letters, 
II, 347. Also, it must be remembered that Eliot never completely rejected Christianity— it 
was only historical Christianity that she sought to demolish and then reformulate along the 
lines o f  a Spinozistic ‘universal religion’. Eliot was always an ‘emotional’ Christian, even if 
not an ‘intellectual’ one. See Letters, III, 231. Martin J. Svaglic points out that Eliot’s ‘basic 
inspiration which gave direction to all her works and led her to make o f her novels a plea for 
human solidarity was Christianity’. ‘Religion in the Novels o f  George Eliot’ in Haight, ed., 
A Century o f  George Eliot Criticism, 285-94, p. 286.
57 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 79.
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This potential for change is linked to Mr Tryan, who is the representative 
of a true universal religion; one rooted in immanence, but at the same time 
containing a semi-religious element relating to Spinoza’s idea of secular 
salvation. In a letter to her publisher, Eliot explains the real theme of the story:
The collision in the drama is not at all between ‘bigotted 
churchmanship’ and evangelicalism, but between /rreligion and 
religion. Religion in this case happens to be represented by evangelicalism. [...] I thought I made it apparent in my sketch of 
Milby feelings on the advent of Mr Tryan that the conflict lay 
between immorality and morality—irréligion and r e l i g i o n . 58
Thus the town divides itself ‘into two zealous parties, the Tryanites and
the anti-Tryanites’, the former wishing ‘to establish a Sunday evening lecture
on the grounds that old Mr Crewe did not preach the Gospel’, and the latter
now being ‘convinced [...] that Mr Crewe was the model of a parish priest,
and his sermons the soundest and most edifying that ever remained unheard
by a church population’. Eliot’s irony is mostly, but not exclusively, reserved
for the anti-Tryanites, whose first snipe against the evening lecture is to
present a petition, ‘carried to Mr Prendergast by three delegates representing
the intellect, morality, and wealth of Milby’ (264). The three delegates that
comprise this Holy Trinity of irréligion are, respectively, Mr Dempster, Mr
Tomlinson, and Mr Budd. The uneducated townspeople are very responsive to
Dempster’s demagoguery, since they are in thrall to the first kind of
knowledge. Despite his alcoholism, they are confident of his hermeneutic
skills:
‘He’s a long-headed feller, Dempster; why, it shows yer what a 
headpiece Dempster has, as he can drink a bottle o ’ brandy at a 
sittin’, an’ y it see further through a stone wall when he’s done, than 
other folks ’11 see through a glass winder’ (257).
As indicated above, the Tryanites are also subjected to satirical 
treatment: to the Misses Linnet, Mr Tryan is an eligible baehelor; to Miss
58 Letters, II, 347. John Blackwood had advised Eliot to ‘soften’ her picture o f human 
nature, and had asked: ‘When are you going to give us a really good active working 
clergyman, neither absurdly evangelical nor absurdly High Church?’ Letters, II, 344-345.
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Pratt, he is the object of her intellectual and poetical pretensions.59 They all 
eagerly assist in Tryan’s seheme for a Lending Library. Mary Linnet, who 
‘combined a love of serious and poetical reading with her skill in fancy-work’, 
has a bookcase, the ‘chief ornaments’ (265) of which are mainly eighteenth- 
century works, including Burke’s On the Sublime and Beautiful Despite her 
impressive reading list, the bookcase had not been added to for fifteen years, 
and the most that can be said of her intellect is that Mrs Pettifer ‘didn’t know a 
more sensible person to talk to’ (266). Rebecca Linnet is a devotee of pulp 
fiction, whose taste in fashion corresponds with those of the heroine of the 
latest book borrowed from the circulating library.61 Mrs Linnet only reads 
‘the purely secular portions’ of Mr Tryan’s religious books: the Life o f  Leigh 
Richmond, for example, is found to be of interest not for its Evangelicalism, 
but because Leigh Richmond ‘found out all about that woman at Tutbury as 
pretended to live without eating’ (270). Miss Pratt, Milby’s resident 
bluestocking, is more interested in the doctrinal aspects of Try an’s ministry, 
and is gratefiil to him for awakening to her the ‘errors of Romanism’ (269), 
the chief one of which is its ‘denial of the great doctrine of justification by 
faith’ (270). She also dabbles in ‘authorship, though it was understood that she 
had never put forth the full powers of her mind into print’. This would appear 
no great loss, as her ‘latest production’, consisting of ‘Six Stanzas, addressed 
to the Rev. Edgar Tryan’, opens with the line: ‘Forward, young wrestler for 
the truth! ’ (269)
59 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, pp. 83-84.
60 It is interesting to note that Kant makes use o f  Burke’s discussion o f the sublime in his 
aesthetic writings. For Kant, it is through the sublime that we can gain ‘intimations’ o f  
transcendence. See Roger Scruton, Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 89. 
Perhaps it is part o f  Eliot’s reaction against the eighteenth-century that these works are 
relegated to the status o f ‘ornaments’. See Thomas Pinney’s headnote to Eliot’s essay on 
Young, Essays, p. 335.
61 For examples o f  the types o f  books referred to here, see Eliot’s essay ‘Silly Novels by 
Lady N ovelists’, Essays, 300-24.
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Mr Tryan, according to Eliot, is an ‘ideal’ character, ‘made of human 
nature’s finer clay’.62 When he enters Mrs Linnet’s parlour, ‘the strange light 
from the golden sky falling on his light-brown hair [...] makes it look almost 
like an auréole’ (276). But it is in his human and not his theological aspect 
that we are introduced to him. Tryan’s presence ‘called forth all the little 
agitations that belong to the divine necessity of loving’ (275-6) in the Miss 
Linnets and Eliza Pratt; and notwithstanding Miss Pratt’s doctrinal ‘oration’, 
Mr Tryan’s religion is seen to be firmly rooted in humanity, as he enquires 
about the progress of his ‘good works’ (278), and relates the story of his first 
meeting with Mrs Dempster, with whom he will commune, and whose simple 
and unselfconscious religion of the heart will partly temper his doctrinal zeal.
Janet initially has no sympathy for the teaching of the Gospel: for her, 
‘that is the best Gospel that makes everybody happy and comfortable’ (290). 
‘Kindness is my religion’, she tells Mrs Pettifer, refusing to break an old tie 
even though she is a ‘Tryanite’ (330). Janet’s mother, Mrs Raynor, holds a 
simple religion of basic nuclear concepts, which is presented sympathetically, 
while at the same time obliquely criticising the doctrine of justification by 
faith:
Mrs Raynor had her faith and her spiritual comforts, though she 
was not in the least evangelical and knew nothing of doctrinal zeal.
I fear most of Mr Tryan’s hearers would have considered her 
destitute of saving knowledge, and I am quite sure she had no well- 
defined views on justification. Nevertheless, she read her Bible a 
great deal, and thought she found divine lessons there—how to 
bear the cross meekly, and be merciful. Let us hope that there is a 
saving ignorance, and that Mrs Raynor was justified without 
knowing exactly how (2 9 1 ) .63
There is certainly no sympathy held between Janet and Mrs Dempster, 
who is content to think her son can do no wrong. Dempster himself is in
62 Letters, II, 375.
63 This is reminiscent o f the story o f  Spinoza and his hostess (see above, Chapter 1). Mrs 
Raynor is ignorant, but her crude piety, even though its grounding is in the first kind o f 
knowledge, will serve to foster social cohesion. She will not be ‘saved’ as such; Eliot uses 
the word in a rhetorical sense only.
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almost complete bondage to the passions of the first kind of knowledge: he is 
‘callous in worldliness, fevered by sensuality, enslaved by chance impulses’. 
Even he is not altogether beyond redemption, however; the ‘deep-down 
fibrous roots of human love and goodness’ surface in his relationship with his 
mother, and provide an experience of ‘close brotherhood with us through 
some of our most sacred feelings’ (299).
It is these ‘sacred’ feelings of brotherhood and personal communion that 
are the basis of Mr and Mrs Jerome’s attraction to Mr Tryan and his ministry. 
Mrs Jerome, who ‘had not a keen susceptibly to shades of doctrine’, respects 
Mr Tryan simply as a ‘Church clergyman’; and even though ‘in the first 
instance she had the greatest repugnance to renouncing the religious forms in 
which she had been brought up’, she soon concluded that:
‘the ministers say pretty nigh the same things as the Church 
parsons, by what I could iver make out, an’ we’re out o ’ chapel i ’ the mornin’ a good deal sooner nor they’re out o ’ church. An’ as 
for pews, ours is a deal comfortabler nor any i’ Milby Church’.
(301)
Similarly, Mr Jerome ‘had not a theoretic basis for Dissent’, it
recommending itself to him simply ‘as piety and goodness’, and Mr Tryan ‘as
a good man and a powerfiil preacher, who was stirring the hearts of people’
(305). As Mrs Pettifer points out, Mr Tryan ‘puts himself on a level with one,
and talks to one like a brother’ (329), confirming that, like Mr Gilfil, he fulfils
a ‘constructive hermeneutic function’. The narrator is insistent to stress that it
is Mr Tryan as an individual which is important, and in a scathing attack on
the Utilitarian doctrine o f ‘the balance of happiness’, lambasts the ‘inherent
imbecility of feeling’ (373) of those who believe
that individuals really exist for no other purpose than that 
abstractions may be drawn from them—abstractions that may rise 
from heaps of ruined lives like the sweet savour of a sacrifice in the 
nostrils of philosophers, and of a philosophic Deity. (374)
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Notwithstanding his tenacious quest for the bodies and souls of Milby,
Tryan still has ‘an acute sensibility to the very hatred or ridicule he did not
flinch from provoking’. Mr Tryan is no ‘gratuitous martyr’, and ‘he had no
pugnacious pleasure in the contest’, having an ‘acute sensibility to blame’, and
a ‘dependence on sympathy’. Thus Mr Jerome’s homely compassion and
‘soothing words were balm to him’ (310).64 Even Mr Tryan, then, has his
painful moments, where he remembers ‘the time before he had taken the yoke
of self-denial’. The narrator muses that
it is apt to be so in this life, I think. While we are coldly discussing 
a man’s career, sneering at his mistakes, blaming his rashness, and 
labelling his opinions— ‘Evangelical and narrow’ or ‘Latitudinarian 
and Pantheistic’ or ‘Anglican and supercilious’—that man, in his 
solitude, is perhaps shedding hot tears because his sacrifice is a 
hard one, because strength and patience are failing him to speak the 
difficult word, and do the difficult deed. (312)65
The world of Milby is seen at its lowest moral ebb during the playbill 
episode, and even though it is intended as satire of ‘Milby wit’,66 the Anti- 
Tryanites’ ‘derisive glances and virulent words’ (315), and the breakdown of 
community associated with the spread of gossip, calumny, and religious strife 
upset Mr Tryan’s equipoise: ‘outwardly Mr Tryan was composed, but 
inwardly he was suffering acutely’. The virulent nature of the opposition soon 
dissipates, however, the townspeople finding it ‘inconvenient’ to conduct 
commerce along sectarian lines; and by the time of the Tryanites’ second 
procession to the church, the shouts o f ‘hatred and scorn’ have become 
‘whispers [...] of sorrow and blessing’ (315). It is at this point that Janet 
seems to have a premonition of Mr Tryan’s death, unaware that she will share 
in his final epiphany, when he will scale the lofty heights of the third kind of
64 David Carroll argues that Mr Jerome ‘is an anachronism, representing the idea o f  
community before religious and industrial upheavals, and reconciling in his person most o f  
the conflicts o f contemporary M ilby’. “‘Janet’s Repentance” and the Myth o f the Organic’, 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 35 (1980), 331-48, p. 340.
65 We may recall that Spinoza was felt to be much more than a pantheist by many Victorian 
men o f letters. See above, chapter one.
66 Letters, II, 362.
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knowledge, bringing us closer to some conception of the possibility of secular 
salvation.
The main redeeming feature of Evangelicalism, for all its faults, is 
palpably that of ‘duty, that recognition of something to be lived for beyond the 
mere satisfaction of se lf. This is qualitatively a very different kind of ‘duty’ 
to that grotesquely misrepresented by Captain Wybrow of the preceding story, 
whose concept of duty was eharaeterised by a Kantian adherence to the purity 
of one’s will. The ‘divine work’ which presents itself to Mr Tryan’s followers 
as a duty, however, is firmly other-directed, and though they seem to 
recognise a ‘higher’ law, and hold transcendent notions, the practical effect of 
their conduct results in behaviour which conforms to those basic nuclear 
doctrines of justice, solidarity and compassion that are at the heart of Eliot’s 
reformulated Christianity, a religion rooted in immanence:
Whatever might be the weaknesses of the ladies who pruned the 
luxuriance of their lace and ribbons, cut out garments for the poor, 
distributed tracts, quoted Scripture, and defined the true Gospel, 
they had learned this—that there was divine work to be done in 
life, a rule of goodness higher than the opinion of their neighbours; 
and if the notion of heaven in reserve was a little too prominent, yet 
the theory of fitness for that heaven consisted in purity of heart, in 
Christ-like compassion, in the subduing of selfish desires. They 
might give the name of piety to much that was only puritanic 
egoism; they might eall many things sin that were not sin; but they 
had at least the feeling that sin was to be avoided and resisted, and 
colour-blindness, whieh may mistake drab for scarlet, is better than 
total blindness, which sees no distinction of colour at all (320).
Mr Tryan himself is full of these imperfections that mark our common
humanity, but nevertheless he is one of ‘the real heroes, o f God’s making’
pursuing ‘the blessed work of helping the world forward’ (321). This ‘blessed’
work, is pursued indefatigably, even at the expense of his health, illustrated by
his refusal of the offer of a horse from Mr Jerome which will surely hasten his
death.67 Mr Jerome’s warning (‘We mustn’t fling our lives away’) is duly
67 u . C. Knoepflmacher sees this refusal as an ‘obsessive desire for martyrdom’. George 
E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 84.
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ignored, Mr Tryan flying in the face of the categorical imperative:68 ‘“No, not 
fling them away lightly, but we are permitted to lay down our lives in a right 
cause. There are many duties, as you know, Mr Jerome, which stand before 
the taking of our own lives’” (326). Mr Tryan ‘believed himself consumptive, 
and he had not yet felt any desire to escape the early death which he had for 
some time contemplated as probable’ (404). In fact, Mr Tryan is beginning to 
reveal himself as the Spinozistic free man, inasmuch as ‘the more the mind 
knows by the second and third kind of cognition, the less it will suffer by 
emotions which are evil, and the less it fears death’.69
Janet’s first meeting with Tryan, where she overhears his words of 
support to the consumptive Sally Martin, bring home to Janet that her 
interpretation of Mr Tryan’s mode of ministry has been wrong: ‘there was 
none of the self-satisfied unction of the teacher, quoting, or exhorting, or 
expounding, for the benefit of the hearer, but a simple appeal for help, a 
confession of weakness’. Janet recognises ‘this fellowship in suffering’, and 
her ‘entire absence of self-consciousness which belongs to a new and vivid 
impression’ (361), lead them to share a fleeting moment of personal 
communion.
After this initial meeting, Janet’s suffering becomes more acute in direct 
proportion to Dempster’s physical and mental deterioration. She becomes 
embroiled in a spiral of bitterness and despair, almost totally in bondage to the 
‘angry passions’ of the first kind of knowledge, and even makes ‘wild 
reproaches against that one patient listener’, Mrs Raynor, who ‘saw too clearly 
all through the winter that things were getting worse in Orchard Street’ (335). 
This suffering culminates in her ejection, at the hands of Dempster, from the
68 One o f Kant’s examples o f  universal maxims relates to suicide. The maxim o f suicide 
‘cannot possibly exist as a universal law o f nature, and consequently would be wholly 
inconsistent with the supreme principle o f  duty’. Fundamental Principles o f  the Metaphysics 
o f  Ethics, p. 47.
69 Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXVIII. This is not to say that Tryan would willingly take his own 
life; it is only to suggest that he doesn’tyêar death. His conatus, or ability to preserve in his 
own being, would stop him committing suicide.
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family home, where Janet finds herself ‘on the confines of the unknown’ 
(343), without even her restoring faith: ‘Oh, if some ray of hope, of pity, of 
consolation, would pierce through the horrible gloom, she might believe then 
in a Divine love—-in a heavenly Father who cared for His Children! But she 
had no faith, no trust’ (344). However, the familiar sound of the church clock 
awakes her fiom her disembodied state, Janet having a ‘strong instinctive 
dread of pain and death which made her recoil from suicide’ (345).70 Mrs 
Pettifer— a Tryanite—takes her in, but Janet is still very much in thrall to the 
inadequate ideas of the first kind of knowledge, and completely determined by 
the actions of external modes, which is the complete antithesis of the free 
individual, who is free insofar as he or she is 5'eÿ-determined:71 ‘her thoughts, 
instead of springing from the action of her own mind, were external 
existences, that thrust themselves imperiously on her like haunting visions’ 
(348). The one ‘untried spring’ (350) amidst this desolation might be the 
influence of Mr Tryan, whose secrets of faith seem to offer some hope for her 
renovation. It is clear that Mr Tryan offers something new, not just ‘barren 
exhortation’ and the prescriptions of historical religion, with its promises of 
reward and threats of punishment. Janet simply ‘wanted strength to do right’; 
she needed someone who would ‘understand her helplessness, her wants’, and 
who could ‘unlock the chambers o f her soul’ (351).
Their first meeting after the crisis is like a church service: ‘it was dusk, 
and the candles were lighted’, and it is soon confirmed that Janet ‘had not 
deceived herself (355) in her instinctive turning to Mr Tryan, who has an 
intuitive grasp of the causes of her condition. Tryan realises that a mutual 
confession will be the most efficacious in Janet’s restoration,72 but it is also
70 This shows Janet’s conatus in operation; it should not be equated with Mr Jerome’s 
Kantian prescription to Mr Tryan: ‘We mustn’t fling our lives away’ (327).
71 Ethics, Pt. I, Def. 7.
72 Cf. ‘Mr G ilfil’s Love Story’, pp. 234-35. Similarly, Gilfil judges that a mutual confession 
will be most effective in helping to temper Tina’s ‘bad passions’. Both Gilfil and Tryan rely 
on adequate ideas, which are characteristic o f  the second and third kinds o f knowledge. 
There is however a qualitative difference between the two clergymen’s respective levels o f
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clear that this is by no means a one-way process, and that he also must grasp 
reality and be partly humanised ;
In this artificial life of ours, it is not often we see a human face 
with all a heart’s agony in it, uncontrolled by self-consciousness; when we do see it, it startles us as if we had suddenly waked into 
the real world of which this eveiy day one is but a puppet-show 
copy. For some moments Mr Tryan was too deeply moved to speak 
(357).
Mr Tryan’s heartfelt confession shows that he once was in bondage to 
the passions, and his story redefines the traditional formulations of theology. 
For Tryan, ‘sin’ is bondage to the passions; and ‘strength’ is the becoming of 
an ‘active’ individual, revelling in the freedom of self-determination and 
removing the shackles of finitude:
‘But a dear friend to whom I opened my mind showed me it was 
just such as I—the helpless who feel themselves helpless—that 
God especially invites to come to Him, and offers all the riches of 
His salvation: not forgiveness only; forgiveness would be worth little if it left us under the power of our evil passions; but strength—that strength which enables us to conquer sin’ (357-8).
We can see that he is using the language of transcendence
metaphorically and rhetorically, but it is still rooted in immanence. The
salvation to which he refers is a secular salvation for those who can reach the
third kind of knowledge. However, Tryan’s entreaty, although it is human and
not theological in its intent, sounds to Janet altogether too much like the
traditional discourse of theology to suit her position, having found no comfort
in the prescriptions of traditional theology. This indicates that she may
perhaps be able to move up the epistemological scale to at least the second
kind of knowledge:
‘But’, said Janet, ‘I can feel no trust in God. He seems always to 
have left me to myself. I have sometimes prayed to Him to help 
me, and yet everything has been just the same as before. If you felt 
like me, how did you come to have hope and trust?’ (358)
apprehension; G ilfil’s grasp o f particulars is deduced  from generalities; Tryan’s is an 
intuitive grasp o f the essence o f  a particular thing as part o f  the web o f  immanence.
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Mr Tryan sees intuitively what Janet needs; that is, a confession of his 
own, a deeply-felt human account of suffering and redemption.73 And just 
like Janet, in his darkest hour Mr Tryan found traditional religion wanting:
T was convinced that if I ever got health and comfort, it must be 
from religion. I went to hear celebrated preachers, and I read 
religious books. But I found nothing that fitted my own need. The 
faith that puts the sinner in possession of salvation seemed, as I  
understood it, to be quite out of my reach. I had no faith; I only felt 
utterly wretched, under the power of habits and dispositions which 
had wrought hideous evil’ (360, my italics).
It is clear that for Mr Tryan, knowledge is understanding of the real 
meaning of faith and salvation, and he describes how through his reformulated 
religion, a true universal religion, he is able to breathe the ‘pure free air’ of 
immanence:
‘As long as we live in rebellion against God, desiring to have our 
own will, seeking to have happiness in the things of this world, it is 
as if we shut ourselves up in a crowded stifling room, where we 
breathe only poisonous air; but we have only to walk out under the infinite heavens, and we breathe the pure free air that gives us 
health, and stren^h, and gladness. It is just so with God’s spirit: as 
soon as we submit ourselves to his will, as soon as we desire to be 
united to him, and made pure and holy, it is as if the walls had 
fallen down that shut us out from God, and we are fed with his spirit, which gives us new strength’ (361).
For Tryan, ‘submit ourselves to his will’ means realise the determined 
nature of our existence; and the ‘walls’ which ‘shut us out from God’, are 
external modes which we are in bondage to, and must be resisted to gain a sort 
of freedom which comes with the recognition and understanding of the 
determined nature of our immanent realm. Indeed, the very idea of resignation 
and submission to an immanent reality, so crucial to an understanding of 
Eliot’s ethics, is seen to be ‘active’ in the philosophical sense, at once 
resolving the seeming paradox between determinism and responsibility:
‘We cannot foretell the working of the smallest event in our own lot; how can we presume to judge of things that are much too high 
for us? There is nothing that becomes us but entire submission, 
perfect resignation. As long as we set up our own will and our own
73 The fact that this mutual confession is realised through narrative itself should be noted, 
as it will have important consequences below.
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wisdom against God’s, we make that wall between us and his love which I have spoken of just now. But as soon as we lay ourselves 
entirely at his feet, we have enough light given us to guide our own 
steps; as the foot soldier who hears nothing of the councils that 
determine the course of the great battle he is in, hears plainly 
enough the word of command which he must obey’ (362).
Mr Tryan is now seen firmly to be guided by the third kind of
knowledge, that semi-religious realm in which one no longer deduces
particulars from generalities, but has an intuitive knowledge of the relations of
cause and effect in the determined world. His actions are, of course, consistent
with reason, but the operation of logic is somehow circumvented, enabling a
quantum leap into a semi-mystical realm, which is both the result of and the
reward for those rare few who have attained the ‘blessedness’ and ‘power’ of
the third kind of knowledge, and are presented with the opportunity of a true,
secular salvation. Mr Tryan’s Spinozistic equipoise has a marked effect on
Janet: a ‘calmness’, and ‘a delicious hope [...] of purification and inward
peace’ (365), which even the ‘adequate’ ideas of the second kind of
knowledge cannot account for:
. Blessed influence of one true loving human soul on another! Not 
calculable by algebra, not deducible by logic, but mysterious, 
effectual, mighty as the hidden process by which the tiny seed is 
quickened, and bursts forth into tall stem and broad leaf, and 
glowing tasseled flower.
Mr Tryan tells Janet that ‘God is training us for the eternal enjoyment of 
his love’ (364), and we can see how far we are away from the traditional 
theistic concepts of immortality and the everlasting soul, as it is clear that Mr 
Tryan has in mind the Spinozistic sense of the ‘eternal’. Spinoza makes an 
important distinction between the ‘eternal’ and the ‘everlasting’:
By eternity I understand existence itself, conceived as following 
solely and necessarily from the definition of the thing which is 
eternal.
Exp. For existence so conceived is an eternal truth, inasmuch as it is the essence of the eternal thing; consequently, it cannot be
62
explained by duration or time, even though the duration be 
conceived as without beginning and end.74
The third kind of knowledge leads to an ‘intellectual love of God’ which 
itself is eternal,75 and of itself leads to a greater degree of blessedness and 
perfection.76 Janet is now feeling a ‘new freedom’, and has sensed a ‘blessed 
opening’ (371) in the shape of Mr Tryan, who can ‘divine’ the difficulties that 
Janet will have to face along the road to redemption, and who will use his 
intuitive knowledge to summon up the shadowy reserves of semi-religious 
experience:
such unseen elements Mr Tryan called the Divine will, and filled 
up the margin of ignorance which surrounds all our knowledge 
with the feelings of trust and resignation. Perhaps the profoundest 
philosophy could hardly fill it up better (374).
The reference to ‘the margin of ignorance’ is an acceptance that our 
knowledge of the chain of cause and effect is necessarily limited and partial; 
only God has complete knowledge and thus complete freedom in Spinoza’s 
special sense of the term. But, as Spinoza says, in so far as we ‘bear with 
equanimity’ those things which seem to be ‘in opposition to our interest’, and 
understand ‘that we are part of Nature, whose order we obey’,77 we can gain a 
sort o f freedom, that comes with our understanding of our place within ‘the 
common universal order of nature’. What Mr Tryan chooses to call the 
‘Divine Will’, is not a transcendent notion: the ‘unseen elements’ which 
constitute it are simply ‘feelings of trust and resignation’, feelings not 
dissimilar to a Spinozistic ‘equanimity’. In Spinoza’s semantic and 
philosophical revolution, there truly is a ‘Divine Will’, but one, of course, far 
divorced from its original acceptation.
74 Ethics, Pt. 1, Def. 8. See Ethics, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson, p. 226n. Parkinson writes: ‘In 
effect, eternity is necessary existence— or perhaps it would be better to say, a certain feature 
o f necessary existence. Such existence, Spinoza says, cannot be explained in temporal 
terms, just as the truth that the interior angles o f  a triangle are equal to two right angles is a 
timeless truth. In short, the eternal is not the everlasting; it is tim eless.’
75 Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXIII (Eliot trans.).
76 Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXI, Schol.
77 Ethics, Pt. IV, App. §32.
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Janet feels something of the ‘blessing of serene freedom’ that ‘lies in all 
simple direct acts of mercy’, as she tends to Mr Dempster after his accident. 
The ‘sick-room’ is where ‘the moral relation of man to man is reduced to its 
utmost simplicity: bigotry cannot confuse it, theory cannot pervert it, passion^ 
awed into quiescence, can neither pollute nor perturb it’ (my italics, 384). This 
‘blessedness’ that Janet is in sight of as she becomes more philosophically 
‘active’ is, as Gilles Deleuze points out, o f a different order to our temporal 
realm:
The word blessedness should be reserved for these active joys: they 
appear to conquer and extend themselves within duration, like the 
passive joys, but in fact they are eternal and are no longer 
explained by duration; they no longer imply transitions and 
passages, but express themselves and one another in an eternal 
mode, together with the adequate ideas from which they issue 
{Ethics, Pt. V, Props. XXXI-XXXIII).78
Janet does have a slight relapse, however, when the temptation for 
alcohol almost proves too strong, and ‘where her prayers did not help her, for 
fear predominated over trust’ (396). Once again, the act of confession restores 
her equilibrium, and this time ‘prepared her soul for the stronger leap by 
which her faith grasps the idea of the Divine sympathy’ (397). It is significant 
that in these moments of Spinozistic equipoise, when ‘the Divine Presence did 
not now seem far o ff , Janet has no need of the supports of traditional religion: 
‘prayer itself seemed superfluous in those moments of calm trust’. These 
moments represent ‘baptismal epochs, when the soul, dipped in the sacred 
waters of joy and peace, rises from them with new energies, with more 
unalterable longings’ (398).
Janet gradually recovers her equipoise (400) at the same time as Mr 
Tryan gradually becomes to be accepted by the community. Even Messrs. 
Budd and Tomlinson, the remaining two thirds of the anti-Tryanite 
triumvirate, find that their theories are inadequate in explaining this clergyman 
who seems to be of a different mould:
Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 51.
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Twist and stretch their theory as they might, it would not fit Mr 
Tryan; and so, with that remarkable resemblance as to the mental 
processes which may frequently be observed to exist between plain 
men and philosophers, they concluded the less said about him the 
better (401).
Janet and Tryan ever more closely commune; Tryan having a ‘new 
yearning for [...] pure human joys’ which Janet can provide, and Tryan 
representing for Janet ‘repose from that conflict of emotion, with trust in the 
unchangeable, with an influx of a power to subdue se lf. The ‘heaven-senf 
Tryan had ‘loosed her bonds’ of subservience to the passions, and helped her 
achieve a calm equipoise that is characteristic of a person moved by the 
adequate ideas of the second and third kinds of knowledge. It is natural that 
Janet should be tending to Mr Tryan in his last illness: God’s will, which is 
simply the ‘train of events’ (409) leading up to his illness, dictates that Janet 
should have this honour. And as Mr Tryan lies ‘calmly conscious of the 
reality’ of death, he tells Janet that now that she has ‘a sure trust in God’, he 
can be released from his temporal existence. They then share ‘a sacred kiss of 
promise’ (410), which is not intended to suggest that they will physically meet 
again in some transcendent realm, but that insofar as Mr Tryan has achieved 
the ‘blessed’ state of the third kind of knowledge, he will be ‘saved’ in a sense 
which has resonances beyond the metaphorical and rhetorical use of the term. 
Mr Tryan’s state of ‘blessedness’ is nothing less than the Spinozistic ideal of 
secular salvation itself, one related to the third kind of knowledge, where one 
sees the world under the aspect of eternity, achieving a limited emancipation 
from the bondage of fmitude. It is a true universal salvation which inheres in 
and defines our ‘common plane of immanence’ (see above).
U. C. Knoepflmacher suggests that Tryan’s death ‘marks a triumph over 
his temporal se lf ,79 while David Carroll argues that Tryan ‘achieves a kind of
79 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 85.
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heaven [...] in Janet’s memory’, in contrast to Dempster’s hell.^^ Mr Tryan 
does achieve a ‘kind of heaven’, but it is more than this sort of hallo^ved 
remembrance. Mr Tryan achieves a kind of Spinozistic ‘eternity’, which while 
far removed from theistic notions of ‘immortality’ and the everlasting soul, 
nonetheless reveals a metaphysical dimension to Spinoza’s thought.
Eliot uses the language of traditional Christianity while at the same time 
evoking this Spinozistic ideal, because she is to some extent reformulating 
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge into a language of feeling and sympathy, 
which is in contradistinction to his purely philosophical mode of discourse. 
George Eliot posits the literary and the intersubjective, which in themselves 
while not being sufficient are certainly necessary for any ethical position or 
the recognition of ‘higher’ knowledge or experience.
‘“Janet’s Repentance’” , p. 347. In 1849, in a letter to Sarah Hennell, Eliot seems to refer 
to this phenomenon: ‘Poor and shallow as one’s own soul is, it is blessed to think that a sort 
o f transhumanation is possible by which the greater ones can live in us.’ Letters, I, 280. 
Significantly, Eliot was translating the Tractatus at the time.
8i See Yovel, Spinoza, pp. 169-171; and see Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXVIII, Schol.
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IllBeyond Hermeneutics;Adam Bede and the Power of Narrative
Tell me not that I am a mere prater—that feeling never talks. [...] I 
will talk, and caress and look lovingly until death makes me as 
stony as the Gorgon-like heads of all the judicious people I know. 
What is anything worth until it is uttered? Is not the Universe one 
great utterance? Utterance there must be in word or deed to make 
life of any worth. 1
We have now tentatively begun to define George Eliof s philosophical and 
ethical position, which asserts an intersubjective humanism which can in some 
sense extend beyond its worldly capacity, and which is in tension with Kant’s 
formulation of the limits of human knowledge. Kantianism insists on the finite 
nature of our experience, but does warn against the inevitable speculative 
capacities of Reason to posit objects beyond finite experience. While Reason 
must ‘check’ its capacity to posit these objects, certain aspects o f Reason (the 
moral law, freedom, the Sublime) go beyond finite experience. However, it 
still remains that for Kant human knowledge is finite and does not extend to 
the noumenal, all such claims being illegitimate and ‘metaphysical’. Eliot 
rejects K anfs postulation of the noumenal in favour of a reformulated 
Spinozism that translates the second and third kinds of knowledge into a 
language of feeling and sympathy
In this chapter I shall begin to explore this particular language against a 
backdrop of what David Can'oll terms the mid-nineteenth-century ‘crisis of 
interpretation’. In George Eliot and the Conflict o f  Interpretations he 
describes the attempt to find ‘that Victorian Holy Grail, a comprehensive 
synthetic philosophy’. Eliot as a polymath was particularly suited to this task,
1 Letter to Sara Hennell, April 1849, Letters, I, 279.
 ^ This is not to suggest that feeling is not important for Kant (e.g. in ûve Aesthetic)', the key 
difference here is E liof s sympathy and intersubjectivity. Feeling, for Kant, is reflective, i.e., 
the subject reflects upon the pleasure o f aesthetic judgement; and the subject feels a respect 
for the moral law insofar as the law is other than its own (finite) interests.
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Carroll claims, as each of her disciplines—biblical criticism, philosophy, 
biology, history—was concerned at a fundamental level with ‘the problem of 
interpretation’ ?
The paradigmatic metaphor for this hermeneutic quest is that of the 
circle, and I shall discuss this in relation to one of the founding fathers of 
hermeneutics, Friedrich Schleiermacher. His distinctive formulation of the 
hermeneutic circle and his hermeneutical approach to the interpretation of the 
Scriptures is related to the ideas Mackay discussed in The Progress o f  the 
Intellect (1850), which Eliot reviewed with approval. According to Eliot, 
Mackay takes as a given ‘the presence of undeviating law in the material and 
moral world—of that invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be 
the basis of physical science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social 
organisation, our ethics and our religion’. She pinpoints the ‘law of 
consequences’ as the ‘master key’ to ‘divine revelation’;4
It is Mr Mackay’s faith that divine revelation is not contained 
exclusively or pre-eminently in the facts and inspirations of any one age or nation, but is coextensive with the history of human 
development, and is perpetually unfolding itself to our widened 
experience and investigation, as firmament upon firmament 
becomes visible to us in proportion to the power and range of our 
exploring instruments.^
Eliot goes on to quote Mackay approvingly: ‘The true religious 
philosophy of an imperfect being is not a system of creed, but, as Socrates 
thought, an infinite search or approximation.’6 For Eliot, Mackay is akin to 
the German critics: his ‘mythical’ themes may be ‘still startling to the English 
theological mind’,? but nonetheless Eliot urges our theologians to adopt
J David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict o f  Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 2-3. I am much indebted to this excellent study. See also 
George Levine, ‘George Eliot’s Hypothesis o f Reality’, Nineteenth-Century Fiction 35, 1 
(June, 1980), 1-28.
4 Essays, pp. 30-1. This is pointed out by Carroll, George Eliot, p. 12.
 ^Essays, pp. 30-1.
6 Essays, p. 44.
7 Essays, p. 40.
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Mackay’s Tiberal’ biblical criticism, where the ‘spirit’ and not the ‘letter’ 
becomes important in the interpretative quest. ^
Similarly, Eliot’s review of Greg’s The Creed o f  Christendom (1851) 
gives considerable prominence to Greg’s statement of the ‘inexorable law of 
consequences’, a crucial idea in determining Eliot’s ethical and philosophical 
position:
Let any one look back upon his past career, look inward on his 
daily life, and then say what effect would be produced upon him, 
were the conviction once fixedly embedded in his soul, that 
everything done is done irrevocably, that even the omnipotence of God cannot uncommit a deed, cannot make that undone which has 
been done; that every act of his must bear its allotted fruit 
according to the everlasting laws—must remain for ever 
ineffaceably inscribed on the tablets of universal Nature. And, then, 
let him consider what would have been the result upon the moral 
condition of our race, had all men ever held this conviction.9
It was, however, Charles Bray, whose The Philosophy o f  Necessity
(1841) Eliot read during her Coventry period, who subsequently claimed to
have provided ‘the base of the philosophy which she afterwards retained’.
He maintained that Eliot ‘always held with me as a sequence to such doctrine
of consequences that one of the greatest duties of life was unembittered
resignation to the inevitable’.H Eliot’s novels—her ‘experiments in life’—are
 ^Essays, p. 42.
9 Leader, 2 (20 September 1851), 897-9, in Joseph Wiesenfarth, ed., George Eliot: A 
W riter’s Notebook 1854-1879 and Uncollected Writings (Charlottesville: The University 
Press o f Virginia, 1981), p. 235.
^9 Charles Bray, Phases o f  Opinion and Experience During a Long Life: An Autobiography 
(London, 1885), p. 73. Albert J. Fyfe insists that while 'Adam Bede may seem orthodox 
enough, [...] the work actually exemplifies the utilitarian system o f  George Eliot’s friend 
Charles Bray’. ‘The Interpretation o f  Adam B ed e \ Nineteenth-Century Fiction 9 
(September, 1954), 134-9.
 ^1 Bray, Autobiography, p. 74. Eliot agreed with Bray’s basic premise o f the law o f  
consequences, but found herself ‘unable to agree with much that you say in relation to the 
religious ideas and the moral tendencies. For I dislike extremely a passage quoted by Sarah 
[in Christianity and Infidelity (hondon, 1857), p. 131; The Philosophy o f  Necessity, 2 vols. 
(London, 1841), I, 205-6] in which you appear to consider the disregard o f  individuals to be 
a lofty state o f mind. My own experience and development deepen every day my conviction 
that our moral progress may be measured by the degree in which we sympathize with 
individual suffering and individual joy. The fact that in the scheme o f things we see a 
constant and tremendous sacrifice o f individuals is, it seems to me only one ofthe many 
proofs that urge upon us our total inability to find in our own natures a key to the Divine 
Mystery. I could more readily turn Christian and worship Jesus again than embrace a 
Theism which professes to explain the proceedings o f God’. (Letter to Charles Bray, 15 
November, 1857, Letters, II, 403)
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informed by this doctrine, 12 which as Carroll points out, ‘goes hand-in-hand 
with a vivid awareness of the unknown continually pressing in on the known, 
o f the need for faith and knowledge, credulity and scepticism, to work
together’. 13
Another important idea which was working itself out during this time of 
intellectual ferment was the development theory, which Eliot’s friend Herbert 
Spencer, in his The Principles o f  Psychology (1855), had already adumbrated 
well before the publication in 1859 of Darwin’s The Origin o f  Species. The 
rise of the empirical sciences, and the far-reaching influence of the theories of 
Mill, Spencer and Comte, 14 together with the fundamental influence of 
Spinoza, provided the context for Eliot’s contribution to this task, which was 
none other than to ‘progressively uncover the known laws of the uni verse’.15 
As Rosemary Ashton points out, all of these Empirical-positivist writers with 
whom Eliot shared her world, ‘looked to history to verify their claims, and all 
used the methods and terminology of science’. 16 It is not surprising then, that 
Eliot should approve so wholeheartedly of the German social historian 
Wilhelm Heinrich von RiehTs ‘social-political conservatism’, which at once 
combines a thoroughly ‘historical’ approach to the empirical and inductive 
investigation of natural laws, a ‘social-political-conservatism’, reflected in a 
deference for tradition, and a belief in the inevitable progress (or 
‘development’) of humanity. 17 Although Eliot stopped short of labelling 
herself as a positivist—in fact she never accepted any philosophical system 
wholeheartedly, with the possible exception of Feuerbach’s while she was 
translating his Essence o f  Christianity—and preferred to characterise herself
12 Letters, VI, 216.
13 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 17. He goes on to observe that ‘it is only the uncertain gap 
between the known and the unknown that makes both life and narrative possible’ (p. 35).
14 Lewes was o f  course Comte’s great populariser. See his C om te’s Philosophy o f  the 
Sciences (London, 1853).
13 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 16.
16 Rosemary Ashton, George Eliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 19.
17 Ashton, George Eliot, p. 20.
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as a meiiorist,!^ her generous review of RiehTs work reflects a sympathy with 
his views, and might just as well stand as a summary of her own position:
The views at which he has arrived by this inductive process, he 
sums up in the term—social-political-conservatism', but his 
conservatism is, we conceive, of a thoroughly philosophical kind.
He sees in European society incarnate history, and any attempt to 
disengage it from its historical elements must, he believes, be 
simply destructive of social vitality. What has grown up 
historically can only die out historically, by the gradual operation 
of necessary laws. The external conditions which society has 
inherited from the past are but the manifestation of inherited 
internal conditions in the human beings who compose it; the 
internal conditions and the external are related to each other as the 
organism and its medium, and development can take place only by 
the gradual consentaneous development of both. 19
Rosemary Ashton notes that towards the end of the Riehl review, all of
Eliot's ‘intellectual agreements’-—Spinoza, Feuerbach, Spencer, Lewes—seem
to coalesce in her ‘prescription’ for the social novel, which must needs be
‘realistic’ and ‘moral’:20
Our social novels profess to represent the people as they are, and the unreality of their representations is a grave evil. The greatest 
benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is 
the extension of our sympathies. [.,.] Art is the nearest thing to life; 
it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact 
with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot. All the 
more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the 
life of the People.21
This connection between art and morality is brought out strongly in 
Eliot's review of Ruskin’s Modern Painters III (1856). Despite all his faults, 
Ruskin teaches us a ‘truth of infinite value’, that of ‘realism—the doctrine that 
all truth and beauty are to be attained by a humble and faithful study of nature.
18 According to the OED (2nd ed ition ), the word was first used in 1858, and refers to ‘the 
doctrine, intermediate between pessimism and optimism, which affirms that the world may 
be made better by rightly-directed effort’. See Hardy, The Novels o f  George Eliot, p. 236, 
for a discussion o f Eliot's meliorism.
19 Essays, pp. 286-7. Ian Adam points out the connection between the Riehl review and 
Adam Bede, which was published the following year: ‘indeed, at some points it is not only 
spirit, but illustration itself which is identical’. ‘The Structure o f  Realisms in Adam B ede’, 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 30 (1975), 127-49, p. 136. See also John Goode, 'Adam B ed e\ 
in Barbara Hardy, ed., C ritical Essays on George Eliot (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1970), 19-41, p. 20.
20 Ashton, George Eliot, p. 21.
21 Essays, pp. 270-1, cited by Ashton, George Eliot, p. 21.
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and not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mists of
feeling, in place of definite, substantial reality’. Eliot notes that Ruskin is a
polymath, who when he
brings his varied studies to bear on one great purpose, when he has 
to trace their common relation to a grand phase of human activity, 
it is obvious that he will have a great deal to say of interest and 
importance to others besides painters. The fundamental principles 
of all just thought and beautiful action or creation are the same, and 
in making clear to ourselves what is best and noblest in art, we are 
making clear to ourselves what is best and noblest in morals; in 
learning how to estimate the artistic products of a particular age 
according to the external attitude and mental life of that age, we are 
widening our sympathy and deepening the basis o f our tolerance 
and charity.22
We discussed earlier the received wisdom (following Basil Willey) that 
Eliot had a divided self, and that she refused to allow ‘metaphysical 
inconsistencies’ to hinder her art. We concluded that from a Spinozistic 
perspective these inconsistencies are more apparent than real, and that her 
philosophical position is perfectly consistent with ethical responsibility; 
indeed, it is meaningless without it (see above, chapter one). According to 
Graham Hough, there is no dichotomy to resolve: Eliot for the most part 
observed the rules of society because they had stood the test of time. He points 
out that ‘there is no need to despise a particular set of rules because they are 
not absolute; it is enough if they can give dignity and the means of happiness 
to those who belong to it’. This (one might say Spinozistic) approach to these 
fundamental ethical questions, far from resulting in emotional or philosophical 
schizophrenia, satisfies her ‘positivistic and scientific credentials’ at the same 
time as it reinforces traditional values.23
However, in establishing Eliot’s positivist and empiricist credentials, we 
may be in danger of neglecting the other side of the philosophical divide in the 
nineteenth-century: the transcendentalism of Carlyle, the Catholicism of
22 [Modern Painters 7/7], ‘Arts and Belles Lettres’, Westminster Review  65 (April 1856), 
USA ed., 343-4, in Wiesenfarth, ed., Uncollected Writings, p. 273.
23 Graham Hough, ‘Novelist-Philosophers-XII: George L \io t\H orizon  17 (Jan. 1948), 50- 
62, p. 57.
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Newman, and the philosophical idealism of Green.24 That Eliot would not 
dismiss this opposing tendency in philosophy and letters is suggested by her 
famous reaction to her first reading of The Origin o f Species:
It will have a great effect in the scientific world, causing a thorough 
and open discussion of a question about which people have hitherto 
felt timid. So the world gets on step by step towards brave 
clearness and honesty! But to me the Development theory and all 
other explanations of processes by which things came to be, 
produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies 
under the processes.23
Further, it is little observed that George Henry Lewes’s magnum opus. 
Problems o f  Life and Mind (third series, 1879) which Eliot revised prior to 
publication after Lewes’s death, is as Jack Kaminsky points out, a 
comprehensive attempt to unite the two seemingly incompatible positions of 
empiricism and idealism into a synthetic ‘empirical metaphysics’.26 
Kaminsky argues that the traditional view of Lewes as a thorough-going 
positivist, while understandable, is false, and that his dispute with metaphysics 
is for the most part concerned with its methods rather than its subject matter: 
Lewes ‘was not in opposition to metaphysical speculation per se’.27 And K. 
M. Newton argues that Spencer and Lewes should not to be thought of as 
‘pure’ empiricists; indeed, one of Lewes’s ‘main concerns was to account for 
the Kantian categories which condition human knowledge in evolutionary and 
biological terms, thus effecting a reconciliation between Kantian thinking and
empiricism’.2 8
24 Jack Kaminsky, ‘The Empirical Metaphysics o f  George Henry Lewes’, Journal o f  the 
History o f  Ideas XIII (1952), 314-32, p. 314
25 Letters, 3, 227. This issue shall be discussed in greater detail in chapter five.
26 Kaminsky, ‘Empirical Metaphysics’, p. 314.
27 Kaminsky, ‘Empirical Metaphysics’, p. 317. Valerie Dodd, in revealing the contents o f a 
notebook belonging to Eliot now held in the Nuneaton Library, points out that in Eliot's 
‘chain’ o f philosophers through the ages, she includes Kant and Hegel o f  ‘only four thinkers 
who suwived into her own century’. Dodd argues that this is evidence o f her continuing 
interest in Idealism. The other two nineteenth-century thinkers are Gall (the phrenologist) 
and Comte. See Valerie A. Dodd, ‘A George Eliot Notebook’, Studies in Bibliography: 
Papers o f  the Bibliographical Society o f  the University o f  Virginia 34 (1981), 258-62, p. 
262.
28 K. M. Newton, George Eliot: Romantic Humanist (Totowa, N. J: Barnes & Noble, 
1981), p. 59. Newton also points out that m Problems o f  Life and Mind, 1, 219, Lewes cites 
Eliot, and ‘suggests her agreement with his belief that Kantian thinking can be reconciled
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Eliot had a distrust of all systems, and not exclusively metaphysical 
systems, so it is not surprising that not only would she be less confident than 
the other members of her circle about the hermeneutic quest, but that she 
would look for another discourse in which to conduct her ‘experiments in 
life’. This discourse would be particular and individual, rather than general 
and synthetic, and would embrace the human and the intersubjective, rather 
than the broad sweep of abstractions from philosophical or scientific first 
principles:
But my writing is simply a set of experiments in life— an 
endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be capable 
of—what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give 
promise of a better after which we may strive—what gains from 
past revelations and disciplines we must strive to keep hold of as 
something more sure than shifting theory. I become more and more 
timid—with less daring to adopt any formula which does not get 
itself clothed for me in some human figure and individual 
experience, and perhaps that is a sign that if I help others to see at 
all it must be through that medium of art.29
Before we begin to discuss these ‘experiments’ in the form of some key
scenes from Adam Bede, and discuss them in relation to Schleiermacher, Kant
and Spinoza, it will be necessary to set the historical context in order to back
up our claim that Eliot’s work might be informed by these philosophical
concerns.
After the Pantheismusstreit (the Pantheism Controversy) and Kanfs 
death, the first half of the nineteenth century was notable for the sustained 
attempt somehow to find a synthesis o f Kant and Spinoza, of which the latter 
assumed utmost importance (see above, chapter one).30 The Romantics had an 
anti-Kantian impulse, but they nonetheless took up Kanfs suggestion of the 
Sublime in the third Critique as a way of bridging the gap between the
with empiricism’ (p. 60). See also Edith Sim cox’s tribute to ‘George Eliot’ in The 
Nineteenth Century 9 (1881), 778-801.
29 Letters, VI, 216-7.
30 B. A. Gerrish tells the fascinating story about this controversy, which from a seemingly 
insignificant episode ‘grew into a broad literary debate about the merits o f Spinoza's 
allegedly “pantheistic” conception o f God’. See ‘The Secret Religion o f  Germany: Christian 
Piety and the Pantheism Controversy’, The Journal o f  Religion 67 (October 1987), 437-55, 
p. 439.
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phenomenal and the noumenal that the first and second Critiques had opened 
up. The possibility of a ‘constitutive aesthetic form’ is present in the third 
Critique, and ‘arises out of the connection between the sublime and the 
reason’, although however it is ‘inconceivable that Kant should have allowed 
a breakthrough to the noumenal world’.31 Kant had no answer to the 
irreparable fracture ofthe autonomous subject, seemingly operating at once in 
the phenomenal realm of cause and effect, and the noumenal world of freedom 
and poetry.32 Kanfs only ‘solution’ to this dichotomy ‘was to split the subject 
down the middle, secreting its liberty at such an unsearchable depth that it 
becomes at once inviolable and ineffectual’.33 Kantianism had the third kind 
of knowledge of Spinoza and other ‘metaphysical’ pretensions (such as 
Leibniz’s ‘dogmatism’) in its sights, and was not just an attempted answer to 
Hume’s scepticism.34 However, the early German Romantics responded to the 
Kantian ‘crisis’ by taking up Kant’s own suggestion that the sublime could 
reveal those moments not exhausted by Reason, affirming that which Kant 
had refuted. Here, the position of art and poetry becomes crucial. For the 
Romantics, it was the sublime figured through art which could provide a sense
31 Adam Hazard, Philosophy o f  the Literary Symbolic (Tallahassee: Florida State 
University Press, 1983), p. 43.
32 Xerry Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic (Oxford and Cambridge, Ma: Blackwell, 
1990), p. 81.
33 Eagleton, Ideology, p. 100. Husserl claims that Kant, ‘warned by Hume’s scepticism, 
fears [ ...]  eveiy recourse to the psychological as an absurd perversion o f the genuine 
problem o f the understanding, [...] [and] gets involved in this mythical concept-formation, 
[...] His transcendental concepts are thus unclear in a quite peculiar way, such as that for 
reasons o f principle they can never be transposed into clarity, can never be transformed into 
a formation o f meaning which is direct and procures self-evidence’. Thus Kant is not truly 
‘radical’, he is ‘a child o f his time, completely bound by its naturalistic psychology’. 
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis o fthe European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: 
An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (first pub. 1954; Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), p. 115.
34 Henry Allison offers a corrective to what he perceives has been a one-sided 
interpretation by Anglo-American critics, viz., that the Critique o f  Pure Reason was directed 
for the most part at Hume’s scepticism. Allison claims that Kant’s little known On a 
Discovery, which was published at the same time as the Critique o f  Judgement (1790), 
points to the conclusion that the Critique o f  Pure Reason was equally distinguishing itself 
from Liebnizian rationalism. See The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: An English translation 
together with supplementary materials and a historical-analytic introduction to Immanuel 
K a n t’s 'On a D iscovery According to Which Any New Critique o f  Pure Reason Has Been 
Made Superfluous by an Earlier O ne’ (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), p. 104.
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of the noumenal: ait could attempt to bridge the gap, and affirm (contra Kant)
the possibility of metaphysical k n o w le d g e .3 5  Wordsworth (an ‘imaginative’
Spinozist according to John J o n e s ) ,36 seems to have expressed this idea in
‘Tintem Abbey’:
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
O f harmony, and the deep power of joy 
We see into the life of things.3 7
The key figure for our purposes in the Jena gi'oup of early Romantics is 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, whom it is probable that Eliot read.38 She would
35 K. M. Newton argues that E lio f s work can be seen as an attempt to reconcile two facets 
o f  Romanticism; the ‘ego isf strand, comprising Byron, Chateaubriand, Lenau, Stirner and 
Nietzsche, who represent an ‘anti-metaphysical’ position; and ‘organicist Romantic’, 
comprising Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Schelling and Schleiermacher, but without 
their ‘metaphysical basis’. George Eliot: Romantic Humanist, p. 11.
36 John Jones, The Egotistical Sublime: A H istory o f  W ordsworth’s Imagination (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1954), p. 36. He writes: ‘Because Wordsworth saw the world as an 
intelligible complex— “frame” is his favourite term— and yet was neither pure materialist 
nor pure idealist, it may fairly be said that his closest philosophical link was with Spinoza. 
And this is an illuminating comparison, provided that imaginative kinship be not 
confounded with formal allegiance. Both were possessed o f an intense ethical passion; both 
talked much o f virtue and wisdom as a discipline (critics have noted the Judaic quality o f  
‘Michael’ and other narrative poems); both had the same instinctive reaction to the 
Cartesian problem o f matter and mind, admitting difference but denying opposition. Above 
all, both were monists’.
37 The Poetical Works o f  William Wordsworth, ed. by E. de Sel incourt, 5 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1944), II, 260,11. 47-9.
38 On the 2nd o f  November, 1851, Eliot wrote to Sarah Hennell, asking her to send ‘the MS 
translation o f  Schleiermacher’s little book and also the book itse lf {Letters, 1, 372). Haight 
says in a note that he cannot identify the book ‘with certainty’. The only works o f  
Schleiermacher’s that appear to have been translated into English before and during this 
time are: B rief Outline o f  the Study o f  Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1851); 
Schleiermacher’s Introductions to the Dialogues o f  Plato, translated by William Dobson 
(Cambridge, 1836); and The Life o f  Schleiermacher as Unfolded in his Autobiography and  
Letters (London, 1860). However, given that Eliot was only requesting an MS translation, 
and not a published translation, we may have to rule them out (reluctantly in the case o f the 
B rief Outline, as it contains some hermeneutics). Otherwise, the book which automatically 
suggests itself is the famous Speeches, which appeared in numerous editions during the 
nineteenth century, but not in an English edition, although it is possible that a translation o f  
some sort was in circulation. Another (admittedly slight) possibility is that Eliot was being 
ironic when she asked for Schleiermacher’s ‘little’ book, and that she in fact was referring 
to his voluminous The Christian Faith. Some evidence for this is provided in the same letter 
to Sarah Hennell, where Eliot directs her to an article by James Martineau in ûxQProspective 
Review  7 (1851), 472-501, entitled, ‘The Harmony o f the Intuitional and Logical Elements 
in the Ultimate Grounds o f  Religious B e lie f . In this article, Martineau cites The Christian 
Faith at length, thus possibly prompting Eliot’s interest in it. I certainly believe that Eliot 
read The Christian Faith some time before writing The M ill on the Floss (1860). I am 
thinking o f the passage in that novel where the narrator describes Maggie as being 
‘unhappily quite without that knowledge o f  the irreversible laws within and without her 
which, governing the habits, becomes morality, and, developing the feelings o f  submission 
and dependence, becomes religion’ (book 4, chapter 3). This seems to me to be very close to 
Schleiermacher’s characteristic idea o f  religion as ‘a feeling o f absolute dependence’. 
Although Schleiermacher evoked this idea in the Speeches, it was only in The Christian 
Faith that he formulated it in precisely this way.
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certainly have been aware of his ideas, ranging from his early Romanticism to 
his later hermeneutics, as these were intimately related to various ideas that 
were part ofthe intellectual milieu of the mid-Victorian period.39
Stephen Prickett, in his recent book Origins o f Narrative, explores the 
contribution of Schleiermacher to the Jena group, claiming that he remained 
more of a Kantian than some of the other members of the group, in particular 
Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling, each of whom allowed Kant’s ideas of reason to 
be ‘constitutive’ rather than merely ‘regulative’.40 Nevertheless, while it is 
true that Schleiermacher followed Kant in his seeming appropriation of the 
ideas of the third Critique, together with Kant’s emphasis on ‘subjectivity’, it 
remains clear that in the Speeches Schleiermacher was primarily motivated by 
an anti-Kantian impulse; indeed, the Speeches were written for those ‘cultured 
despisers’ of religion who were a product of the Aufklarung and Kant’s 
Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone (1792).41 It seems that 
Schleiermacher’s work is in part an attempted synthesis of Kant and Spinoza, 
one which overturns the negativity of the Kantian formulation of religion, 
while also being in tension with the metaphysical approach of orthodox 
religion which itself would be a legitimate target of Kantianism. For 
Schleiermacher, religion is a completely separate realm, and not an object of 
knowledge per se: ‘it is religion that first completes the circle of the truly
human’.42
Julia A. Lamm argues that two early essays of Schleiermacher, written 
during 1793-94, establish his system as that of a ‘post-Kantian Spinozism,
39 None o f Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics was published during Eliot’s lifetime, with the 
exception o f part o f the B rief Outline to the Study o f  Theology. See K. Clements, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher: Pioneer o f  Modern Theology (London: Collins, 1987), p. 157. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it would be inconceivable that an area o f such fundamental 
concern and topical debate could have escaped her attentions.
49 Stephen Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative: The Romantic Appropriation o f  the Bible 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 189.
41 Rudolf Otto, Introduction to the 1926 rpt. o f  the 1st ed. o f the Speeches, rpt. in Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, On Religion, Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. by John Oman 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958, from the 3rd German edition), pp. 16-7.
42 Otto, Introduction to Schleiermacher, Speeches, p. xviii.
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which has four defining characteristics: an organic monism, an ethical 
determinism, a higher realism, and a nonanthropomorphic view of God’ 43 
Lamm observes that Schleiermacher was heavily influenced by Jacobi, who 
posited a stark choice between, on the one hand, ‘atheism, pantheism, and 
determinism’, which he saw as various interpretations of Spinozism; and on 
the other, ‘Christian theism and free will’. In the context of Kant’s three 
Critiques, Schleiermacher developed his own version of Spinozism, but one 
modified and circumscribed by the critical philosophy, a so-called ‘third 
alternative’ to Jacobi's rather severe dichotomy.44
Richard Crouter, in his edition of the Speeches, argues that 
‘ Schleiermacher’s work brilliantly reflects the tensions between the religious 
thought of the Enlightenment and Romanticism’.45 Crouter reflects on the 
differences and similarities between the Speeches and Kanfs Religion Within 
the Limits o f Reason Alone. Both works are eschatological, and emphasise the 
importance of history, although Kant emphasises duty over desire, while for 
Schleiermacher ‘a serene moment of eternity is disclosed in the immediate 
relation of an individual to the universe’. Both works ‘envisage the human in a 
broken world’, and make morality and religion less dependent on external 
authorities. While Kant proposes a natural religion, against all forms of 
‘ecclesiastical faith that is rooted in Scripture, myth, miracles, and ritual’, 
Schleiermacher regards natural religion as being ‘shallow’ and ‘deistic’, and 
‘sees in the actual lived religion (“positive religions”) the locus of true faith 
and contrasts this with its corrupt institutional forms’. While Kant rationalizes 
dogma, Schleiermacher in the Speeches ‘stands aloof from the intellectual 
problems of specific Christian d o g m a s ’.46 In other words, it appears that
43 Julia A. Lamm, ‘Schleiermacher’s Post-Kantian Spinozism: The Early Essays on 
Spinoza, 1793-94’, The Journal o f  Religion  74, 4 (October 1994), 476-505, p. 476.
44 Lamm, ‘Schleiermacher’s Post-Kantian Spinozism’, p. 504.
45 Richard Crouter, Editor’s Introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. by Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 1.
46 Crouter, Editor’s Introduction, pp. 26-7.
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Schleiermacher was trying to synthesise two opposing tendencies, not wanting 
either to remain entirely within one, nor wanting to embrace the other. 
Schleiermacher, in contrast to the philosophical systems of Kant and Fiche,
seeks a more open-ended, literary-rhetorical way of defending a 
philosophical interpretation of religion that will give religion its 
due on its own terms. [...] If  the Kantian dichotomy between spirit 
and nature, represented by the realms of noumena and phenomena, is too great for Schleiermacher, the romantics’ insistence in 
collapsing these distinctions into a single mode of poetic awareness 
ends with too vacuous a line being drawn between spirit and
nature.47
Schleiermacher is perhaps best characterised as a ‘thinker of fmitude’, steering
a course between Kant and the Romantics.48
For Schleiermacher, understanding is an unending task, so the search for
meaning, what he terms the ‘inner unity’ is only to be achieved in an
approximate and provisional s e n s e .49 However, we can find a substitute for
this sense of completeness that is sought; for Schleiermacher this is located in
‘feeling’ {Gefühï)'>^
The sum total of religion is to feel that, in the highest unity, all that 
moves us in feeling is one; to feel that aught single and particular is 
only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our 
being and living is a being and living in and through God. But it is 
not necessary that the Deity should be presented as one distinct 
object.31
47 Crouter, Editor’s Introduction, p. 39.
48 Jack Forstman, A Romantic Triangle: Schleiermacher and Early German Romanticism  
(Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 81-6, cited in Crouter, Editor’s Introduction, 
Schleiermacher, Speeches, p. 38. Hans W. Frei has written extensively on this difficult area. 
See especially The Eclipse o f  Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); 
and Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. by George Hunsinger and William C. 
Placher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
49 David Carroll observes that ‘the search [for meaning] is continuous— the hermeneutic 
circle never stops turning— the most that can be gained at each stage is a fresh and 
conditional awareness o f unity and meaning’. George Eliot, p. 35.
39 Julia A. Lamm notes the importance o f  feeling {Gefühl) for Schleiermacher, and locates 
this in the fact ‘that he was deeply troubled by the unbridgeable gap that Kant had 
established between freedom and desire, a gap that Schleiermacher interpreted as a further 
reification o f the gulf between phenomena and noumena found in the Critique o f  Pure 
Reason'. ‘The Early Philosophical Roots o f  Schleiermacher’s Notion o f  Gefühl, 1788- 
1794’, H arvard Theological Review  87:1 (1994), 67-105, p.73.
31 Schleiermacher, Speeches (Oman ed.), pp. 49-50.
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It appears that, for Schleiermacher, the concept of God is secondary to the 
essence of religious feeling, and certainly Schleiermacher would seem to 
suggest this, when he stresses that
religion is not knowledge and science, either of the world or of 
God. Without being knowledge, it recognises knowledge and 
science. It is itself an affection, a revelation of the Infinite in the 
finite, God being seen in it and it in God.32
Religion for Schleiermacher is not about ethics or metaphysics, or even 
strictly speaking, theology. This invites an immediate comparison with 
Spinoza, whose Tractatus established principles of biblical criticism that 
would inspire the later German ‘higher’ critics. Inspired by Spinoza’s 
approach, if not by his rigorous philosophy of immanence, Schleiermacher 
radically historicised and demythologised the Scriptures in a manner akin to 
his revered predecessor (see above, chapter one). According to 
Schleiermacher:
The sacred writings were not for perfect believers alone, but rather 
for children in belief, for novices, for those who are standing at the 
entrance and would be invited in, and how could they go to work 
except as I am now doing with you? [...] As you can easily see, a 
communication of this sort could be nothing other than poetical or 
rhetorical. Akin to the rhetorical is the dialectic, and what method 
has from old been more brilliantly or more successfully employed 
in revealing the higher nature, not only of knowledge, but of the 
deeper feelings? But if the vehicle alone satisfies, this end will not 
be reached. Wherefore, as it has become so common to seek 
metaphysics and ethics chiefly, in the sacred writings, and to 
appraise them accordingly, it seems time to approach the matter 
from the other end, and to begin with the clear-cut distinction 
between our faith and your ethics and metaphysics, between our 
piety and what you call morality.33
Certainly Schleiermacher cannot escape completely the historical charge 
that has been levelled at him most often, that of being a Spinozist, as any 
number of quotations from his Speeches reveal Spinozistic ‘echoes’, if not a 
‘radical immanence’ which parallels Spinoza’s fundamental doctrine of the
32 Schleiermacher, Speeches, p. 36. John Martin Creed claims that Schleiermacher, like 
Hegel, ‘breaks with the conception o f  a God external to the world’. The Divinity o f  Jesus 
Christ: A Study in the H istory o f  Christian Doctrine since Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1938), p. 41.
33 Schleiermacher, Speeches, p. 34.
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single substance with infinite attributes.34 However, Schleiermacher denied
the literal charge of Spinozism and pantheism at every point, notwithstanding
his famous eulogy of Spinoza quoted by Lewes (see above, chapter one). In a
note to the third edition of the Speeches, Schleiermacher insists that he only
ascribed piety and religiosity to Spinoza, and that he did not subscribe to his
philosophical system:
How would I expect that, because I ascribed piety to Spinoza, I 
would myself be taken for a Spinozist? Yet I had never defended 
his system, and anything philosophic that was in my book was 
manifestly inconsistent with the characteristics of his views and 
had quite a different basis than the unity of substance. Even Jacobi 
[who we can recall fuelled the Pantheism Controversy] has in his criticism by no means hit upon what is most characteristic. When I 
recovered my astonishment, in revising the second edition, this 
parallel occurred to me.33
Otto suspects that Schleiermacher is being slightly disingenuous here, 
and claims that some of the revisions to the Speeches could be seen ‘as an 
attempt to give [it] a Christian interpretation’. In any case, he believes the 
work fully deserves its pantheistic and Spinozistic labels, and any attempt on 
Schleiermacher's part to avoid these charges was a failure.36 Van A. Harvey 
takes the view that Schleiermacher regarded the concept of God, for example, 
‘as almost irrelevant to religion in the first edition’, but in the second and 
third, all the offending passages are ‘eliminated or revised’ to take account of 
the sensibilities of his more ‘orthodox’ readers.3? Further, Harvey claims that 
the second and third editions lack the ‘agnostic’ and ‘radical’ character of the 
first edition.38 Richard Crouter, in his careful study, gives a balanced account
34 Bernard M. G. Reardon, Religion in the Age o f  Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 57.
33 Schleiermacher, p. 104.
36 Otto, Introduction to Schleiermacher, Speeches, p. xviii.
37 Van A. Harvey, ‘On the New Edition o f  Schleiermacher’s Addresses on Religion', 
Journal o f  the American Academy o f  Religion  39 (1971), 488-512, p. 499.
38 Harvey, ‘On the New Edition’, p. 502. He writes: ‘Although Schleiermacher regarded 
religious intuition as something like insight into the unceasing and unified activity o f the 
universe, he also felt it important to stress that any attempt by the intellect to conceptualize 
or symbolize this unity went beyond the limits o f  intuition and threatened to collapse into 
“empty mythology”.’
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of the changes, and claims that changes, both stylistic and substantial, were 
made for a variety of reasons, only one of which was because of the effort to 
play down the Spinozistic associations.39 However, Harvey, in his 
characteristic way, tells us we are missing the point, as:
the radicality of the Schleiermacher’s early position does not 
consist in his pantheism or, indeed, in any view he articulated 
regarding God and the universe. It consists, rather, in his view that 
the entire dispute—pantheism versus theism—is irrelevant for 
religion as he conceives it because religion neither posits nor 
requires such a relationship. The idea of God is not itself essential 
to any religious intuition of the universe. One should take 
Schleiermacher seriously when he writes that religion has nothing 
to do with the God of existence and moral demand.60
Bernard Reardon believes that there is no overwhelming evidence of
inconsistency throughout the Speeches, and ‘no radical break in the continuity
of his doctrines’.61 However, despite being extremely close at times to a
Spinozistic position, Schleiermacher cannot be classed as a pantheist, because
‘feeling’ while not knowledge per se, is the ‘transcendental ground of all
knowledge as of all action’. Feeling is the unity of the self that ‘alone provides
the means by which His [God’s] reality can become accessible to us’.
Ultimately ‘God and the Universe are, then, not the same, but neither can they
be conceived apart from one another; if there is no complete identification of
the two ideas, nor is there a complete separation’.62 Nor equally can
Schleiermacher be seen to reduce religious experience to pure subjectivity.
The ‘feeling of absolute dependence’, which in the mature theology of The
Christian Faith replaces his earlier Gefühl, ‘is an intuition of ultimate reality
39 Crouter, Editor’s Introduction, pp. 56-58.
60 Harvey, ‘On the New edition’, p. 504.
61 Reardon, Religion, p. 31.
62 Reardon, Religion, pp. 44-45. But compare John Cobb, who argues that ‘Schleiermacher 
requires little more than that the universe as a whole be understood as a living and infinite 
unity on which each o f  its parts must be seen as absolutely dependent. Specifically, 
Schleiermacher finds fully acceptable the philosophy o f Spinoza.’ John Cobb, Living 
Options in Protestant Theology: A Survey o f  M ethods (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1962), p. 131, However, Richard R. Niebuhr argues that Schleiermacher is incorrectly seen 
by ‘existentialist’ theologians as a pantheist or mystic because they cannot shake o ff ‘the 
Kierkegaardian-Kantian dictum o f the infinite abyss between God and man’. Richard R. 
Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (London: SCM Press, 1964), p. 13.
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and not merely—pace Schleiermacher’s critics—a purely subjective state’.63 
In surveying the whole of Schleiermacher’s theology, Reardon is left with the 
impression of a
theology subtly transformed into a philosophy of idealist monism.
How precisely this has been done tends to elude him, however. The 
traditional landmarks are there: revelation, the Bible, the articles of 
faith, the church. Yet all show in a perspective new and somehow altered. Their objectivity has become less palpable, their meaning 
more e q u i v o c a l . 6 4
The ‘equivocal’ nature o f Schleiermacher’s programme—the blend of 
Kantianism and Spinozism, its radical break with the rationalist and empirical 
tradition, all the while maintaining an ostensible orthodoxy—cannot be 
considered apart from his hermeneutics. Indeed, as Crouter points out, one of 
the reasons for the revisions in the Speeches over a long period, is that they in 
part ‘reflect the author's continued struggle with the problem of knowledge 
and utterability of the experience of unity between self and consciousness’. 
His concerns became deeper and wider, as he wanted to perceive the ‘unity 
that lies behind all human k n o w i n g ’ .65
Schleiermacher thus established a general philosophical hermeneutics, 
and in doing so freed the more narrow theological hermeneutics from its 
ecclesiastical s h a c k l e s . 6 6  For this reason he has the distinction of being the 
founder of the modern discipline of hermeneutics, which became not only 
about the understanding of biblical texts, but about all texts; indeed, about the 
'art' of understanding anything at a l l . 67 It goes without saying that the Bible 
would now be read as any other text; that is, using general hermeneutical 
principles rather than narrow biblical e x e g e s i s . 6 8  Understanding became ‘a
63 Reardon, Religion, p. 42.
64 Reardon, Religion, p. 57.
65 Crouter, Editor’s Introduction, p. 58.
66 Werner Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 44.
67 Translator’s Introduction, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten 
Manuscripts, ed. by Heinz Kimmerle, trans. by James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, 
Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 1.
68 Translators’ Introduction, Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 7.
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dynamic process’ between the universal and the subjective, between 
‘comparison’ and ‘divination’; that is, not only the comparison of authors and 
texts, but also a ‘feeling’ as to ‘how language as a living thing has affected the 
fabric of thought and the mode of presentation’ (see below). And importantly 
for Schleiermacher, ‘also necessary is some insight into the kind of person 
who writes in order to descry how qualities unique to the author shaped the 
production’.69 In the following paragraphs from the Brief Outline o f the Study 
o f Theology, Schleiermacher begins to claim for the new discipline of 
hermeneutics its status as an ‘art’, the consequences of which will become 
apparent:
§132. The full understanding of a discourse or piece of writing is a 
kind of artistic achievement, and thus requires an ‘art doctrine’ or 
technology, which we designate by the term ‘hermeneutics’.
§133. Such a technology exists insofar as its rules of interpretation 
form a system resting on principles directly evident from the nature 
and thought of language.
§134. This ‘technology’ must be used; to exclude [it] would be 
possible only if one should somehow assume a miraculously 
inspired and perfect understanding of the canon.70
§140. No writing can be fully understood except in connection with 
the total range of ideas out o f which it has come into being and 
through a knowledge of the various relations important to the 
writers’ lives and to the lives for whom they write.
For every writing bears a relation to the collective life of 
which it is part, just as a single sentence relates to the whole 
discourse or writing in which it appears.71
The problem which immediately presents itself, is as Schleiermacher 
himself says: ‘One must already know a man in order to understand what he
69 Translators’ Introduction, Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 5. Kimmerle, in his 
Afterword to the Handwritten Manuscripts, insists on the importance o f feeling for 
Schleiermacher, where he stresses the intersubjective, social, and historical aspect of 
Schleiermacher’s thought.
70 Note how Schleiermacher continues the Kantian emphasis on human finitude and our 
difference from divine intuition.
71 Friedrich Schleiermacher, B rief Outline to the Study o f  Theology, trans. by Terence N. 
Tice (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox, 1966), pp. 56-8. A translation o f  this work was 
carried out by the English Congregationalist W. Farrer (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1850). It 
is not known whether Eliot read it or even knew o f its existence. None o f Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutics, with the exception o f the few paragraphs given here, was published until the 
twentieth-century.
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says, and yet one first becomes acquainted with him by what he s a y s . ’72 This 
is just one instance of the circular nature of all of our understanding, the 
classic hermeneutic circle; the apparent paradox that ‘the whole is understood 
from the parts, so the parts can be understood only from the whole’. For 
Schleiermacher, ‘this principle is of such consequence for hermeneutics and 
so incontestable that one cannot even begin to interpret without it.’73 The 
consequence of this paradox is that a text can never be understood completely: 
‘understanding is an unending task’.74 The ‘art’ of hermeneutics:
requires agility, an ability to weave from the ^ammatical to psychological side and from the comparative to divinatory method. 
Furthermore, interpretation involves constant movement back and 
forth, for it is always open to revision and supplementation. Since 
the life of the language and the life of the person form an infinite 
horizon, perfect understanding is an ideal ever approximated but 
never attained.75
But how does one begin to grasp meaning, however provisional? 
Schleiermacher answers his own question, by way of an example of the 
development of language in children:
For a child every instance of relating a name to an object must 
seem indefinite. It does not become definite until after many 
comparisons, and comparison demands references to particulars.
Only by means of associating and comparing particular meanings 
does one begin to grasp the inner unity. The inner unity is that which is representable in every particular instance of the intuition.
But since the completeness of the particular is never reached, the 
task is unending. Is there any substitute for this feeling of 
completeness? And even if one had such a substitute, would there
72 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, MS 1, p. 56.
73 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, MS 5, p. 196. The problem o f the hermeneutic circle is a 
later manifestation o f Zeno’s classic paradoxes. Interestingly enough, Eliot was wrestling 
with these paradoxes possibly as late as 1877, where in the notebook held in the Nuneaton 
Library, she refers to Zeno, ‘author o f the four arguments against motion’. Notebook no. 
GE890 ELI-8. And see Dodd, ‘A George Eliot Notebook’, pp. 258-9. Dodd tentatively 
assigns a dating o f 1867-1877 for the notebook.
74 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, MS 1, p. 41.
75 Translator’s Introduction, Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 6. Richard R. Niebuhr 
points out that the Spinozistic ‘idea o f  an ultimate, organic, unity o f meanings rested 
uneasily with Schleiermacher’s insistence on the infinality o f interpretation’. For 
Schleiermacher, there is not ‘only one correct exegesis o f a text’; this is the falsehood o f  
‘dogmatic’ hermeneutics as opposed to philosophical Schleiermacher, p. 91. 
One might add in passing that this is in tension with those who would argue that 
Schleiermacher underwent an unproblematical or uncritical assimilation o f  Spinoza’s 
philosophy.
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be any guarantee that one had grasped the inner unity accurately?
The guarantee could not be another rule having to do with method.
It could only be feeling. Thus this feeling must be the substitute for 
completeness. [...] The task can only be completed by
approximation. 76
In his ground-breaking work, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to 
Nietzsche, Andrew Bowie makes a careful study of the relationship between 
Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics and the little-known Aesthetics?^ He argues 
that the term ‘divination’, which as we have seen in the above example is the 
counterpoint to the ‘comparative’, has been wrongly taken (by Dilthey 
onwards) to mean Einfuhlung, or “‘feeling one’s way into” another person’s 
thought via their writings’. This has resulted in a ‘psychologist’ interpretation 
of divination, which Schleiermacher did not intend, and which is an absurdity 
anyway because Schleiermacher never used the term Einfühlung in the first 
place. Bowie argues that the standard interpretation cannot be sustained, as it 
clearly rejects the possibility that Schleiermacher could yet offer a way out of 
the ‘hopeless relativism that would make any kind of understanding between 
people impossible’.78 On the contrary, Schleiermacher’s formulation of the 
aesthetic act o f ‘divination’ involves ‘production’ and ‘creation’ {Erzeugung), 
and, far from being a ‘mystical act of identification’ with another author or 
speaker, is actually part of immediate se lf consciousness itself. The art of 
‘divination’, then, is ‘a necessary component of our everyday, and always 
incomplete, praxis of understanding each other and the world’.79
76 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, MS 1, pp. 76-7.
77 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester and 
New  York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 157. He writes: ‘Schleiermacher was one 
o f the first philosophers to take the “linguistic turn”. Whilst Kant sees the “conditions o f 
possibility” o f knowledge as being the necessary categorical operations o f our 
consciousness, Schleiermacher sees these conditions as dependent on language. [...]  
Language therefore “deconstructs” the opposition o f the empirical and the a priori because it 
is both sensuous and intelligible’ (pp. 146-7). I am much indebted to this excellent study. 
Bowie has recently translated and edited Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics and Criticism, 
together with various related texts. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and 
Criticism and Other Writings, trans. and ed. by Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
78 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 163.
79 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 164.
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The apparent paradox of subjectivity and meaning is central to Eliot’s 
work, and perhaps especially Adam Bede, whose central characters Dinah and 
Hetty, dramatise the search for a coherent world view. In many ways all the 
other characters in the novel tiy to understand, assimilate or synthesise the 
‘extremes’ represented by Dinah and H e tty .C a rro ll points out that the very 
language of Adam Bede—that of ‘optics, perspective, focus’— already makes 
the problem of hermeneutics central to the novel.81 Hetty and Dinah are 
continually unable to grasp each other’s meaning, and the narrator is in no 
doubt that the blame should be shared equally, and that Dinah, for all her 
‘divinity’, has yet to learn the ‘art’ of ‘divination’:
It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete 
view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this 
comprehension, as we learn the art of vision, by a good deal of hard 
experience, often with bruises and gashes incurred in taking things 
up by the wrong end, and fancying our space wider than it is.^2
Stephen Prickett makes an analysis of the ‘typology’ of Adam Bede, and
reads ‘The Two Bed-Chambers’ scene in terms of Schleiermacher’s
h e r m e n e u t i c s . 3^ jh e  unending nature of interpretation, and the need for
sympathetic ‘divination’, mean that while each girl’s ‘vision’ is flawed, what
becomes important
is the relationship between that vision and the unrepeatable context 
of the personal circumstances from which it arises. Both must be 
understood with sympathy and imagination—even though in the 
end judgement must be made. Seen thus this contrast between the
80 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 83. According to U. C. Knoepflmacher, Dinah and Hetty ‘are 
incomplete halves’. George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 118. John Goode adds: ‘If the primary 
function o f “The Two Bed Chambers” scene is to underlie the difference between them, it is 
also true that both are looking for a world beyond that in which they find themselves.’ 
'Adam Bede', p. 39. W. J. Harvey provides an excellent discussion o f imagery and 
symbolism in the novel, which largely contributes to the effect o f  this dichotomy, especially 
o f animal and nature imagery in relation to Hetty. See The A rt o f  George Eliot (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1961), pp. 222-45.
81 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 75.
82 George Eliot, Adam Bede, ed. by Stephen Gill (London: Penguin, 1980), p. 206. 
Hereafter, references will be given in the text.
83 Stephen Prickett, ‘Romantics and Victorians: From Typology to Symbolism,’ in Stephen 
Prickett, ed., Reading the Text: B iblical Criticism and Literary Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991), 182-224, p. 212.
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two girls’ act of worship becomes one of the most subtle and 
penetrating hermeneutical exercises in Victorian fiction.84
This is an extremely helpful reading because it establishes the key issue here
as modalities of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 5^ Obviously, the less-formed model is
Hetty’s narcissistic variety. Her self-regard is purely aesthetic and personal: in
terms of Kant she suffers from a failure ofthe categories, treating herself as an
external object rather than a self-determining s u b j e c t . ^ 6  she lacks the critical
distinction between herself as an empirical object of inner perception (the T’),
and the subject which determines this content. Her self-love is directed to
what she is—rather than the intersubjective ethical capabilities:
No eyelashes could be more beautiful than Hetty’s, and now, while 
she walks with her pigeon-like stateliness along the room and looks down on her shoulders bordered by the old black lace, the dark 
fringe shows to perfection on her pink cheek. They are but ill- defined pictures that her narrow bit of imagination can make of the 
future; but of every picture she is the central figure, in fine clothes 
(199).
Conversely, Dinah’s negation of the human world in favour of 
theological knowledge is just as limiting but in the other direction: an 
emphasis on metaphysical exteriority which fails to take into account her 
human situatedness and f m i t u d e . ^ 7  she cannot ‘accommodate’ herself
to the discovery that some of those cunningly-fashioned 
instruments we call human souls have only a limited range of 
music, and will not vibrate in the least under a touch that fills others with tremendous rapture or quivering agony (141).
Dinah’s ‘window’ is just as much a self-deceiving mirror as Hetty's g l a s s : ^ 8
^4 Prickett, ‘Romantics and Victorians’, pp. 212-3.
^5 Carroll suggests that Dinah and Hetty ‘achieve transcendence through their own 
typologies. [...] In their exclusive focus they both become their opposites’. George Eliot, p. 
82.
^6 For Kant, the aesthetic rests upon an ideal o f agreement. To regard something as 
beautiful entails that it be regarded as beautiful for all. In Kantian terms, this distinguishes 
beauty from mere pleasure or interest.
^7 George R. Creeger, in ‘An Interpretation o f Adam Bede', ELH 23 (1956), 213-38, also 
senses that ‘Dinah is an incomplete person’ (p. 235), and demonstrates ‘a kind o f  
unwillingness to become fully involved in life’ (p. 236).
Prickett, ‘Romantics and Victorians’, p. 212. He sees Hetty’s religion as ‘a textbook case 
of Feuerbachian projection’, and suggests that the novel as a whole reflects ‘the 
uncertainties that were increasingly to affect not merely biblical criticism, but all post- 
Kantian epistemology’ (p.213). He further suggests that while both girls are caught up in a
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She closed her eyes, that she might feel more intensely the 
presence of a Love and Sympathy deeper and more tender than was 
breathed from the earth and sky. That was often Dinah's mode of praying in solitude. Simple to close her eyes, and feel herself 
enclosed by the Divine Presence; then gradually her fears, yearning 
anxieties for others, melted away like ice-crystals in a warm ocean.
She had sat in this way perfectly still, with her hands crossed on 
her lap, and the pale light resting on her calm face, for at least ten
minutes, when she was startled by a loud sound, apparently of
something falling in Hetty’s room. But like all sounds that fall on 
our ears in a state of abstraction, it had no distinct character, but 
was simply loud and startling, so she felt uncertain whether she had 
interpreted it rightly (202).89
Dinah cannot interpret the noises, and can only rely on opening the Bible at
random to make the choice between her conflicting impulses; and her literal
interpretation of the parable of Paul at Ephesus leads her totally to misjudge
the situation and Hetty’s needs.90 Dinah’s advice to Hetty is too
‘metaphysical’ and ‘anthropomorphic’, telling her in vague terms that she may
well be in trouble one day, the trouble that
‘comes to us all in this life: we set our hearts on things which it 
isn’t God’s will for us to have, and then we go on sorrowing. [...]
And I desire for you, that while you are young you should seek 
your strength from the Heavenly Father, that you may have a 
support which will not fail you in the evil day’ (205).9P
Dinah’s anthropomorphic conceptions make her a flawed eharacter and,
contrary to received wisdom which suggests that she is the idealised vehicle
hermeneutic circle, only Hetty’s is ‘truly closed’, for Dinah has the possibility o f  
‘participating in an open circle capable o f change and growth’ (p. 214). U. C. 
Knoepflmacher, while not explicitly considering the hermeneutic aspect, agrees that with 
Dinah there is the possibility o f development, but that Hetty ‘will remain blind’. 
Knoepflmacher puts this down to Hetty and Arthur’s being ‘chained to the sensory world’. 
George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 119.
89 Cf. Adam’s inability to interpret the sounds o f  his father attempting to enter the houseon 
the night o f  his untimely death (chapter four, p. 93).
90 M. Kischner, ‘Spinozisms in Three Novels o f George EW otAdam Bede, The M ill on the 
Floss, Silas M arn ef  (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University o f  Washington, 1976), p. 58. Cf. 
the drawing o f lots in the Lantern Yard religion in Silas Marner. George Eliot, Silas 
Marner, ed. by Q. D. Leavis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), part 1, ch. 1, pp. 60-2.
91 Dinah should have heeded Spinoza’s advice in the Ethics, where he shows the ‘falsity’ 
o f certain ‘prejudices’; ‘namely, that men commonly suppose all natural things to act, as 
they themselves do, for the sake o f  an end, and even regard it as certain that God him self 
directs everything to a particular end (for they saw that God made everything for the sake o f  
man, and man that he might worship God)’. Ethics, Pt. I, App., p. 34.
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for Eliot’s Feuerbachian religion of humanity, she actually receives very little 
narrative sympathy.92
A close study of her sermon reveals a similar condemnation of Dinah’s 
bibliolatry to that meted out by Eliot to Dr Gumming in an early essay (see 
above, chapter o n e ) .93 The sermon is ineffective, and fails to move the crowds 
(as Dinah tells Mr Irwine later), and shows an exploitative and judgmental 
side to the Methodist mission, as witnessed by the disturbing theological 
images with which Dinah warns Chad’s Bess to repent:
‘Poor child! poor child! He is beseeching you, and you don’t listen 
to him. You think of earrings and fine gowns and caps, and you 
never think of the Saviour who died to save your precious soul.
Your cheeks will be shrivelled one day, your hair will be grey, your 
body will be thin and tottering! Then you will begin to feel that 
your soul is not saved; then you will have to stand before God 
dressed in your sins, in your evil tempers and vain thoughts. And 
Jesus, who stands ready to help you now, won’t help you then: 
because you won’t have him to be your Saviour, he will be your 
judge. Now he looks at you with love and mercy, and says, “Come
92 Though he thinks the characterisation o f Dinah is ineffective, Albert J. Fyfe states baldly 
that Dinah ‘is Feuerbach’s principle o f  humanitarian love’. ‘The Interpretation o f Adam  
Bede,' p. 138. U. C. Knoepflmacher reads Adam Bede as a Feuerbachian allegory, where 
‘the selflessness and sympathy o f  Dinah Morris clearly prevail over the animalism ofHetty 
Sorrel’. Religious Humanism, p. 54. However, this reading, while illuminating, is far too 
schematic, and does not attend to the subtle dynamics o f the novel. In contrast, John Goode 
argues that Herbert Spencer’s work, and in particular his Social Statics (1851), which both 
Eliot and George Henry Lewes read, has more obvious relevance than the work of Comte 
and Feuerbach. '‘Adam B ed e\ pp. 26-30. Lewes wrote o f Social Statics'. ‘We remember no 
work on ethics since that o f  Spinoza to be compared with it’ {Letters, I, 364, cited by 
Goode, p. 4 In.). George C. Creeger, in ‘An Interpretation o f Adam Bede', while accepting 
that Adam Bede is ‘not merely fictionalised philosophy’ (p. 225n), nonetheless finds the 
Feuerbachian reading irresistible. Dorothy J. Atkins argues that Feuerbach, who posits an 
individual system o f  ethics, is less attractive to Eliot than Spinoza, because Spinoza 
‘recognises a universal moral order on which human values may be based’. George Eliot 
and Spinoza, p. 12. Ian Gregor argues that for Dinah, ‘George Eliot’s moral purpose is more 
complex. This is chiefly because she serves as a moral norm to define the weakness o f the 
other three’ (Hetty, Adam, and Arthur). Ian Gregor, ‘The Two Worlds o f  Adam Bede', in 
Ian Gregor and Brian Nicholas, The M oral and the Story (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), 
13-32, p.23. While Gregor acknowledges that Dinah has faults and must grow and be 
humanised, I would go further and suggest that she is just as inadequate as the rest o f  them, 
and certainly more so than Adam. As we shall see below, his development is the favoured 
model o f consciousness, to which Dinah must accommodate herself. Joan Bennett, normally 
a perceptive critic, states without qualification that ‘Dinah is presented without a fault, but 
Adam is not’. George Eliot: Her M ind and her A rt (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1948; 1962), p. 108.
93 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 80. He suggests that Dinah is ‘deeply flawed’. Graham Hough 
believes that Dinah’s sermon is ‘one o f  the few sympathetic pictures o f  the early Methodist 
fervour’. ‘George Eliot’, p. 56. However, John Goode argues that ‘the superbly structured 
sermon’ actually reinforces the parallel with Hetty ‘that both are alienated dreamers’.‘/I 
Bede', pp. 38-39. George C. Creeger observes that the sermon ‘scarcely touches the 
villagers’. ‘An Interpretation o f Adam Bede', p. 220.
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to me that you may have life”, then he will turn away from you, 
and say, “Depart from me into everlasting fire!” ’ (74-5).
There is no doubt that from the narrator’s perspective, and despite the
irony reserved for those who would represent their own variety of religion as
infallible, Dinah and Seth’s theological notions are incorrect and have nothing
to do with true religious feeling, which is not to be found in doctrine and
exegesis. Even so, the narrator tells us that we must not be too hasty in our
estimation of Methodism:
That would be a pity, for I cannot pretend that Seth and Dinah were 
anything else than Methodists—not indeed of that modern type 
which reads quarterly reviews and attends in chapels with pillared 
porticoes; but of a very old-fashioned kind. They believed in present miracles, in instantaneous conversions, in revelations by 
dreams and visions; they drew lots, and sought for Divine guidance 
by opening the Bible at hazard; having a literal way of interpreting 
the Scriptures, which is not at all sanctioned by approved 
commentators; and it is impossible for me to represent their diction as correct, or their instruction as liberal. Still— if I have read 
religious history aright—faith, hope, and charity have not always 
been found in relation to the three concords; and it is possible, 
thank Heaven! to have very erroneous theories and very sublime 
feelings (82).
Even during the meeting in the prison, Dinah is unable to understand
Hetty, and to use language appropriate to her n e e d s . 94 Dinah brings little
comfort to Hetty, and while she may bring about a confession, it is in spite of
rather than because of her rather chilling theological language:
‘My poor Hetty, death is very dreadful to you, I know it’s 
dreadful. But if  you had a friend to take care of you after death—in 
that other world—someone whose love is greater than mine—who 
can do everything. [...] If God our father was your friend, and was 
willing to save you from sin and suffering, so you should never 
know wicked feelings nor pain again? If  you could believe he loved 
you and would help you, as you believe he loved you and would 
help you, it wouldn’t be so hard to die on Monday, would it?’
‘But I can't know anything about it’, Hetty said, with a sullen sadness (495).
Dinah and Hetty eventually commune, but only in the sense that they become 
each other: Dinah at last registers real human suffering, and Hetty in her
94 R, A. Foakes, 'Adam Bede Reconsidered’, English 12 (1958-59), 173-6, p. 175.
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suffering shows that perhaps she too can l o v e . 9 5  But ultimately Dinah’s 
theology, to which she still returns in silent prayer, is inadequate: Hetty must 
be sacrificed to the human god of the legal system and to the relentless logic
of the hermeneutic.96
During all the defining moments of the book, except when she accepts 
Adam (thereby symbolically embracing the community and accepting her 
fmitude), Dinah is either ineffective or absent completely (for example, she is 
in Leeds when Hetty disappears). Dinah misreads the Bible and consequently 
receives the wrong moral guidance, just as in a similar way Maggie, in The 
Mill on the Floss, misreads Thomas a Kempis.97
Mrs Poyser, who stands midway between the positions of Dinah and 
Hetty, and who, despite herself, is fascinated by one (Hetty) and critical of the 
other (Dinah), comes closest to achieving this synthesis, although Tike the 
other inhabitants, she has a double vision of the world which leads her into 
contradiction and self-defeat’.98 Bartle Massey, who in his excessive 
rationality shares certain Spinozistic assumptions with Mrs Poyser, cannot 
even escape her criticism, and confirms that there is a gender aspect to the 
hermeneutic quest.99 Mrs Poyser is a eorrective to Hetty’s materialism as well 
as Dinah's ascetieism. She approaches the Bible Spinozistically;  ^90 that is, by
95 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 99. John Goode writes: ‘Only Dinah, with her limited and 
alienated way o f  coping with the world, is able to offer human contact. Both Hetty and 
Dinah live in a dream which questions the justice o f the secular world, and it is a bitterly 
ironic commentary on the secular ideology which the novel celebrates that it is Dinah who 
humanizes Hetty, because, in the enforced confrontation with reality, she can offer another, 
more resilient, dream to replace the one which has been destroyed.’ Adam Bede', p. 40.
96 Cf. Jenny Uglow, who writes: ‘Poor Hetty! It makes us think o f a sort o f Christian 
cannibalism— Eliot’s humanised love, like Christian salvation, cannot come about without 
that complex o f guilt, rejection, remorse and compassion which make up the notion o f  
‘sacrifice’— and in the disturbing plots o f  her early fiction the sacrificial victim is inevitably 
a woman.’ George Eliot (London: Virago Press, 1987), p. 113.
97 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 144.
98 Carroll, George Eliot, pp. 88-9. ‘Poyser’ is from the Old French ‘peseor’ or ‘weigher’, 
the official in charge o f  a weighing machine. P. H. Reaney, A Dictionary o f  British 
Surnames (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 258.
99 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 93.
190 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 55.
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the spirit and not the letter of the text, and by the light of natural knowledge. 
For Spinoza:
God’s eternal Word and covenant and true religious faith are 
divinely inscribed in men’s hearts—that is, in men’s minds—and 
that this is the true handwriting of God which he has sealed with 
his own seal, this seal being the idea of himself, the image of his
own divinity. 191
Mrs Poyser and Dinah engage in set-piece (and very one-sided) Socratic 
dialogues, where Dinah’s interpretation of the Scriptures and spiritual life is 
seen to be contrary to logic, and against the spirit of the text, not to mention to 
feed her desire for martyrdom and social alienation:
T never saw the like to you, Dinah’, Mrs Poyser was saying, ‘when 
you’ve once took anything into your head: there’s no more moving 
you than the rooted tree. You may say what you like, but I don’t 
believe that’s religion: for what’s the Sermon on the Mount about, 
as you’re so fond of reading to the boys, but doing what other folks 
‘ud have you do? But if it was anything unreasonable they wanted 
you to do, like taking your coat off and giving it to ‘em, or letting ‘em slap you in the face, I dare say you’d be ready enough: it’s 
only when one ‘ud have you do what’s plain common-sense and good for yourself, as you’re obstinate the other way’ (518).
Spinoza tells us in the Tractatus that the ‘meaning’, although not
necessarily the ‘letter’, of the Divine Law, ‘has come down to us
uncorrupted’:
For from Scripture itself we learn that its message, unclouded by 
any doubt or any ambiguity, is in essence this, to love God above 
all, and one’s neighbour as oneself. There can be no adulteration 
here, nor can it have been written by a hasty and errant pen; for if 
doctrine differing from this is to be found anywhere in Scripture, 
all the rest of its teaching must also have been different. For this is 
the basis of the whole structure of religion; if it is removed, the 
entire fabric crashes to the g r o u n d .  192
Accordingly, Mrs Poyser doesn’t require that the Bible as a whole be divinely
inspired, and can more rely on the standard books of the Anglican liturgy for
her moral guidance, and which in terms of the Tractatus provide her with the
fundamental moral precepts which ensure against the dissolution of society:
191 Spinoza, Tractatus, ch. 12, p. 205.
192 Spinoza, Tractatus, ch. 12, pp. 205, 211.
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‘And all because you’ve got notions i’ your head about 
religion more nor what's i ’ the Catechism and the Prayer-Book’.
But not more than what’s in the Bible, aunt’, said Dinah.
‘Yes, and the Bible too for that matter’, Mrs Poyser rejoined, 
rather sharply; ‘else why shouldn’t them as know best what’s in the 
Bible—the parsons and people as have got nothing to do but learn 
it— do the same as you do? But, for the matter o’ that, if  everybody 
was to do like you, the world must come to a standstill; for if 
everybody tried to do without house and home, and with poor 
eating and drinking, and was always talking as if we must despise 
the things o’ the world, as you say, I should like to know where the 
pick o’ the stock, and the corn, and the best cheeses ‘ud have to go? 
everybody ‘ud be wanting bread made o ’ tail ends, and everybody 
‘ud be running after someone else to preach to ‘em, instead o’ 
bringing up their families, and laying by against a bad harvest. It 
stands to sense as that can 7 be the right religion' (my italics, 122).
Dinah is pleasantly surprised when she finally meets the local clergyman
Mr Irwine. She is ‘quite drawn out to speak to him; I hardly know how, for I
had always thought of him as a worldly Sadducee’ (139). Mrs Poyser however
can recognise Mr Irwine’s human and intersubjective capacities, and see
beneath the surface of the different varieties of religion that the novel reveals:
‘but for the matter o ’ that, it’s the flesh and blood folks are made 
on as makes the difference. Some cheeses are made o’ skimmed 
milk and some o’ new milk, and it’s no matter what you call ‘em, 
you may tell which is which by the look and the smell’ (139-40).
Mr Irwine also uses Spinozistic assumptions, particularly in his
dialogues with Arthur. He represents a Spinozistic variant of determinism, the
‘undeviating law of consequences’, which far from negating human
responsibility, makes it all the more necessary (see above, chapter one).
Arthur, in bondage to the vacillations of the first kind of knowledge, and
trying to understand his infatuation with Hetty (who constantly defies
interpretation anyway), does not heed Irwine’s Spinozistic ‘prescription’: 193
‘Why, yes, a man can’t very well steal a bank-note unless the 
bank-note lies within convenient reach; but he won’t make us think 
him an honest man because he begins to howl at the bank-note for 
falling in his way’.
‘But surely you don’t think a man who struggles against a 
temptation into which he falls at last, as bad as the man who never 
struggles at all?’
193 Atkins, George E liot and Spinoza, p. 150.
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‘No, my boy, I pity him, in proportion to his struggles, for 
they foreshadow the inward suffering which is the worst form of 
Nemesis. Consequences are unpitying. Our deeds carry their 
terrible consequences, quite apart from any fluctuations that went 
before—consequences that are hardly ever confined to ourselves.
And it is best to fix our minds on this certainty, rather instead of 
considering what may be the elements of excuse for us’ (217-8).
But the force of these unyielding consequences are too strong, and
Arthur is not developed enough to become more self-determining, so Irwine
cannot help him, just as Dinah fails to help Hetty. 194 Arthur, who, tellingly,
dismisses most of the Lyrical Ballads as ‘twaddling stuff ( 1 0 9 ), 195 is thereby
at the same time dismissing his creator’s post-Romantic project, 196 and
though he is attracted by ‘The Ancient Mariner’, doesn’t understand its
relevance to his own destiny. 197 Adam, as Kischner points out, also represents
a ‘Spinozian brand of rationalism’. 198 His method of reading the Bible just as
any other text, ‘as a holiday book, serving him for history, biography, and
poetry’, and from which to glean the nuclear doctrines described earlier (see
above, chapter two) is deemed far more effective than the literal interpretation
and discursive treatment of Dinah and Seth. Adam even ‘enjoyed the freedom
of occasionally differing from an Apocryphal writer’ (5 4 2 ). 199 He shows that
his approach to the Scriptures is every bit as practical and oriented towards
this world as Mrs Poyser’s: “‘They that are strong ought to bear the infirmities
of those that are weak, and not to please themselves.” There's a text wants no
194 Knoepflmacher, George Eliot's Early Novels, p. 108.
195 Goode, 'Adam Bede', p. 24.
196 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 94.
197 Stephen Gill reminds us that ‘The Ancient Mariner’ is ‘about a man who commits a 
crime against Nature’. Explanatoiy notes io Adam Bede, p. 596n. Martin J. Svaglic writes 
that Eliot’s emphasis on fellow-feeling ‘connects her, for all her intellectualizing and 
realism, with her beloved Wordsworth and the Romantic Movement’. ‘Religion in the 
Novels o f  George Eliot’, p. 293.
198 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 32.
199 And see Tractatus, ch. 14, pp. 225-6. Spinoza reflects that ‘every man is in duty bound 
to adapt these religious dogmas to his own understanding and to interpret them for himself 
in whatever way makes him feel that he can the more readily accept them with full 
confidence and conviction’. According to Spinoza, ‘faith demands piety rather than truth; 
faith is pious and saving only by reason o f  the obedience it inspires, and consequently 
nobody is faithful except by reason o f  his obedience. Therefore the best faith is not 
necessarily manifested by him who displays the best arguments, but by him who displays 
the best works o f  justice and charity’.
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candle to show ‘t: it shines by its own light’ (93). In fact, Adam’s method is 
picked up by Lisbeth, who frequently holds theological discussions with Seth 
which parallel those of Mrs Poyser and Dinah:
‘An’ when the Bible’s such a big book, an’ thee canst read all 
thro ‘t, an’ ha’ the pick o’ the texes, I canna think why thee dostna 
pick words as donna mean so much more than they say. Adam 
doesna pick a that ‘n; I can understan’ the tex as he’s allays a- 
sayin’, “God helps them as helps theirsens’” .
‘Nay, mother,’ said Seth, ‘that’s no text o’ the Bible. It comes 
out of a book as Adam picked up at the stall at Treddles’on. It was 
wrote by a knowing man, but overworldly, I doubt. However, that 
saying’s partly true; for the Bible tells us we must be workers 
together with God’.‘Well, how’m I to know? It sounds like a tex’ (90).
Again, this shows the importance of accepting other sources of 
knowledge and inspiration than that of the Bible; and this is dramatised on a 
larger scale when Dinah marries Adam and gives up the preaching, thereby 
implicitly rejecting the Bible as the only source of guidance.^ 19 Carroll points 
out that ‘Adam’s moral universe consists essentially of God and his own 
conscience, both of which are defined by his carpentry’.! G He ‘asserts the 
claims of God over the gospel, and the claims of conscience over the 
unhealthy spirituality of the Methodists’.G2 Adam articulates a Spinozistic 
‘realism and rationalism’,G3 which predicates his moral sense on the truths of 
mathematics:
‘There’s nothing but what’s bearable as long as a man can work,’ 
he said to himself: ‘the natur o ’ things doesn’t change, though it 
seems as if one's own life was nothing but change. The square o’ 
four is sixteen, and you must lengthen your lever in proportion to 
your weight, is as true when a man’s miserable as when he’s 
happy; and the best o ’ working is, it gives you a grip hold o’ things 
outside your own lot’ (160).
Adam’s demonstration of proportionality is similar to that in the Ethics, 
where Spinoza explains the three kinds of knowledge with the example of
119 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 62.
111 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 83.
112 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 92.
113 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 38.
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finding a fourth proportional (see below, chapter one). Adam demonstrates his 
grasp of this by virtue of the second kind of knowledge, referring to a 
universal rule based on ‘the ground of a common property of proportionals’, 
and not by the vagaries of the first kind of knowledge, with its ‘confused, 
unorderly manner’; that is, ‘cognition from vague experience’.! 14 But Adam 
clearly still has a lot to learn, even in terms of the Spinozistic model, because 
the third kind of knowledge which eludes him is ‘capable of containing the 
claims of knowledge and feeling’,H5 of which the latter quality he is shown to 
be peculiarly lacking for most of the novel. This is seen particularly in relation 
to his father, whose narrative function seems to be to throw light on Adam's 
development, from moral ‘hardness’ to a position which goes beyond the 
Spinozistic and recognises the claims of sympathy and intersubjectivity. 116 
Indeed, it is only at the death of his father that he begins to learn the ‘alphabet’ 
of this language, which must first learn to recognise the ‘inward suffering’ of 
others: 117
Whenever Adam was strongly convinced of any proposition, it 
took the form of a principle in his mind: it was a knowledge to be 
acted on, as much as the knowledge that damp will cause rust. 
Perhaps here lay the secret of the hardness he had accused himself 
of: he had too little fellow-feeling with the weakness that errs in 
spite of foreseen consequences. Without this fellow-feeling, how are we to get enough patience and charity towards our stumbling, 
falling companions in the long and changeful journey? And there is 
but one way in a which a strong determined soul can learn it—by 
getting his heart-strings bound by the weak and erring, so that he 
must share not only in the outward consequence of their error, but 
their inward suffering. That is a long and hard lesson, and Adam 
had at present only learnt the alphabet of it in his father’s sudden 
death, which, by annihilating in an instant all that had stimulated his indignation, had sent a sudden rush of thought and memory 
over what had claimed his pity and tenderness (255-6).
Adam is equally as deceived by Hetty as Arthur is, and while coming
from different moral perspectives, both men’s inability to understand Hetty,
1 Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. XL, Scliol. 2. Cf. Tom's use o f  Euclid in The M ill on the Floss, ch. 2.
115 Kischner, ‘Spinozisms’, p. 39.
116 Creeger, ‘An Interpretation o f Adam Bede', p. 232.
117 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 92.
97
and to read the language of her soul, or rather the narrowness of her 
imagination and her lack of a moral and aesthetic sense, is continually 
juxtaposed. We are left in no doubt as to the difficulty of the hermeneutic 
process:
After all, I believe the wisest of us must be beguiled in this way sometimes, and must think both better and worse of people than 
they deserve. Nature has her language, and she is not unveracious; 
but we don’t know all the intricacies of her syntax just yet, and in a 
hasty reading we may happen to extract the very opposite of her 
real meaning. Long dark eyelashes, now: what could be more 
exquisite? I find it impossible not to expect some depth of soul 
behind a deep grey eye with a long dark eyelash, in spite of an 
experience which shows to me that they may go along with deceit, 
peculation, and stupidity. But if, in the reaction of disgust, I have betaken myself of a fishy eye, there is a surprising similarity of 
result. One begins to suspect at length that there is no direct 
correlation between eyelashes and morals; or else, that the 
eyelashes expresses the disposition of the fair one’s grandmother, 
which is on the whole less important to us (198-9).
Even though he is mistaken about Hetty’s character, and his own love
for her, there is something about Adam’s ‘aesthetic appreciation’ ofHetty that
‘enables him to see beyond her material reality to a higher o r d e r ’ . G 8  T h e
narrator cannot describe this beauty, prefening to compare it to music:
For the beauty of a lovely woman is like music: what can one say more? Beauty has an expression beyond and far above the one 
woman’s soul it clothes, as the words of genius have a wider 
meaning than the thought that prompted them (400).
Adam, too, has ‘no fine words into which he could put his feeling for Hetty’
(p. 400). The ‘schism’ between the concrete and the abstract, and the inability
of language to bridge this gap thus ‘emphasise the ineffability of the
experience’. And it is Adam’s inability to articulate these feelings, that brings
him, paradoxically, closer to ‘the truth of f e e l i n g ’ . G 9
The symbolic regeneration of Adam begins when he renounces his
previous hardness, and agrees to go to the courthouse for Hetty’s t r i a l . G O
G 8 Kenny Marotta, 'Adam Bede as a Pastoral’, Genre 9 (1976), 59-72, p. 69.
G 9 Marotta, 'Adam Bede', p. 65. Marotta argues that this is a Wordsworthian trait o f 
Eliot’s. He also suggests that ‘the higher order in Adam’s life, o f  which he cannot be aware, 
is his participation in the literary work’ (p. 70).
120 a trial is, o f  course, a retelling (and interpretation) o f  a narrative.
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Adam shares the bread and wine, the sacramental resonances of which are 
meant to be obvious, and finally begins to accept the claims of sympathy and 
intersubjectivity:
‘Mr Massey,’ he said at last, pushing the hair off his forehead,
‘I ’ll go back with you. I ’ll go into court. It’s cowardly of me to 
keep away. I ’ll stand by her—I’ll own her for all she’s been 
deceitful. They oughtn’t to cast her off—her own flesh and blood.
We hand folks over to God’s mercy, and show none ourselves. I 
used to be hard sometimes: I ’ll never be hard again. I ’ll go with 
you, Mr Massey—I ’ll go with you.’
This acceptance of moral hardness is further reinforced by Adam’s 
second meeting in the wood with Arthur, where Adam is now is not only able 
to master his emotions and commune with the other man, but also learn the 
language of suffering: G 1
There was silence for several minutes, for the struggle in 
Adam’s mind was not easily decided. Facile natures, whose emotions have little permanence, can hardly understand how much 
inward resistance he overcame before he rose from his seat and 
turned towards Arthur. Arthur heard the movement, and turning 
round, met the sad but softened look with which Adam said,
‘It’s true what you say, sir: I ’m hard—it’s in my nature. I was 
too hard with my father for doing wrong. I ’ve been a bit hard to 
everybody but her. I felt as if nobody pitied her enough—her 
suffering cut into me so! and when I thought the folks at the Farm 
were too hard with her, I said I ’d never be hard to anybody myself 
again’ (514).
Adam’s sense of sorrow and suffering gradually transmute into 
submission and sympathy, and allow him to commune with Dinah, not 
however through theology or divine grace, but through imperceptible ‘signs’ 
of sympathy and intersubjectivity. These intuitive, unspeakable ‘signs’ 
demonstrate the incapacity of words, but paradoxically at the same time 
demonstrate the inescapability of narrative and the pressing need for human 
‘divination’ and true understanding. This tentative way out of the ‘infinite 
regress’ of the hermeneutic circle has a ‘musical’ aspect, disrupting semantic 
logic, and demanding meaning not by the relation of signifier to signified, but
121 Dorothy J. Atkins reads this as a Spinozistic overcoming o f  bondage to the passions. 
See George Eliot and Spinoza, p. 118.
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by its own internal coherence and the ability in the aesthetic act to represent
the unrepresentable: 122
Those slight looks and touches are part of the soul’s language; and 
the finest language, I believe, is chiefly made up of unimposing 
words, such as Tight,’ ‘sound,’ ‘stars,’ ‘music’—words really not 
worth looking at, or hearing, in themselves, any more than ‘chips’ 
or ‘sawdust’: it is only that they happen to be s i^ s  of something 
unspeakably great and beautiful. I am of the opinion that love is a 
^ e a t and beautiful thing too; and if you agree with me, the smallest 
signs of it will not be chips and sawdust to you: they will rather be 
like those little words, ‘light’ and ‘music,’ stirring the long-winding 
fibres of your memory, and enriching your present with your most 
precious past (537).
Indeed, Adam’s love for Dinah has ‘a new sacredness’ precisely because 
it had ‘grown out of that past: it was the noon of that morning’ (546). It is 
often overlooked that it is Adam who persuades Dinah to embrace the 
community and to dismiss the competing claims of dogmatic theology, and 
not Dinah whose ideality beckons Adam to enter her state of Feuerbachian 
grace. In the midst of Dinah’s prevarication and struggle with the bondage of 
temptation, Adam’s arguments—which the narrator and the reader know he 
could not have made at the ‘start’ of the narrative—centre on the claims of 
feeling and intersubjectivity:
‘Yes, Dinah,’ said Adam, sadly, ‘I ’ll never be the man t ’ urge 
you against your conscience. But I can’t give up hope that you may 
come to see different. I don’t believe your loving me could shut up 
your heart; it’s only adding to what you’ve been before, not taking 
away from it; for it seems to me it’s the same with love and 
happiness as with sorrow—the more we know of it the better we 
can feel what other people’s lives are or might be, and so we shall 
only be more tender to ‘em, and wishful to help ‘em. The more 
knowledge a man has the better he’ll do ‘s work; and feeling’s a 
sort of knowledge’ (553).
122 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 1 8 4 .1 should stress that I am merely drawing on 
B ow ie’s discussion o f Romantic aesthetics, and that Bowie him self is not writing in relation 
to Eliot. The importance o f  music for Eliot will be discussed below (chapter four). Eliot 
writes {Letters, I, 247): ‘I agree with you [John Sibree, Hegel scholar] as to the inherent 
superiority o f music— as that questionable woman the Countess Hahn-Hahn says, painting 
and sculpture are but an idealizing o f  our actual existence. Music arches over this existence 
with another and a diviner.’
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Eliot, in a much later notebook, confirms the relationship between 
feeling and knowledge, using as the title of the note exactly the same phrase as 
Adam’s:
‘Feeling is a sort of knowledge’.
What seems eminently wanted is a closer comparison between the 
knowledge we call rational and the experience we call emotional.
The sequences which are forced upon us by perception, which 
establish fundamental associations, & are classed as knowledge are 
accompanied in varying degiees by satisfaction, and denial or 
suffering, to the organism in proportion as the established 
sequences are affirmed or disturbed. What is the difference with the 
sequences which are the subject matter of ethics? Only that the 
satisfaction or suffering is something more deeply organic, 
dependent on the primary vital movements, the first seeds of dread 
& desire, which in some cases grow to a convulsive force, & are 
ready to fasten their companionship on ideas & acts which are 
usually regarded as impersonal and i n d i f f e r e n t .  G3
Dinah, in considering Adam’s arguments, now uses as her guide not the
Bible, but ‘the ultimate guiding voice from within’ (572). And as Adam waits
for Dinah’s decision, the narrator reminds us that the hermeneutic process is
inextricably bound up with narrative, which shapes the future from an
imaginative recasting of the past:
But no story is the same to us after a lapse of time; or rather, we 
who read it are no longer the same interpreters; and Adam this 
morning brought with him new thoughts through that grey 
country—thoughts which gave an altered significance to the story of the past (573).
Adam’s love for Dinah is different from his love for Hetty, because ‘it was the 
outgrowth of that fuller life which had come to him through acquaintance with 
deep sorrow’. This ‘higher feeling’ is a sort of freedom, a ‘liberty’, which 
nonetheless demands selflessness and the awareness of the bonds of
G 3 MS HM 12993, held at the Huntingdon Library. See Thomas Pinney, ‘More Leaves 
from George Eliot’s Notebook’, Huntingdon Library Quarterly 29 (1966), 353-76, p. 364. 
This notebook can be dated from between 1872 and 1879, and, apart from its intrinsic 
interest, helps strengthen the view that Eliot’s ideas did not change significantly in 
substance throughout her whole career.
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community and intersubjectivity.G4 The imperatives of the narrative of his 
life make a return to his earlier narrowness and moral hardness impossible:
The ^ow th of higher feeling within us is like the growth of faculty, 
bringing with it a sense of added strength: we can no more wish to 
return to a narrower sympathy, than a painter or a musician can 
wish to return to his crude manner, or a philosopher to his less 
complete formula (5 7 4 ). G5
Adam now calls Dinah down from the mountain, ending her ‘spiritual 
isolation’ and drawing her ‘into the human community o f  H a y s l o p e ’ . G 6  Tfiat 
they should marry at the expense of Hetty and Arthur is not only artistically 
valid, but a narrative and ethical necessity. And far from being a narrative 
contrivance, it dramatises a partial, albeit provisional reconciliation of the 
different world-views in the novel, as well as registering the suffering that lies 
uneasily and darkly with love and sympathy at the root of the hermeneutic
quest. G7
Adam is the only character that is treated in such a comprehensively 
temporal fashion, as is confirmed by chapter seventeen, ‘When the Story 
Pauses a Little’, where the elderly Adam compares the doctrinal Mr Ryde with 
Mr Irwine. This chapter is usually noted for little other than Eliot’s famous 
discussion of realism, but it is surely just as important in the sense of revealing 
an open-ended narrative continuum. Adam now fully accepts the claims of 
feeling:
G 4 David Carroll observes that Adam and Dinah complete the ‘final phase o f the 
transformation o f pain into sympathy’, Adam becomes ‘selfless’, while Dinah becomes 
‘self-conscious’. George Eliot, p. 103.
125 Dorothy J. Atkins argues that Adam grows in knowledge and self-determination (which 
is freedom in a Spinozistic sense) as a result o f  his ordeal, and starts to be ‘truly free’. 
George Eliot and Spinoza, p. 116.
G 6 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 104.
127 Henry James thought Û\?iXÂdam Bede should have finished before Adam’s marriage, as 
Hetty is the ‘central figure’ o f  the novel. See Haight, ed., A Century o f  George Eliot 
Criticism, p. 47. Both Ian Gregor and V. S. Pritchett object to the marriage, either the fact or 
the manner o f it, and F. R. Leavis agrees with Henry James that the marriage is an ‘artistic 
weakness’. Ian Gregor, ‘The Two Worlds o f Adam Bede', p. 29; V. S. Pritchett, The Living 
Wove/(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), p. 83; F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition (London: 
Penguin Books, 1948), p. 51. R. A. Foakes, however, takes issue with Leavis, and argues 
that whether or not the marriage is convincing, it ‘fulfils its place in the pattern o f the novel, 
in restoring the unity o f  that fine community which has been disrupted by Hetty and 
Arthur’. 'Adam Bede', p. 176.
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‘But’, said Adam, ‘I ’ve seen pretty clear, ever since I was a 
young un, as religion’s something else beside notions. It isn’t 
notions sets people doing the right thing—it’s feelings. It’s the 
same with the notions in religion as it is with math’matics,— a man 
may be able to work problems straight off in’s head as he sits by the fire and smokes his pipe; but if he has to make a machine or a 
building, he must have a will and a resolution, and love something else better than his own ease’ (226).
While Adam sustains the Spinozian relationship between ethics and
mathematics, he seems also to reflect the ‘mystical’ side of Spinoza, accepting
intuitive knowledge and acknowledging the limitations of the geometric
method:
‘I know there’s a deal in a man’s inward life as you can’t measure 
by the square, and say, “do this and that ‘11 follow,” and, “do that 
and this ‘11 follow”. There’s things go on in the soul, and times 
when feelings come into you like the rushing mighty wind, as the 
Scripture says, and part your life in two a ’most, so as you look 
back on yourself as if you was somebody else’ (227).
Adam’s development seems to provide the favoured model of 
consciousness in his move beyond Kantianism to a reformulated Spinozistic 
position which is beyond the ethical law. The fact that we see his ethics in this 
temporal way is itself significant and part of Eliot’s stress on both inter­
subjectivity and n a r r a t i v e .  G8 These ideas are related: we become ethical 
through others and we know others through the temporal projection of life 
stories. In this sense, Eliot goes beyond both Spinoza and Kant. Eliot’s anti- 
Kantianism seems to lie in the fact that she sees the possibility of critical self­
reflection as inextricably s o c i a l ,  i 29 while her Spinozism lies in her move— 
through Adam— ‘beyond good and evil’ in Deleuze’s sense, where ethics is 
defined relationally—and of course this is linked to the importance of others.
128 w . J. Harvey, in an excellent analysis o f  the novel’s temporal structure, argues that ‘the 
relationship o f the part to the whole is governed by its sequential position so that what the 
story means is largely determined by the way in which it unfolds in tim e’. He points out that 
‘temporal processes’ are part o f  the ‘moral and aesthetic structure’ o f  the novel. ‘The 
Treatment o f Time in Adam B ed e \ Anglia 75 (1957), 429-40, in Haight, ed., A Century o f  
George Eliot Criticism, 298-306, pp. 300-301.
129 Jürgen Habermas’s reflections on Kant and Fichte are relevant here. See his ‘Reason 
and Interest: Retrospect on Kant and Fichte’, in Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. by 
Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972), 191-213.
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Spinoza adumbrates an ‘ethics’ as opposed to a ‘morality’, where ‘evil’ does
not exist save as a necessary human fiction, defined solely in relation to
circumstances, and where ‘there are no such things as the moral sanctions of a
divine Judge, no punishments or rewards, but only the natural consequences of
our existence’. GO
Spinoza describes this concept in Part 4 of the Ethics:
As to good and evil, they also indicate nothing positive in things 
considered in themselves, and are simply modes of thought or 
notions which we form from a comparison of individuals. For one 
and the same thing can be at the same time good, evil and 
indifferent. For example, music is good to the melancholy, evil to 
those who are in deep distress, and to the deaf neither good nor evil {Ethics, Pt. 1, Preface).
This concept is dramatised in Arthur’s prevarication and self-deception
regarding the consequences of his actions towards Hetty:
Our deeds determine us, as much as we determine our deeds; and 
until we know what has been or what will be the peculiar 
combination of outward with inward facts, which constitutes a 
man’s critical actions, it will be better not to think ourselves wise 
about his character. There is a terrible coercion in our deeds which 
may first turn the honest man into a deceiver, and then reconcile 
him to the change; for this reason—that the second wrong presents 
itself to him as a practicable right. The action which before 
commission has been seen with that blended common-sense and 
fresh untarnished feeling which is the healthy eye of the soul, is 
looked afterwards with the lens of apologetic ingenuity, through which all things that men call beautiful and ugly are seen to be 
made up of textures very much alike (359).
Arthur finally learns from Adam, retold much later by Adam in a phrase
tinged with their shared suffering: “‘But you told me the truth when you said
to me once, ‘There’s a sort o wrong that can never be made up for”” (584).
Kenny Marotta, in discussing Eliot’s use of pastoral, argues that ‘the
novel’s nostalgic descriptions only reiterate Nature’s opacity, and that the
intimations of meaning only reveal the human need to create such fictions’.
What Eliot offers us is not the ‘consolations’ of religion or nostalgia, ‘but the
GO Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 
pp. 248, 257,319.
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temporary and acknowledged consolations of art’. Marotta goes on to claim 
that the novel
obviates the question of ‘realism’, as Eliot does herself by her 
metaphor of the defective mirror— a mirror the faintness or blurring 
of whose reflection says as much about itself as about what is 
reflected. i3i
The pastoral genre in Eliot’s hands becomes ‘a genre for expressing doubts 
about any order higher than that of the artist’s work, and any ordering 
consciousness more comprehensive than the individual mind’.G2 Adam’s 
relation to his work is that of an artist: in the aesthetic act he gains freedom 
and self-consciousness, and unmasks a reworked third kind of knowledge 
which subtly figures the sublime through art in its self-production, yet still 
points towards the demands of feeling and intersubjectivity:
The sound of tools to a clever workman who loves his work, is like 
the tentative sounds of the orchestra to the violinist who has to bear 
his part in the overture: the strong fibres begin their accustomed 
thrill, and what was a moment before joy, vexation, or ambition, 
begins its change into energy. All passion becomes strength when it 
has an outlet from the narrow limits of our personal lot in the 
labour of our right arm, the cunning of our right hand, or the still, 
creative activity of our thought (257).
We are thus led to the conclusion that Eliot is close to the early 
Romantic project which uses the literaiy as a metaphor for subjective self­
production. The key work here in this difficult area is Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy’s The Literary Absolute, w h i c h  itself draws on Maurice Blanchot’s 
study of the Athenaeum, t h e  journal from which the Jena group, in the 
aftermath of the Kantian ‘crisis’, articulated their theories which posited 
literature as a ‘higher’ discourse than both philosophy and religion:
In literature, i.e., in the productive unity of creative formation and 
critical reflection, the formative power or bildende Kraft of the 
artist extends beyond a presentation of the sensible (beyond the
G1 Marotta, 'Adam Bede', p. 71. 
iJ2  Marotta, 'Adam Bede', pp. 71-72.
133 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. by Philip 
Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1988).
134 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, trans. by Deborah Esch and Ian Balfour, Studies 
in Romanticism  22 (1983), 163-172.
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level of representation), and, recalling Kant’s concept of the 
sublime, accomplishes a presentation of what in Kant remainedunpresentable. 135
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s approach is Kantian in the sense that it 
focuses on the negativity of the sublime and the limits of representation; and it 
continues the basic premises of German subject philosophy, i.e., that the 
subject is always ‘hyperbolic’, other than, in excess of any representation:
The Process of absolutization or infinitization, the Process as such, 
exceeds—in every way—the general theoretical (or philosophical) 
power of which it is nonetheless the completion. The ‘auto’ 
movement, so to speak—auto-formation, auto-organisation, auto­
dissolution, and so on—is perpetually in excess in relation to
itself. 136
The authors then go on to cite Athenaeum fragment 116, which seems to 
confirm the infinite and forever incomplete nature of the romantic project:
the romantic kind of poetry is still becoming; that is its real 
essence, that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected.
No theory can exhaust it, and only a divinatory criticism would 
dare to characterise its ideal. 137
Indeed, it is Kant’s assertion of fmitude— of the transcendental horizon that
can never itself be experienced—which enables Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s
reading of Romanticism. Kant’s drawing of a limit is also a perception of that
which draws the limit. In this reading, the subject, for the Jena Romantics,
exists, but only in its perceived negation, and in its necessary failure to be
adequately represented as a positivity. Maurice Blanchot recognises the
‘ambiguity’ at the heart of Romanticism:
And it is, indeed, often unproductive— for it is the work of the 
absence of the work, poetry affirmed in the purity of the poetic act, 
affirmation without duration, freedom without realization, power 
that is exalted as it disappears, in no way discredited if it leaves no 
traces, for this was its goal: to make poetry shine, not as nature, nor 
even as artwork, but as pure, instantaneous consciousness. 138
135 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, Translators’ Introduction, p. ix.
136 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 92.
137 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 92.
138 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, pp. 164-65.
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While all we have are particular stories, literature shows us the 
production/RzMwMg of the story as originary (quasi-transcendental):
The narrator conceives of his fulfilment or perfection by analogy to 
the perfection of the work of art, but a work of art that could behold 
itself. In his fulfilment, he would become both work of art and 
artist; as the product of Bildung, he would become both a 
completed Bild, or picture, and his own beholder. [. . .] In short, he 
would become what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call the ‘subject 
work’, the paradigmatic model of the romantic subject’s auto­
production in the (literary) work of art. Engaged as he is in the task of auto-production, the narrator’s disposition as the subject 
work is fragmentary in nature; that is, it assumes and continually 
points towards a perfection and completion that lie beyond it, yet 
also underlie its self-productive a c t i v i t y ,  i 3 9
Blanchot recognises further the creative possibilities inherent in the 
theory of literature as outlined in the Athenaeum:
Literature (understood as the totality of forms of expression, 
including forms of dissolution as well) suddenly becomes 
conscious of itself, manifests itself and in this manifestation has no 
other task nor trait than to declare itself. In short, literature 
announces that it is taking p o w e r .  GO
In its manifestation, literature is nothing and everything; it is ‘nothing other
than its manifestation’, but also the ‘totality’, ‘the all that acts invisibly and
mysteriously in everything’. This is the ambiguity of Romanticism, an
ambiguity through which ‘the absolute subject of all revelation comes into
play, the ‘ I ’ in its freedom [...] in the totality which it is f r e e ’ . G l  Moreover,
Romantic art is ‘free’ not despite of but because of its provisional and never-
ending nature:
Romantic creative art is still in the process of becoming, and it is 
even in its very essence never to be able to attain perfection, to be 
forever and eternally new; it cannot be exhausted by any theory; it 
alone is infinite, as it alone is f r e e ,  i 42
139 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, Translators’ Introduction, pp. xi- 
xii. Stephen Prickett notes the connection between and hermeneutics in Origins o f  
N a r r a t i v e , 197.
140 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, pp. 166-67.
141 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, p. 168.
142 Part o f Athenaeum Fragment no. 116, cited by Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, p. 168 (see 
below, chapter four).
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This freedom is the result of the act of creation, not the work itself, for it is 
only this activity which gives true freedom to the subject.!43
Stephen Prickett observes that the work of literature which became 
paradigmatic for Schlegel and Schleiermacher during the last few months of 
the short-lived Jena circle is the Bible; indeed, it becomes ‘the central and 
organising metaphor’ for the Ideas, Jena’s final set of f r a g m e n t s .  144 The Bible 
is ‘the ultimate anthology from which we constantly shape and re-shape our 
understanding’. As a collection of fragments, it ‘can hint at unrealisable 
sublimity and infinite wholes’. Its most essential requirement will be that it 
‘contains its own critical theory, by which it must be read and u n d e r s t o o d ’ . 145 
The Bible became the paradigm for the Romantic’s appropriation of the novel 
as the genre par excellence, which alone was capable of articulating the 
constant series of contradictions, of questions rather than responses, which 
constitutes Romanticism (see below, chapter four). Schlegel and Novalis 
insisted that:
romantic art, which concentrates creative truth in the freedom of 
the subject, also formulates the ambition of a total book, a sort of 
perpetually growing Bible that will not represent, but rather 
replace, the real: for the whole would only be able to affirm itself 
in the unobjective sphere of the work. The novel, according to all 
the great Romantics, would be that Book. 146
None of the Jena Romantics managed that ‘total book’, and their 
ambition was soon to dissolve into the fragment as the only way of allowing 
their utterances to approach the ‘absolute’. As Blanchot observes, however, 
the contradiction which lies at the heart of romanticism which recognises itself 
as all and nothing, always already contains the seeds of its own destruction. 147 
Clifford J. Marks points out that the reader of Adam Bede is made 
constantly aware of two texts: the first is, of course, the Bible, but the second
143 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, p. 170.
144 Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, pp. 202-3.
145 Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, p. 203.
146 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, p. 170-71.
147 Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’, p. 168.
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is Eliot’s story itself.G8 Marks sees literature as a ‘connective thread’ 
between the Romantics and the Victorians, positing literature as ‘an active 
ethical force at the heart of linguistic representation’. Although Marks does 
not situate this formulation of the function of literature in the context of the 
post-Kantian crisis, he usefully sees it as an attempt to ‘transcend’ the chaos 
and the turmoil of the nineteenth-century with an ethical possibility situated in 
language. He claims that Eliot and Shelley recognised ‘a split between spirit 
and body’, and that ‘each tries to recuperate this schism through their 
recognition of the ethical nature of language’, which in turn provides ‘the 
possibility of provisionally uniting individuals despite cultural 
fi'agmentation’.!49 Once again we are brought to the essentially 
intersubjective nature of language, which relates to Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy’s notion of writing, forming, and the literary as a primary 
communality/dialogue. And further, this approach through the possibilities of 
language and literature is in sharp contradistinction to the ethical logic of the 
Kantian categorical imperative.
The idea that there could be an ethical aspect in the act of reading itself 
is explored by J. Hillis Miller in The Ethics o f Reading. Miller turns his 
attention to Eliot’s theory of realism as proposed in chapter seventeen of 
Adam Bede, ‘In Which the Story Pauses a Little’. Miller finds that, for all its 
ostensible affirmation of realistic narration, and by extension a ‘rejection of 
the aesthetics of the sublime’, the way the characters ‘live out’ an alternative 
theory of language elsewhere in the book, ‘plays ironically against the notion 
of a referential language affirmed in chapter seventeen for the narrator’s 
truthtelling’.GO Miller reveals that the chapter itself relies, not on referential
!48 Clifford J. Marks, ‘Dynamic Representations: A Theory o f  Ethical Transcendence in 
the Works o f Percy Bysshe Shelley and George Eliot’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, State 
University o f Ne^v York at Buffalo, 1992), p. 211.
!49 Marks, ‘Dynamic Representations’, Abstract.
!50 j_ Hillis Miller, The Ethics o f  Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and 
Benjamin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 70-71.
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language at all, but on figurative language of a special kind. Miller explains 
that this language is ' catachresis, the use of terms borrowed from another 
realm to name what has no literal language of its own. Only such language can 
perform into existence feelings, a will, a resolution’.G 1 Adam seems well 
aware of the inadequacy of language to describe these feelings:
T look at it as if the doctrines was like finding names for your 
feelings, so as you can talk of ‘em when you’ve never known ‘em, 
just as a man may talk o’ tools when he knows their names, though he’s never so much as seen ‘em, still less handled ‘em’ (227-8).
The language of catachresis (here the language of Dutch painting)
genuinely performs an action, causing ‘a break in the chain of cause and effect
which ordinarily operates, for Eliot, both in the physical and social worlds and
in the internal world of s e lf . This operation allows something new to happen
‘in the “real” world’, allows us to love our ugly neighbour as Eliot is urging,
because it causes a semantic shift and ‘redirects those words to unheard of
meanings’. For Miller, the language of realism itself is catachresis, and the
most elaborate catachresis of them all is the use o f ‘ G o d ’ : !  5 2
‘And they’re poor foolish questions after all; for what have we got either inside or outside of us but what comes from God? If we’ve 
got a resolution to do right. He gave it to us, I reckon, first or last; 
but I see plain enough we shall never do it without a resolution, and 
that’s enough for me’ (228).
The reader knows that ‘God’ in this case is simply a name for human 
feelings, but it is in these ‘performative catachreses’ that changes are made in 
the world that can transform people in a way that other types of language-— 
‘literal, conceptual, notional or doctrinal’—cannot. These figures or 
‘analogies’ are based on analogy itself, giving them a power—despite the 
ostensible claim of the chapter only to be dealing with ‘reality’—to bring 
‘groundless novelty into the social world’—namely, the ability ‘to love my 
ugly neighbour’. However, because these performatives are grounded in
!31 Miller, Ethics, p. 73.
152 Miller, Ethics, pp. 73-4.
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language, they are ‘fundamentally ambiguous’, and as the last paragraph of 
the chapter shows, in the end are groundless, admitting of no difference 
between the evaluation of ugly people by ‘idealists’ and ‘cynics’ a l i k e ; !  33
For example, I have often heard Mr Gedge, the landlord of the 
Royal Oak, who used to turn a bloodshot eye on his neighbours in 
the village of Shepperton, sum up his opinion of the people in his 
own parish—and they were the only people he knew—in these 
emphatic words: ‘Ay, sir. I ’ve said it often, and I ’ll say it again, 
they’re a poor lot i’ this parish—a poor lot, sir, big and little’. I 
think he had a dim idea that if he could migrate to a distant parish, 
he might find neighbours worthy of him, and indeed he did 
subsequently transfer himself to the Saracen’s Head, which was 
doing a thriving business in the back street of a neighbouring 
market-town. But, oddly enough, he has found the people up that 
back street of precisely the same stamp as the inhabitants of 
Shepperton— ‘a poor lot, sir, big and little, and them as comes for a 
go o’ gin are not better than them as comes for a pint o ’ 
twopenny—a poor lot’ (229-30).
Yet the effect of the narrator’s insistence on a ‘positive’ gloss on the issue of
ugly people is crucial: it is ‘the difference between the maintenance and the
dissolution of society’. The very ‘cement of society is the fiction that my ugly
neighbour is l o v e a b l e ’ . ! 3 4
Miller also offers a deconstructive reading of Kant’s Foundations o f  the
Metaphysics o f  Morals, and observes that the only way that Kant can explain
the categorical imperative is by means of an example in a footnote in the form
of ‘as i f .  The problem for the reader o f this section of the Metaphysic is that
according to Kant, the only way to act in a particular situation is by having
recourse to the universal law, which however does not apply directly to any
particular ethical situation. Kant’s solution to this seeming paradox is through
narrative, so that one may imagine ‘as i f  the rule applied to everybody. Miller
points out that this universalising of a particular maxim is ‘an act of
imagination, like writing a novel’. This imaginative act illustrates ‘the
necessity of narrative’ even in such an austere system as Kant’s. This process
acts as ‘the bridge without which there would be no connection between the
133 U x W q x ,  Ethics, pp. 77-8.
134 Miller, Ethics, p. 80.
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law as such and any particular ethical rule of behaviour’. The function of this 
narrative is much the same as that of art in the Critique o f  Judgement, which 
acts to bridge the gap between pure and practical r e a s o n . ! 35 P q j - Miller:
there is no theory of ethics, no theory of the moral law and of its 
irresistible, stringent imperative, its ‘Thou shalt’ and ‘Thou shalt 
not’, without storytelling and the temporalization (in several senses 
of the word) which is an intrinsic feature of narrative. [...] 
Narrative, like analogy, is inserted into that blank place where the 
presumed purely conceptual language of philosophy fails or is
missing.! 36
Miller’s formulation reminds us once again of the singularity of the 
putting-into-work emphasised in The Literary Absolute. Even the universality 
of pure form is only ever given as effected, or ‘forming’ form, in the Art 
Work:
In the romantic theory of literature and art, what is perceived as 
both the dead end and the most formidable challenge of the Kantian 
model of presentation is transformed into a model o f art as the 
aesthetic activity of production and formation in which the absolute 
might be experienced in an unmediated, immediate fashion. [...]Art realises an adequate conception of the Idea, or in other words 
accomplishes a sensible actualisation of the Idea in the realm of the 
aesthetic. This conception of literature, by virtue of its ability to 
perform this operation, comes to be situated as more basic than or 
superior to the realm of philosophy from which it has drawn its 
founding concepts.!37
Martha Nussbaum, in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature, develops (from a broadly Aristotelian basis) the idea of the 
limitations of philosophical discourse, arguing that literary form is ‘more 
complex, more allusive,’ and is ‘more attentive to particulars’. This form ‘is 
not separable from philosophical content, but is, itself, part of content—an 
integral part, then, of the search for and the statement of truth’.! 38 she claims 
that we find in a literary text ‘an organic connection between its form and its
133 Miller, Ethics, p. 28.
136 Miller, Ethics, p. 23. However, see below (chapter four), where I critique Miller’s 
formalism.
!37 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, Translators’ Introduction, p. ix. 
Also see Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, pp. 42-43.
138 Martha C. Nussbaum, L o ve’s  Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New  
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 3.
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content’, and indeed we find that ‘certain truths about human life can only be 
fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms of the narrative 
a r t i s t ’ . ! 3 9  Nussbaum advocates a ‘transcendence [...] of an internal and 
human sort’. This is not to suggest a ‘religious’ or ‘otherworldly’ 
transcendence, but a ‘positive’ transcendence which, while it recognises 
human frailties and limitations, has the unique quality of concentrating on the 
particular and intersubjective.!60 ‘Internal’ transcendence, is thus to be 
distinguished from the ‘external’ variety, but is supplemented by a 
‘transcendence of creation’, whereby one satisfies ‘the seeming necessity to 
push towards the outer limits of human capabilities’.!61
Nussbaum seems to be advocating the novel as the genre of immanence 
par excellence; but usefully for our thesis it is a modified immanence, capable 
of expression beyond the mundane, but still circumscribed by the limitations 
of our human finitude. For Nussbaum, narratives
speak to the humanness o f their readers, they immerse them in the 
characteristic movements of human time and the adventures of 
human finitude— in a form of life in which it is natural to love 
particular people and to have concern for the concrete events which 
happen to them. They cultivate the forms of vision and concern that 
inhabit the human form of life generally, and would be unavailable 
to the beasts, uninteresting to gods.!62
This great gulf between the world and the world of language, just like 
the gulf between Kanf s phenomenal and the noumenal, can only be filled— 
albeit provisionally—by narrative. In the end, while Kant accepts human 
finitude, Eliot embraces it. Her intimation of what lies behind the immediately
! 39 Nussbaum, L o ve’s Knowledge, pp. 4-5.
!60 Nussbaum, L o ve’s Knowledge, pp. 379-80.
161 Nussbaum, L o ve’s Knowledge, p. 381.
162 Nussbaum, L ove’s Knowledge, Endnote. It is surprising that Nussbaum dismisses 
E liof s novels as inappropriate for this ethical task, on account o f her use o f  the omniscient 
narrator, which to Nussbaum's mind is ‘a falsification o f our human position’ (p. 45). This 
is difficult to sustain, as Eliot’s use o f the omniscient narrator is much more sophisticated 
than Nussbaum appears to credit her with, and certainly does not assume a god-like 
position. Nussbaum champions James and Proust as being particularly suited to this ethical 
task. Both o f these novelist were warm admirers o f  Eliot (albeit not uncritically in James’s 
case), and it is difficult to imagine that this would be the case if  Eliot’s novels were 
completely contrary to these novelists’ ethical impulses.
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given— an intimation which for Kant can only be regulatory— lies in 
intersubjectivity. She rejects, like Kant, any metaphysics which is 
disembodied, Platonic, transcendental, or eternal. But she does, like Spinoza, 
and unlike Kant, embrace a ‘sensible transcendental’ (the phrase is Irigaray’s) 
which issues in the form of Other and community. 1^ 3 Her sublime, then, 
unlike Kant’s is social and positive, and seems to be influenced by the 
‘mysticism’ of Spinoza, the semi-religious transcendental naturalism best 
exemplified by the third kind of knowledge. For Eliot, what lies beyond 
reason and fmitude is not just a negative— ‘critical’ in the Kantian sense— 
perception of limits but a reformulated ‘third kind of knowledge’. Using this 
type of knowledge we can get a sense of the possible experience of something 
beyond the time and space world. At the same time, though, this sublime also 
seems irreducibly intersubjective, social, and sensible—connected to beauty, 
other persons, simplicity and fiction—and not a Kantian abstraction or 
inference from these forms of human fmitude.
It could be said that Kant and Spinoza sometimes occupy the same 
terrain (on immanence for example) and are sometimes diametrically opposed 
(on the possibility of metaphysical knowledge). What seems clear though, is 
that Eliot is introducing a factor that neither thinker works through—the 
power of narrative and social experience. While George Eliot agrees with 
Kant that what lies beyond the knowable and intuitable can have a regulatory 
function only, she takes up the challenge of the third Critique and uses the 
sublime to inform her ethical criticism—one which posits the other person as 
that lies beyond comprehension, presentability, and interpretability.
1^  ^ Luce Irigaray, An Ethics o f  Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill (London: Athlone Press, 1993), p. 129. Irigaray does not use this term in relation to 
Eliot.
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Part Two:
The Mill on the Floss and Narrative Pity
IV
George Eliot and the Early Romantics
In this chapter I shall take up a major theme from the first part of this study, 
and continue to situate George Eliot within a post-Romantic framework, in 
particular discussing how her work interacts with the literary theory of the 
early Romantics. If the key question raised by Kantianism is the relation 
between the faculties—knowledge, ethics, art—then Eliof s work as a novelist 
could be seen to be unifying in a veiy rich sense. We shall see that by 
redefining ethics in relation to reason, she not only formulates a new aesthetic, 
but can be seen to be occupying a position of striking modernity.
Andrew Bowie, in From Romanticism to Critical Theory, gives an 
excellent account of the relationship between the literary theory of the Jena 
Romantics—the Schlegels, Novalis, and Schleiermacher—and the
contemporary phenomenon we know as ‘literary theory’. He argues that the 
roots of deconstruction already lie in the reaction of the early German 
Romantics to Kant and Jacobi, and that an understanding of this not only helps 
bridge the gap between ‘traditional’ and ‘theoretical’ ways of looking at 
literature, but also offers literary theory a way out of its current 
methodological crisis. 1 This crisis has been brought about, Bowie argues, 
because Derrida and other theorists have misread the project of the early 
Romantics, ignoring their urgent concern for truth, art, and meaning; and, 
following a certain interpretation of Nietzsche, have been reduced to 
‘nihilism’, ‘meaninglessness’, and a potentially dangerous relativism, once the
1 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 2. From B ow ie’s perspective, this is a 'crisis’ because o f the 
absence o f foundations. As we shall see, the point will be that in the absence o f foundations 
we are compelled to decide freely— and hence the importance o f openness and narrative.
115
consolations and epistemological underpinning of theology could no longer be 
taken for granted.^ Bowie wishes not only to curb the excesses of post­
structuralism, but also to point out a direction in which ‘traditional’ literary 
criticism may now orient itself. He does not question the ‘partial validity’ of 
both broad approaches; however, he shows that in certain crucial respects both 
positions end up collapsing into each another, because of the refusal of post­
structuralist theorists to admit the notion of the ‘literary’, and the inability of 
the practitioners of traditional literary criticism to defend an adequate notion 
of it. Bowie refuses to reject the notion of the ‘literary’, which not only can be 
defended but becomes inescapable when one considers the history of modern 
philosophy in the light of the development of aesthetics, a project that the 
early Romantics, following Kant, were so vigorous in pursuing.3
Bowie also offers the possibility of a rapprochement between the 
hermeneutic and the analytic traditions of philosophy. Even though the story 
he tells is mainly concerned with a certain tradition of German hermeneutic 
philosophy, he draws some remarkable parallels with some of the 
preoccupations of both post-structuralism and contemporary analytical 
philosophy, enabling the early Romantics to be seen as the originators of a
2 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 7, 27. See also B ow ie’s entry on the ‘Aesthetics o f Music’ in the 
New Grove Dictionary o f  Music and Musicians, forthcoming. It perhaps should be 
mentioned in passing that contrary to the received interpretation, Nietzsche was not a 
nihilist; he in fact demonstrated the difficulty o f  sustaining nihilism, Nietzsche simply 
considered the question o f values and made any appeal to a value precisely the issue o f  
concern (and not a thing to be naively assumed or dismissed). Far from dismissing notions 
o f truth, deconstruction is overtly concerned with its unavoidability, so its practitioners 
therefore are able to provide a more subtle reading o f Nietzsche and problematise the ethical 
impulse towards a notion o f truth. See Azade Seyhan, Representation and Its Discontents: 
The Critical Legacy o f  German Romanticism  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1992), p. 153. Described in these terms, deconstruction is really a radicalised Kantianism: in 
the absence o f any given foundation we must assume the burden o f justification, a position 
for which truth remains as an infinite regulative idea (in the Kantian sense). As we shall see 
below, however, Eliot will place the ethical beyond the question o f truth and truth 
conditions.
3 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 11, 12.
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long tradition of philosophical reflection on meaning, truth, and art, and not as 
an isolated literary and philosophical phenomenon.4
Though Bowie’s response to deconstruction is important and forceful, 
the significance of his work for this project is the relationship that he 
maintains, following the early Romantics, between philosophy and literature 
and its ethical significance. The point of Bowie’s turn to the Romantics is to 
describe a general critique of representation. This is held to be necessary, 
because on a non-representational view, art would not be a ‘picture’ of the 
real, but an event in the real itself.^ Bowie argues that post-structuralism leads 
to a linguistic monism or narcissism, precisely because the post-structuralists 
overplay the difference between experience and meaning. Bowie therefore 
appeals to the early Romantics to overcome the perceived Kantian 
subjectivism in post-structuralism. Bowie offers ethical reasons for this return 
to the Romantics. The anxiety about linguistic narcissism rests on a fear that 
to ‘lose’ the world is to lose ethical foundations or philosophical grounding. 
Philosophy has become a separated formalism, and therefore art and literature 
would provide a form of immediacy, a way of life, and an ethical and 
philosophical grounding that would be able to think truth non-cognitively.^
Ernst Behler also claims a crucial place for the early Romantics in the 
history of modernity, and argues that their distinctive blend of poetry, 
philosophy, art, and literary self-consciousness, became the model for future 
emanations of literary modernity insofar as it consisted in a ‘pluralistic 
movement of counteractive and interactive principles that seem to oppose, but
4 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 3.
3 The critique o f  ‘picture’ theory goes back to Hegel’s Phenomenology, where he argues 
that thought is always more than a simple picture o f the world. See Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology o f  Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), § 58, p. 35. This conception can have two consequences: Bowie 
and others wish to pursue the possibility o f  an art that is unifying and grounding; while the 
post-structuralists want to emphasise the gap or distance between the actual and the virtual.
6 Bowie’s work is typical o f  a general anxiety about ‘theory’. If all we have is ‘text’, then 
we are placed in a dangerous relativism. But if  we redefine literature as a relation to the 
world, then we are given some way o f  grounding our own language games.
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in their interaction actually generate and maintain each other’7  Behler 
suggests that early Romantic theory has a direct link with contemporary 
criticism through thinkers as diverse as Adorno, Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Nancy, and Paul de Man7 Although some commentators claim that it is 
stretching the point to suggest that German Romanticism was the actual 
‘origin’ of modern approaches to criticism,^ it is clear that the German 
tradition of philosophical and theoretical reflections on art and truth that we 
are considering constitute the ‘condition of possibility’ of the discipline that 
we understand to be ‘literary theory’, and in particular the work of Foucault, 
Derrida, and Paul de Man.l^
In discussing the legacy of German Romanticism, Azade Seyhan 
suggests that it was the work of the Jena Romantics, and in particular Schlegel 
and Novalis, that ‘has found forceful expression in contemporary literary 
theory’, because of their interest in ‘the problem of representation’. Seyhan 
sees early Romanticism as the start of our own modernity, and in particular 
the fragments produced for the Athenaeum, in that they exhibit ‘an unresolved 
critical tension’, because o f ‘the awareness of the impossibility of representing 
the absolute’. He suggests that in ‘positioning themselves against the 
representational conceit of philosophy and the noncontradiction rules of logic, 
the Romantics demonstrate that the critical adventure of art and literature 
thrives on moments of discontinuity, rupture, and reversal’. Neither science 
nor philosophy is equal to the task of representing the absolute, which ‘can 
only be indirectly understood through artistic representation’. Romanticism, 
then, becomes an aesthetic and historical exercise, and ‘constitutes the first
 ^ Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p. 5.
 ^Behler, Literary Theory, p. 8.
9 For example, Kathleen M. Wheeler, ed., German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The 
Romantic Ironists and Goethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. ix.
Bowie, Romanticism, p. 3.
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modem challenge to philosophy’s denial of its textual and ultimately 
metaphorical condition’.H
Another way of outlining what is at stake here is to suggest that there are 
two ways of responding to Hegel’s argument that philosophy is the 
achievement of absolute knowledge. The first would be hermeneutic: against 
philosophy and its claims to knowledge we would assert the arts of 
inteipretation and understanding (this is the ‘hermeneutic’ tradition appealed 
to by Bowie). The second approach would be post-structuralist, a tradition that 
regards both philosophy and literature as making foundational claims that are 
always impeded by the textual condition.
The advantage of what we may call the ‘hermeneutic’ approach is that it 
avoids the textual indeterminacy of Derrida and the epistemological 
‘pragmatism’ of Richard Rorty,i2 but also does not lose sight of essential 
post-Kantian insights of which we are indeed reminded by post-structuralism. 
Knowledge cannot adequately be ‘giounded’ in the manner attempted by 
Western philosophy before Kant, and any attempt to find such a gi'ound will 
inevitably come up against the ‘cireular’ nature of our understanding. 13 This 
is in some ways the alternative story of philosophy after Kant: the attempt to 
escape Jacobi’s ‘infinite regress’ (see below) which will directly result in the 
early Romantics’ interest in aesthetics, and more specifically the notion that 
the autonomous work of art is able to articulate aspects of the world which are 
not able to be diselosed through the logocentric medium of traditional 
philosophy or the empirical s c i e n c e s .  ^ 4
11 Seyhdwi, Representation, pp. 1 ,3 , 12, 17.
12 See his Consequences o f  Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980 (Brighton; Harvester, 1982).
13 Post-structuralism, like Hegel, affirms this circularity, while another tradition o f  
Romanticism argues that art will find a way out o f  this closure.
1'^  Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 18, 39, 40, 42, 50. The logocentric nature o f philosophy and 
science is the idea that what is can be given logically; that is, in terms o f a present category, 
system or logic known in advance.
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The dispute between post-structuralists who claim that no text can have a 
pure pre-textuai foundation and ‘hermeneutic’ scholars who believe there is 
some meaning that underlies a text is now a familiar one. But this opposition 
between being caught up in the limits of knowledge and the desire (or 
presupposition) for some foundation for knowledge was familiar both to the 
pre-Romantic philosophy of Kant and the post-Romantic philosophy of Eliot’s 
generation. The issue is conducted around the question of art. Is art purely 
formal, a manifestation that all our experience is mediated (Kant)? Or, is art 
mimetic, helping us to relate to our world (Aristotle)? Eliot, like so many post- 
Romantics, wants to unify both possibilities.
Novalis is a good example of the ambivalent approach to modernity by 
the early Romantics, which advances a Modern ‘semiotic critique of 
philosophy’ (anticipating Derrida), but at the same time ‘remain[s] squarely 
within a philosophy of being’. 1^  Novalis offers a promising approach because 
it makes for a more subtle reading of the problems of modernity and the 
position of the early Romantics, in which we find them in a ‘precarious’ 
position, ‘on the cusp of Classical and Modern thought’. Novalis is typical 
of this alternative story of modernity that we are advancing, one in which the 
inability of language to be ‘self-grounding’ is taken for granted. At the same 
time, however, we do not need as a necessary consequence of this to deny that 
the subject might not be fully transparent to itself. 1? This broad approach to 
modernity will present a different and much less narrow conception of 
philosophy, one which, although it rejects as misguided the expectation of 
finding an ultimate ground of consciousness, or of representing the Absolute, 
finds in this very failure a source of meaning, i ^  Romantic philosophy can be
13 Wm. Arctander O’Brien, Novalis: Signs o f  Revolution (Durham, N. C: Duke University 
Press, 1995), pp. 6, 86.
O’Brien, Novalis, p. 80. 
i?  Bowie, ‘Music, Language and Modernity’, in Andrew Benjamin, ed.. The Problems o f  
Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin (London; Routiedge, 1989), 67-85, pp. 75, 77.
Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 79, 87.
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characterised as an infinite search for truth (not ‘Truth’) via two related 
‘imperatives’, which Bowie calls respectively the ‘aesthetic’ and the 
‘hermeneutic’. This quest is always unfinished, but it is precisely that 
openness which enables the philosophy of the early Romantics to be seen as a 
‘positive’ response to the negativity of the Kantian formulation, one which 
allows art and literature to articulate truths and generate meanings which 
cannot otheiivise be conceptually determ in ed . 19
While it is post-structuralism that reminds us of the problem of 
grounding a philosophical system, it is certainly not one of its insights; for that 
we need to go back to the work of Jacobi, and his influential critiques of Kant 
and Spinoza during the Pantheism Controversy (see above, chapter one). In a 
way it could be said that Jacobi minus his theology plus aesthetics equals early 
Romanticism. This formulation is not much of an exaggeration when we 
consider that it was Jacobi’s critiques both of Spinoza’s deterministic system, 
and also of Kant’s response to the problem of the ‘infinite regress’ which led 
Jacobi, crucially for the direction that the early Romantics would take, to 
reject the very notion of philosophy as being adequate ‘to make being 
intelligible’. 20 Bowie provides a useful account of the problem: r
The world of the laws of nature for Kant is a world of ‘conditions’, 
in which the explanation of something depends upon seeking its 
prior condition, such that z is conditioned by y  is conditioned by x, 
etc. This leads to a regress, because any particular judgment will be 
reliant on a potentially infinite series of prior conditions.21
Kant’s solution to this problem saw him separate the world of
appearances and the noumenal world, with the result being that our
‘knowledge’ is only of appearances, so that we must postulate the existence of
the ‘unconditioned condition’ to necessarily complete the series of conditions.
A further consequence of this is that as our knowledge is limited, and we can
^9 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 84-6, 88.
20 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 33, 37.
21 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 33.
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thus have no immediate access to the noumenal world. A system such as 
Spinoza’s, which tries to construct a totality of conditions predicated on the 
nature of ‘God’, is rendered illegitimate and unintelligible, because we could 
never know that the totality existed.22 Like Kant, George Henry Lewes, even 
though he admired Spinoza’s ‘consistency’ in trying to build a complete 
system, thought that his ‘fundamental error’ was the doctrine:
that the correct definition of a thing expresses the nature of that 
thing, and nothing but its nature. We cannot but admire the 
consistency of this; he grapples boldly with the very difficulty of 
the science he is endeavoring to establish. It is obvious that, to 
know things whieh are beyond appearances, which transcend the 
sphere of sense—we must know them as they are, [...] and not as 
they are under the conditions o f  sense, Spinoza at once pronounces 
that we can so know them. He says: whatever I clearly know is 
true; true not merely in reference to my conception of it, but in 
reference to the thing known. In other words, the mind is a mirror 
reflecting things as they are. [...] Now this doctrine, forced upon 
Des Cartes [sic] and Spinoza, and implied in the very nature of 
their enquiries [...] mistakes a relative truth for an universal one.
There can be no doubt that— as regards myself-—consciousness is 
the clear and articulate voice of truth; but it by no means follows, 
therefore, that~~a5 regards not~self-—consciousnQSS is a perfect 
mirror reflecting what is, as it is. To suppose the mind such a 
mirror, is obviously to take a metaphor for a fact. ‘The human 
understanding’ as one of the great thinkers finely said ‘is like an 
unequal mirror to the rays o f things, which, mixing its own nature 
with the nature o f  things, distorts and perverts them\'^^
Lewes shared Jacobi’s fear that the ultimate consequence of Spinoza’s
philosophy was ‘fatalism’ or ‘nihilism’, because a necessary consequence of
Spinoza’s system was that nothing could have happened other than how it did
happen, whieh for both Kant and Jacobi, would have the intolerable
consequence of making human freedom and responsibility a c h i m e r a . 24
22 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 33-4.
23 ‘Spinoza’s Life and Works’, pp. 398-9. Lewes refers to Novalis, whose Monologue 
(cited below) is important in relation to my discussion o f Eliot’s ‘realism’ (see below).
24 Lewes posed the ultimate question for the future o f metaphysics: ‘Spinozism or 
Scepticism?’ Biographical H istory o f  Philosophy, p. 415.
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However, even Kant could not entirely escape Jacobi’s charge of nihilism, 
because of his separation of appearances and things-in-themselves. In order to 
establish the truth of his system, Kant would somehow have to ‘transcend’ the 
realm of appearances, the possibility which his system is logically committed 
to denying. Jacobi is only able to ‘solve’ the problem by recourse to theology, 
a ‘leap of faith’ which at once absolves reason of the impossible task of 
seeking knowledge of anything which transcends the world of conditions. 
However, the important aspect for this alternative story of modernity is not the 
recourse to theology, but the fact that for Jacobi, this faith is a type of intuitive 
‘non-knowledge’, which precisely because it is logically prior to ‘knowledge’, 
is able to insist on a distinctive notion of ‘the true’. This conception 
circumvents the infinite regress, and grounds our knowledge of the world of 
appearances, while avoiding the nihilism of Spinoza, and what he terms the 
‘inverted Spinozism’ of Fiehte. Fichte’s answer to the problem of the infinite 
regress lay in the spontaneous activity of the ‘I ’, which provided the ground in 
the sense that the ‘I ’ did not require a gi'ound by virtue of the fact of its 
spontaneity. This led Jaeobi to point out that in a sense the two positions— 
Fichte’s ‘I ’ and Spinoza’s substance—mirror each other: they both grounded 
themselves on the identity of subject and object, and became self-perpetuating 
systems, ‘fully transpaient’ to themselves. For Jacobi, both positions have an 
illegitimate concept of truth, where meaning is determined either by an 
absolute origin or by some sort of systematic totality. These sort of objections 
have been echoed throughout the subsequent history of modernity, and it is no 
surprise that literary theory has been rehearsing forms of the arguments ever
since.23
The Romantics, of course, would not accept either alternative, preferring 
to balance these competing claims in a characteristic movement between
23 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 36, 39-40, 42, 48.
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‘relativism’ and ‘absolutism’.26 Nonetheless, while Fichte’s conception of the 
‘r  as the ‘absolute gi'ound’ for his philosophical system was not accepted 
completely by the Romantics, they were attracted by its ‘subjective’ nature, 
leading them to conceive of the ‘I ’ in aesthetic and creative terms, which 
would be of utmost importance for the literary and philosophical ferment that 
would follow.27 Spinoza, as we saw in the previous chapters, will be a crucial 
figure in this ‘new mythology’, not because of his drive to system, which for 
the Romantics can hy definition never be completed, but more importantly 
because the Romantics were attracted by the ‘poetical’ side of his imagination, 
which they distinguished from the ‘realism’ of his monistic philosophy of 
immanence.28 in this ‘new mythology’, Shakespeare, the ‘romantic’ poet par 
excellence, and Plato, whose philosophy, despite itself, heralds the triumph of 
art over philosophy, would together ‘reunite poetry and philosophy’; and in a 
similar synthesis, the Romantics would ‘reunite art and religion’, using the 
model of Greek tragedy as their inspiration.29
The story begins around the middle of the eighteenth century, which 
witnessed a new approach to language developed in the work of Rousseau, 
Hamman, and Herder, and which signaled a move away from a view of 
language merely as representation (re-presentation) of a pre-given reality, a 
reality predicated on a theological world view which was being increasingly 
undermined by the more naturalistic conceptions characteristic of 
modernity.30 Two texts are crucial here. The first is Hamman’s ‘Metacritique
26 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 5.
27 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 42.
28 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 163. And see F. Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry and Literary 
Aphorisms, trans. by Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1968), pp. 84-7.
29 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 26. Shakespeare and Plato were celebrated for their 
impersonality. We therefore need to signal at this juncture that this is contrary to E lio f s 
ultimate commitment to point o f  view and the location o f knowledge in the ‘givenness’ o f 
the world.
30 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 21. Eliot’s German reading (from as early as 1840) was 
extensive, and included Goethe, Richter, Schiller, Herder, Lessing, Novalis, and probably
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on the Purism of Reason’ (1784), a critique of Kant’s ‘autonomous’ view of 
human reason. Hamman sought to place language within its historical and 
cultural specificity, in tension with the notion of a ‘general philosophical 
language’, subservient and subsequent to reason.31 The second work is 
Herder’s ‘Essay on the Origin of Language’ (1770), which explains language 
as a ‘human phenomenon’, rejecting both the ‘divine’ and the ‘natural’ 
(biological) explanations for the origin of language, preferring to think of 
‘human being and language as coexistent’. For Herder, the origin of language 
(and, importantly, poetry) is ‘reflection’, a spontaneous ‘inner urge, like the 
push of a foetus towards birth at the moment of maturity’.32 In this 
conception, language ‘arises for its own sake’, and ‘is not bound to 
representation’.33 Foucault, in The Order o f  Things, famously locates this 
paradigm shift—where ‘words cease to intersect with representations’—at the 
turn of the nineteenth century,34 but it should already be clear that a new 
conception of language (a ‘linguistic revolution’)35 was already emerging 
during the second half o f the eighteenth century, especially when the work of 
Rousseau, Kant, Jacobi and the early Romantics is considered.
Novalis, in his famous Monologue of 1798, provides a striking example 
of this approach to language, and it is worth quoting in full:
Schleiermacher and Hegel. Also, Eliot knew Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867), who 
studied at Jena University from 1802-5, and met Goethe, Schiller, and Herder, among 
others. See Edward Anthony McCobb, ‘George E liof s Knowledge o f  German Life and 
Letters’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University o f  Hull, 1977); and see Robinson’s entry In 
the Dictionary o f  National Biography (1897), pp. 15-7. Eliot’s journals and diaries, which 
have recently been published in full for the first time, show fully the extent o f  Eliot’s 
absorption in German letters and culture. See The Journals o f  George Eliot, ed. by Margaret 
Harris and Judith Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
31 Aesthetics and Subjectivity, pp. 146-7; 'QovNxe, Romanticism, p. 60. Bowie points 
out that although Hamman still ‘held a thoroughly theological (and Locke-influenced) 
conception o f language, [ .,.]  his important claim in this context was that the multiplicity o f 
languages could not be reduced to a common language by philosophy" (p. 31 In.).
32 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 265-8.
33 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 21.
34 Michel Foucault, The Order o f  Things (London: Tavistock, 1970), p. 304, cited by 
Bowie, Romanticism, p. 21.
33 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 300.
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Speaking and writing is a crazy state of affairs really; true 
conversation is just a game with words. It is amazing, the absurd 
eiTor people make of imagining they are speaking for the sake of 
things; no one knows the essential thing about language, that it is 
concerned only with itself. That is why it is such a marvellous and 
fruitful mystery—for if someone merely speaks for the sake of 
speaking, he utters the most splendid, original truths. But if he 
wants to talk about something definite, the whims of language 
make him say the most ridiculous false stuff. Hence the hatred that 
so many serious people have for language. They notice its 
waywardness, but they do not notice that the babbling they scorn is 
the infinitely serious side of language. If  it were only possible to 
make people understand that it is the same with language as it is 
with mathematical formulae—they constitute a world in itself— 
their play is self-sufficient, they express nothing but their own 
marvellous nature, and this is the very reason why they are so 
expressive, why they are the mirror to the strange play of 
relationship among things. Only their freedom makes them 
members of nature, only in their free movements does the world- 
soul express itself and make of them a delicate measure and a 
ground-plan of things. And it is so with language—the man who 
has a fine feeling for its tempo, its fingering, its musical spirit, who 
can hear with his inward ear the fine effects of its inner nature and 
raises his voice or hand accordingly, he shall surely be a prophet; 
on the other hand the man who knows how to write truths like this, 
but lacks a feeling and an ear for language, will find language 
making a mockery of him, and will become a mockery to men, as 
Cassandra was to the Trojans. And though I believe that with these 
words I have delineated the nature and office of poetry as clearly as 
I can, all the same I know that no one can understand it, and what I 
have said is quite foolish because I wanted to say it, and that is no 
way for poetry to come about. But what if we were compelled to 
speak? what if this urge to speak were the mark of the inspiration 
of language, the working of language within me? and my will only 
wanted to do what I had to do? Could this in the end, without my 
knowing or believing, be poetry? Could it make a mystery 
comprehensible to language? If so, would I be a writer by vocation, 
for after all, a writer is only someone inspired by l a n g u a g e ? 3 6
The most immediate aspect to notice is how far, even accounting for the
irony and the hyperbole (which of course is an essential part of its content).
36 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, pp. 92-3.
126
Novalis has gone from a representational conception of language. Rather, 
language is a historical and cultural phenomenon, no longer unproblematically 
reflecting a pre-given reality, but a means of replaying the infinite 
relationships among things which, together with the spontaneous, creative 
genius of the artist, throws up truths of a different order from those established 
by way of a correspondence to something existing in the ‘ready-made 
world’.37 This conception of truth is more like a ‘coherence’ theory of truth 
that one associates with the ‘pragmatism’ of Richard Rorty (see below), as 
opposed to a theory that locates truth in the correspondence of propositions to 
a pre-given reality. The early Romantic conception is already looking 
thoroughly modern, but the distinctiveness of this position, is that it while it 
renounces determinate truths, it doesn’t renounce the possibility of 
establishing meaning via a ‘holistic’ notion of the ‘true’, which locates 
meaning in the forever renewable articulations of context-dependent
propositions.3 8
This relates to the early Romantics’ conception of the Absolute, which is 
neither a mystical realm, nor the perspective of ‘objective knowledge’ which 
would make legitimate the findings of the natural sciences, but is that which 
makes knowledge relative, an ironic position which presupposes the freedom 
and autonomy of the subject from the operation of the causal world. The 
Absolute is a ‘regulative idea’, a conception not able to be described in 
discursive or philosophical terms, but a theoretical space which renders truth 
relative, ‘experienced in the failure of the attempt to get beyond the 
relativity’.39 This recognition of the distance of the Absolute is not however 
mere ‘relativism’, but a serious quest for truth and value, a positive source of 
meaning in the ironic knowledge of the necessary failure of philosophical
3? This is Hilary Putman’s term. See his Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers 
Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
38 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 70-3.
39 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 75, 77, 79.
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systems even as we ineluctably attempt to construct them. This Romantic 
‘irony’ is not a negative phenomenon; it is ‘positive’ in that while it 
recognises the constant failure of the representation of the Absolute, it finds in 
this ‘creative tension’ something that is life-affirming and active as opposed to 
the passive delusion of a final resolution.40 It goes without saying that the 
approach of the early Romantics we have been considering will need to retain 
a conception of ‘literature’, which will be the locus of this ineluctable but 
necessarily incomplete attempt to transcend the Kantian categories, an attempt 
which need not accept ‘relativism’. It will at the same time use and develop 
Kant’s insights into aesthetics and the intrinsic dignity of the other person to 
form a distinctive ethical and hermeneutic programme which will open up 
possibilities for intersubjectivity.41
Friedrich Schlegel, in his Athenaeum Fragment 116, describes this ironic 
view of literature:
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. [...] It 
embraces everything that is purely poetic, from the greatest 
systems of art, containing within themselves still further systems, 
to the sigh, the kiss that the poetizing child breathes forth in artless 
song. It can so lose itself in what it describes that one might believe 
it exists only to characterise poetical individuals of all sorts; and 
yet there is no form so fit for expressing the entire spirit of an 
author: so that many artists who started out to write only a novel 
ended up by providing us with a portrait of themselves. It alone can 
become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, 
an image of the age. [...] Romantic poetry is in the arts what wit is 
in philosophy, and what society and sociability, friendship and love 
are in life. Other kinds of poetry are finished and are now capable 
of being fully analysed. The Romantic kind of poetry is still in a 
state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should 
forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by 
no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to 
characterise its ideal. It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and 
it recognises as its first commandment that the will of the poet can 
tolerate no law above itself. The romantic kind of poetry is the only
40 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 22.
41 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 88.
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one that is more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself: for in a 
certain sense all poetry is or should be romantic.42
It should be obvious that the main target of the Romantics was mimesis,
that is, they rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of literature as a
representation of a pre-given reality, in favour of a creative relationship
between subject and object from which emerges the ‘poetic experience of the
world’. However, it would be a mistake to assume that this constituted an
attack on ‘classicism as such’. Rather, the Romantics subsumed these
historical terms (‘modernism’, ‘classicism’) into a more comprehensive notion
of mutually interacting positions which undercut established notions of
historical ‘progress’, in favour of a ‘progressive, universal poetry’ (Schlegel)
characterised by ‘infinite perfectibility’. The Romantics’ historical
intenogation of literature not only reflects on the losses of time but also
joyfully affirms the limits of the human condition.43
It would also be a mistake to consider that the early Romantics rejected
reason and sought to diminish the claims of the natural sciences. One should
bear in mind that the mystical and pietistic Storm and Stress movement
preceded the Romantics, and that the early Romantics saw themselves as
opposed to that movement’s promotion of feeling at the expense of reason. As
far as the Romantics were concerned, their search for the infinite in the finite
was rational, as Kant had taught them.44 Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and
Schelling insisted on a synthesis of feeling and reason, not a rejection of
42 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde’ and the Fragments, trans. by Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: 
University o f Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 175-6.
43 Behler, Literary Theory, pp. 3, 301-3. See also Seyhan, Representation, pp. 159, 167. 
George Henry Levies thought that Augustus Schlegel’s classification o f art into ‘classic’ and 
‘romantic’ to be ‘meaningless’, preferring ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ as more appropriate 
appellations. See his ‘Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel’, Foreign Quarterly Review  32, 63 
(October, 1843), 160-81. Lewes obviously had a very low opinion o f this Schlegel brother 
at this time, calling him ‘a foppish p e tit maître", and contrasting him to ‘the masculine 
intellect o f a Lessing, whom he regards as ‘clear as crystal and solid’ (p. 174).
44 For Kant had defined reason— against the rationalists— not as a closed system, but as a 
capacity to strive for pure concepts o f  reason.
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reason. Where they went beyond Kant was in the recognition that a necessary 
adjunct to reason was moral and aesthetic education.45
Even though it is legitimate to indicate a paradigm shift in the 
conception of literature at this historical juncture of Romanticism and the 
Enlightenment, it needs to be stressed that historically the notion of mimesis 
has always been fluid. After all, Plato thought that the poets were ‘poor’ 
imitators, and Aristotle, in his Poetics, when he stresses that every narrative 
should have a beginning, middle, and end, is implicitly suggesting that the 
imitation of ‘reality’ is not a straightforward process, but one which needs to 
be filtered through and structured by the imagination of the artist.46 it is 
obvious that Eliot was particularly aware of the problematical nature of 
representation, and in her ‘Notes on Form in Art’, she makes a statement that 
has puzzled critics who want to insist on a rigid division between her ‘realism’ 
and her more ‘symbolical’ or ‘poetical’ treatments, and between the 
‘referential’ and ‘expressive’ aspects of language:
In Poetry—which has this superiority over all the other arts, that its 
medium, language, is the least imitative, & is in the most complex 
relation with what it expresses—Form begins in the choice of 
rhythms & images as signs of a mental state, for this is a process of 
grouping or association of a less spontaneous & more conscious 
order than the grouping or association which constitutes the very 
growth & natural history of mind.47
In his headnote to this essay, Thomas Pinney assumes that when Eliot 
refers to ‘Poetry’, she means ‘verse rather than prose’. The reasons he 
advances for this are that in 1868, Eliot was writing The Spanish Gypsy, that 
her apparent views are inconsistent with the ‘doctrines of imaginative realism’ 
that informed her novel writing, and that she ‘distinguished sharply between 
the limits of prose and verse’.48 Evidence for this conclusion is Eliot’s letter
43 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, pp. 1-2. 
46 Behler, Literary Theory, pp. 301-2. 
4? Essays, p. 435.
48 Essays, p. 431.
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to her publisher regarding her choice of literary mode for Silas Marner: ‘I 
have felt all through as if the story would have lent itself best to metrical 
rather than prose fiction, [...] but, as my mind dwelt on the subject, I became 
inclined to a more realistic treatment’.49 However, this statement implies 
anything but a rigid distinction between verse and prose; Eliot’s initial 
indecision, and the phrase ‘more realistic treatment’ surely implies a fluid 
distinction between ‘realistic’ and ‘symbolic’ treatment, and a continuum 
between the prose and verse modes. Apart from anything else, Silas Marner 
itself as a Wordsworthian prose-poem is enough to convince one of the limits 
of the usefulness of the distinction between prose and poetry, a distinction that 
Eliot consciously stretched in her Wordsworthian shaping of realistic and 
symbolic elements in the story. To be fair to Pinney, he does suggest that it is 
possible that Eliot is including the novel in this definition of poetry, and that 
this would indicate that her views underwent considerable modification from 
‘her earlier conceptions of realism in fiction, which emphasise imitation, and 
insist upon “truth” not merely to the feelings of the artist but to the external 
world’. He further suggests that Eliot’s later conception of fiction is not 
‘irreconcilable’ with her earlier realism, in the sense that both these modes of 
representation insist on ‘the communication of feeling’.30 This last suggestion 
is certainly true, but Pinney need not try so hard to reconcile Eliot’s ‘early’ 
and ‘late’ theories of fiction. Eliot consistently explores both the potential and 
the limits o f realism, and her fiction is always an imaginative recasting of 
elements which can be reconciled by placing her in a post-Romantic 
framework that moves away from representational approaches to literature. At 
the same time, however, this formulation does not collapse the ultimate 
distinction between subject and object, and is predicated on (or at least 
‘regulated’ by) the postulate of an external reality that exists independently of
49 Letters, 111,382. 
39 Essays, pp. 431-2.
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our perceptions of it, and of a higher ‘unity’ which is the locus of this non- 
determinate conception of artistic ‘truth’ that presents itself
Indeed, even a cursory look at The Mill on the Floss reveals that the sort 
of criticism leveled at nineteenth-century realism by critics such as Belsey and 
MacCabe is as wide of the mark as it is impoverished.31 This most poetical of 
all Eliot’s novels, quite apart from being told through the medium of a dream, 
is constantly exploring the connections between language and meaning; and 
far from being an ideologically suspect work of seemingly unselfconscious 
transparency, is manifestly concerned with its own form and mode of 
expression, rendering critical assertions of a tension between ‘realism’ and 
‘symbolism’ somewhat shallow and misplaced.
Maggie and Tom’s differing conceptions of language are constantly 
juxtaposed—Tom’s literalism is compared to Maggie’s conception of 
language which reveals ‘no singular relationship between words and
things’: 32
‘I know what Latin is very well’, said Maggie, confidently. 
Latin’s a language. There are Latin words in the Dictionary. 
There’s bonus, a gift’,
‘Now, you’re just wrong there, Miss Maggie!’, said Tom, 
secretly astonished. ‘You think you’re very wise! But “bonus” 
means “good”, as it happens—bonus, bona, bonum’.
‘Well, that’s no reason why it shouldn’t mean “gift,”’ said 
Maggie, stoutly. ‘It may mean several things. Almost every word 
does. There’s “lawn”— it means the grass plot, as well as the stuff 
pocket-handkerchiefs are made of.’33
31 See especially Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980). Penny 
Boumelha has a similar complaint about B elsey’s critique o f ‘classic realism’. See her 
excellent ‘George Eliot and the End o f Realism’, in Sue Roe, ed., Women Reading Women’s 
Writing (Brighion: Harvester, 1987), 13-35, pp. 19-20.
32 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 120.
33 George Eliot, The M ill on the Floss, ed. by A. S. Byatt (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 214. 
Hereafter, references will be given in the text.
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Maggie’s ‘linguistic discovery’ is ‘sadly confirmed by the narrator’, who 
however, unlike Aristotle, will not unequivocally praise metaphorical
speech: 34
O Aristotle! if you had the advantage of being ‘the freshest 
modern’ instead of the greatest ancient, would you not have 
mingled your praise of metaphorical speech as a sign of high 
intelligence, with a lamentation that intelligence so rarely shows 
itself in a speech without metaphor,—that we can so seldom 
declare what a thing is, except by saying it is something else? (209)
Mr Tulliver is puzzled by the non-representational approach to language
that has been bequeathed by modernity, and wants Tom’s education to equip
him to master this aspect of the world, a hermeneutic task that Tulliver
himself is uniquely unqualified to perform:
‘Not but what, if the world had been left as God made it, I could 
ha’ seen my way and held my own wi’ the best o f ‘em; but things 
have got so twisted round and wrapped up i’ unreasonable words, 
as arn’t a bit like ‘em, as I ’m clean at fault, often an’ often. 
Everything winds about so—the more straightforrard you are, the 
more you’re puzzled’. (69)
Tom, significantly, inherits his literalism from his mother, who is not 
able to discern that her husband might be speaking figuratively when he 
suggests that she would “ ‘want me not to hire a good waggoner, ’cause he’d 
got a mole on his face’” (57). Mi' Tulliver “‘meant it to stand for summat else; 
but never mind—it’s puzzling work, talking is’” (58). Tom, similarly, cannot 
comprehend anything of a metaphorical or non-literal nature, and in a crucial 
scene from their childhood days, contemptuously and in patriarchal fashion 
dismisses Maggie’s attempts at providing an imaginary historical narrative for 
the toad and Mrs Earwig:
Still Lucy wished Maggie to enjoy the spectacle also, especially as 
she would doubtless find a name for the toad and say what had 
been its past history; for Lucy had a delighted semi-belief in 
Maggie’s stories about the live things they came upon by
34 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 120.
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accident—how Mrs Earwig had a wash at home, and one of her 
children had fallen into the hot copper, for which reason, she was 
running so fast to fetch the doctor. Tom had a profound contempt 
for this nonsense of Maggie’s, smashing the earwig at once as a 
superfluous yet easy means of proving the entire unreality of such a 
story (161).
Indeed, Eliot everywhere problematises the whole notion of 
representation, and in her essay ‘Notes on Form in Art’, distances herself from 
the ‘mere imitation’ of poetry as opposed to ‘poetic form’, which makes it 
clear that for Eliot, ‘truth’ is concerned with formal qualities such as the 
ability of the art work to throw up new combinations of existing elements. 
These elements find their coherence in their relation to one another, rather 
than in their reference to what we termed the ‘ready-made world’:
Artistic form, as distinguished from mere imitation, begins in 
sculpture & painting with composition or the selection of attitudes 
& the formation of groups, let the objects be of what order they 
may. In music it begins with the adjustment of tones & rhythm to a 
climax, apart from any direct imitation. But my concern here is 
chiefly with poetry which I take in its wider sense as including all 
literary production of which it is the prerogative & not the reproach 
that the choice & sequence of images & ideas—that is, of relations 
& groups of relations—are more or less not only determined by 
emotion but intended to express it. [...] Sometimes the wider 
signification of poetry is taken to be fiction or invention as opposed 
to ascertained external fact or discovery. But what is fiction other 
than an arrangement of events or feigned correspondences 
according to predominant feeling? We find what destiny pleases; 
we make what pleases us—or what we think will please others.35
E. S. Dallas, one of the most perceptive of Eliot’s contemporary critics,
wrote in his Poetics that despite Plato’s ‘mimetic’ theory of forms, ‘art is
much more than a mirror; it is creative’. To Dallas, even though modern
dramatic art is essentially ‘imitative’, it is no contradiction to call it creative,
because ‘in the sympathy and appropriation of a dramatist [...] freedom is
35 Essays, p. 434.
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implied’. This ‘freedom’ is nothing but the ‘power to originate’.36 This is 
related to Eliot’s own views about ‘artistic power’, the ability of the artist in 
his or her individual freedom, to wrest out truths from ever renewable 
combinations of elements, which mark out the special genius of the artist:
Artistic power seems to me to resemble dramatic power—to be an 
intuitive perception of the varied states of which the human mind is 
susceptible with ability to give them out anew in intensified 
expression. 3 7
When Dallas claimed for the artist the ‘power to originate’, it seems 
clear that he had in mind the novel above all genres of artistic expression. For 
the Romantics before him, the novel was the genre par excellence, mainly 
because it was a ‘mixed’ genre, fr agmentary but unified, one that contained all 
the various disciplines and genres, and was thus a philosophical ‘tendency’ 
and not a ‘genre’.38 it was also the only mode of expression that came to 
represent for the Romantics the ‘spirit of modernity’, in its own characteristic 
way on a level of greatness with the towering works of the Greek
tragedians. 3 9
This new conception of language and modernity that we are 
investigating, which found a voice in the novel, cannot be completely 
understood unless we take into account the contemporaneous rise in the status 
of that most non-representational of all art forms, music, and specifically the
36 E. S. Dallas, Poetics (London; Smith, Elder & Co., 1852), p. 257. Dallas wrote some o f  
the most powerful (and favorable) reviews o f  Eliot’s novels, and they became good friends. 
I have not been able to establish whether Eliot read the Poetics, but I think it is almost 
certain that she would have been familiar with his Ideas. The Poetics is a fascinating and 
little-known work, indebted both to Kant and the early Romantics, especially Schlegel. The 
book is dedicated to one o f Dallas’s teachers, Sir William Hamilton, Professor o f  Logic and 
Metaphysics in the University o f Edinburgh. Hamilton, one o f the Scottish ‘common-sense’ 
philosophers, was deeply influenced by Aristotle and also German philosophy, especially 
Kant, and had a controversy with George Combe over phrenology. It is interesting to note 
that Herbert Spencer attributed his own agnosticism to Hamilton’s influence. Seethe entry 
on Hamilton in the Dictionary o f  National Biography (1890), p. 231.
37 Letters, I, 247.
38 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 4.
39 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 167.
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instrumental compositions of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert.60 E. 
T. A. Hoffman’s 1810 review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony reveals this 
new approach to music as a very special kind of non-determinate (but not 
meaningless) language:
Music opens up an unknown realm to man; a world that has 
nothing in common with the surrounding external world of the 
senses and in which he leaves behind all feelings which are 
determinable by concepts in order to devote himself to the 
unsayable.61
This concept of the ‘unsayable’ is related to those aspects of the world 
that cannot be expressed determinately, and hence the importance of music as 
a model for the opacity of language and its resistance to determinate meaning: 
music does not ‘represent’ anything in the sense that language does, and is 
meaningful in purely relational terms. This in turn leads to the idea of the 
‘literary’, that is, the idea that language itself—even the most purely 
‘referential language’—has a ‘musical’ aspect, an autonomy and freedom 
which resists ‘universalisation’, which is connected with the notion that 
language is ‘expressive’ in origin, gi'owing spontaneously and creatively out 
of its cultural medium, and revealing aspects of the world by virtue of its non- 
determinate nature.62 This idea of the musical, together with her view of the 
impossibility and undesirability of a ‘universal language’, was expressed by 
Eliot in her essay ‘The Natural History of Life’:
Suppose, then, that the effort which has been again and again made 
to construct a universal language on a rational basis has at length 
succeeded, and that you have a language which has no uncertainty, 
no whims of idiom, no cumbrous forms, no fitful shimmer of 
many-hued significance, no hoary archaisms ‘familiar with 
forgotten years’63— a patent de-odorized and non resonant 
language, which effects the purpose of communication as perfectly
69 Bowie, Romanticism, pp. 19, 62.
61 Quoted in Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 184.
62 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 60.
63 Wordsworth, The Excursion, I, 276.
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and rapidly as algebraic signs. Your language may be a perfect 
medium of expression to science, but it will never express life, 
which is a great deal more than science. With the anomalies and 
inconveniences of historical language, you will have parted with its 
music and its passion, with its vital qualities as an expression of 
individual character, with its subtle capabilities of wit, with 
everything that gives it power over the imagination.64
Eliot’s writings on poetry confirm the close relationship of ‘the literary’ and
music:
Though the rhythmic elements of fine verse cannot throughout their 
whole range be paralleled with the structure of fine music, because 
language is another and more complex medium than notes; yet, in 
their fundamental principles they are a n a lo g o u s .63
This idea of the ‘expressive’ origin of language, and of the close 
relationship between music and language was articulated as early as 1762 by 
Rousseau, in his Essay on the Origin o f  Languages Rousseau’s assertion 
that music was the basis of all language, and that language did not have a 
‘divine’ origin, was a precursor of Kant’s attempt, which the early Romantics 
continued, to locate the freedom of the subject in the spontaneous ability of 
the genius to make new rules, at the same time somehow extending the 
categories and provisionally reconciling the phenomenal and noumenal 
worlds. Similarly, Eliot’s organic theory of poetry and art sees the source of 
the ‘valid rules’ of poetry and art as having a non-divine origin, being as they 
are founded on ‘a firmly established sense of relations which is not natural
64 Essays, pp. 287-8.
63 ‘Versification’, in Wiesenfarth, ed.. Uncollected Writings, p. 287
66 Rousseau was an enduring influence on Eliot. She once said that it was her reading o f the 
Confessions that ‘wakened her into deep reflection’ {Letters, I, 2 7 In.). This was related to 
Mrs Cash by Ralph Waldo Emerson, who claimed that Carlyle told him o f a similar debt to 
Rousseau. It was not, however, Rousseau’s beliefs which necessarily attracted Eliot. She 
writes: ‘It is simply that the rushing mighty wind o f his inspiration has so quickened my 
faculties that I have been able to shape more definitely for m yself ideas which had 
previously dwelt as dim “ahnungen” in my soul— the fire o f  his genius has so fused together 
old thoughts and prejudices that I have been ready to make new combinations’ {Letters, I, 
277).
137
merely but permanently human’.67 Music’s seeming ability to ‘say the 
unsay able’ is analogous to our ineluctable striving to transcend the limitations 
of our knowledge, to apprehend that which defines our relativity, the 
Absolute.68 Eliot seemed to be referring to this effect when writing in her 
Journal after visiting a church in Germany where mass was being celebrated:
How the music that stirs all one’s devout emotions blends 
everything into harmony—makes one feel part of one whole, which 
one loves all alike, losing the sense of a separate s e l f . 6 9
In an early letter, Eliot introduces music as a kind of Absolute, but
significantly never dwells on the ‘mystical’ aspect of the experience, always
insisting that what lies outside the subject is approached through another
subject, and not, as in the early Romantics, by the location of ethics in a pre-
semantic Absolute. The Absolute of course has an ethical value, but for Eliot
it is given through others and by aesthetic experience. Despite her Spinozistic
sense of the Absolute and a striving for a totality, Eliot always asks the
critical, Kantian question as to how the Absolute might be given:
It is necessary to me, not simply to be but to utter, and I require 
utterance of my friends. What is it to me that I think the same 
thoughts? I think them in somewhat different fashion. No mind that 
has any real life is a mere echo of another. If the perfect unison 
comes occasionally, as in music, it enhances the harmonies. It is 
like a diffusion or expansion of one’s own life to be assured that its 
vibrations are repeated in another, and words are the media of those
vibrations. 29
Similarly, a short passage entitled ‘Dear Religious Love’ among ‘Leaves 
from a Note-Book’ confirms the fragmentary and relative nature of our 
knowledge of the Absolute, which is here rendered as ‘perfect Love’ for 
another subject:
62 Wiesenfarth, ed., Uncollected Writings, p. 288.
68 Bowie, ‘Aesthetics o f  Music’. Derrida would argue that ‘to say the unsayable’ is the aim 
o f all concepts.
69 Haight, p. 256.
29 Letters, I, 255.
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We get our knowledge of perfect Love by glimpses and in 
fragments chiefly—the rarest only among us knowing what it is to 
worship and caress, reverence and cherish, divide our bread and 
mingle our thoughts at one and the same time, under inspiration of 
the same object. Finest aromas will so often leave the fruits to 
which they are native and cling elsewhere, leaving the fruit empty 
of all but its coarser structure!
As many critics have pointed out, music is crucial to an understanding 
of Eliot’s fiction, both in terms of narrative and character.H ow ever, most 
critics have neglected the philosophical implications of music, factors which 
enable Eliot to be placed within a post-Romantic framework, and help flesh 
out the alternative history of modernity that we have been considering (see 
above). For Novalis, for example, the novel as the poetic genre par excellence, 
was best illustrated by the special language of m u s i c . F o r  him, ‘the musician 
takes the essence of his art from himself—not even the slightest suspicion of 
imitation can be incuned by him’.^  ^ Wackenroder, a marginal figure in the 
Jena circle who, together with Tieck, introduced art and music to the early 
Romantics, described the special language of music in his posthumous 
contributions to Tieck’s Fantasies on Art for Friends o f  Art (1799). For 
Wackenroder, music ‘dares to speak of heavenly things in a strange.
"^ 1 Essays, p. 448.
See especially, Beryl Gray, George Eliot and Music (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); 
Patricia Ann Gately, ‘A Transmutation o f  Self: George Eliot and the Music o f Narrative’ 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University o f  Notre Dame, 1985); William J. Sullivan, ‘Music 
and Musical Allusion in The M ill on the Floss', Criticism  16 (1974), 232-46; and G. S. 
Haight, 'The M ill on the Floss', in Haight, ed., A Century o f  George Eliot Criticism, 339-48.
73 Behler, Literary Theory, pp. 202, 206.
74 Quoted in Behler, Literary Theory, p. 203. It is interesting to note how far the Romantics 
have diverged from the Ancients in this respect. A. E Taylor points out that despite their 
different views as to the desirability o f music, Aristotle and Plato considered it to be ‘the 
most imitative o f  all the arts’, given that music imitates various emotional states and moods. 
By the time o f  the Romantics, however, music (and specifically instrumental music) 
becomes much more important by virtue o f  its being conceptless and «on-imitative. See A. 
E. T?iy\or, Aristotle (London: Dover, 1955), p. 108.
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untranslatable language, with a bold resonanee, a vigorous movement and a 
harmonious union of a whole group of living beings’.75
While it is clear from what I have said above that Eliot would not 
subscribe fully to the Romantic hyperbole of Novalis, Tieck and 
Wackenroder, music is still crucially important for Eliot, because it is 
analogous to the poetical and non-representational aspects of language, 
following the notion that music can be said to be ‘conceptless’, or at any rate 
resistant to ‘conceptual determination’.76 As I said above, this conception of 
music is contemporaneous with the rise of ‘absolute music’ towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, which gave music a special status as a language which 
insists on the ‘individual component in the production of all meaning’. It also 
provides a key element in what may be called ‘a counter discourse of 
modernity’, one which strives to salvage some notion of the individuality of 
the subject in the face of an alienating modernity which threatens to engulf the 
subject under the rules and codes of various systems which cannot ultimately 
be philosophically gi'ounded.77
Maggie’s susceptibility to music has often been observed, and her 
emotional development together with the ebb and flow of her fortunes 
throughout the novel are constantly related to her musical sensibilities. The 
descriptions of music in the novel seem to resist discursive treatment:
There was no music for her any more—no piano, no harmonized 
voices, no delicious stringed instruments with their passionate cries 
of imprisoned spirits sending a strange vibration through her frame 
(378).
Philip shares Maggie’s susceptibility to music, which defies description 
yet is somehow connected to feeling, pity, and sympathy:
75 Quoted in Behler, Literary Theory, p. 246.
76 Bowie, ‘Music, Language and Modernity’, p. 81.
77 Bowie, ‘Music, Language and Modernity’, pp. 79, 82-4.
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‘Certain strains of music affect me so strangely—I can never 
hear them without their changing my whole attitude of mind for a 
time, and if the effect would last I might be capable of heroisms’.
‘Ah! I know what you mean about music—/  feel so’, said 
Maggie, clasping her hands with her old impetuosity. ‘At least’, she 
added, in a saddened tone, ‘I used to feel so when I had any music:
I never have any now, except the organ at church’.
‘And you long for it, Maggie?’ said Philip, looking at her with 
affectionate pity (400-1).
Music even seems to transcend political allegiances:
In the provinces, too, where music was so scarce in that remote 
time, how could the musical people avoid falling in love with one 
another? Even political principle must have been in danger of 
relaxation under such circumstances; and a violin faithful to rotten 
boroughs must have been tempted to fraternise in a demoralising 
way with a reforming violincello (474-5).
And when Maggie, seemingly against her will, goes away with Stephen, 
the most fundamental element of music, rhythm, is invoked to characterise the 
pre-semantic, amoral world of the lovers, where memory is ‘excluded’, and 
where meaning is achieved through looks and sounds, elements that are 
resistant to conceptual determination:
They glided rapidly along, to Stephen’s rowing, helped by the 
backward-flowing tide, past the Tofton trees and houses—on 
between the silent, sunny fields and pastures which seemed filled 
with a natural joy that had no reproach for theirs. The breath of the 
young, unwearied day, the delicious rhythmic dip of the oars, the 
fragmentary song of a passing bird heard now and then as if it were 
only the overflowing of brim-ful gladness, the sweet solitude of a 
two-fold consciousness that was mingled into one by that gi*ave 
untiring gaze which need not be averted—what else could there be 
in their minds for the first hour? Some low, subdued, languid 
exclamation of love came from Stephen from time to time, as he 
went on rowing idly, half automatically: otherwise, they spoke no 
word; for what could words have been, but an inlet to thought? and 
thought did not belong to that enchanted haze in which they were 
enveloped—it belonged to the past and the future that lay outside 
the haze (5 89).
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In fact, the idea of music as ‘conceptless’ means that instead of being 
necessarily associated with words or concepts, it can come to be ‘rooted in 
responsiveness to the sounds that are associated with the growth of 
a w a r e n e s s ’ .78 E . S . Dallas considered hearing ‘to be the most poetical’ of the 
senses:
We do not simply listen to sounds, but whether they be articulate or 
inarticulate, we are constantly translating them into the language of 
sight, with which we are better acquainted; and this is a work of the 
imagination.79
It is interesting to note that this conception of music which we may 
attribute to Eliot, is in contradistinction to Herbert Spencer’s views as 
expressed in an article with which Eliot would almost certainly have been 
familiar, ‘The Origin and Function of Music’.80 Spencer locates the ‘origin’ 
of music in physiological changes in the body as a result o f emotional states; 
for Spencer, music is ‘the idealised language of emotion’, and thus merely 
imitates and heightens emotion. Characteristically, he dismisses the ‘music’ of 
the ‘savages’, and implies that Western art music is the highest manifestation 
of this process.81 As for the ‘function’ of music, Spencer argues that it exists 
for the ‘happiness’ and ‘mutual advancement’ of mankind, and is the principal 
medium of ‘sympathy’.82 Although this last viewpoint would have struck a 
chord with Eliot, she would have disagreed with Spencer’s physiological and 
pseudo-scientific bias. Eliot made her views known in a major essay, ‘Liszt, 
Wagner, and Weimar’, and a close study of this essay reveals that, far from
78 Gray, George Eliot and Music, p. 6. Gillian Beer argues that because music by its nature 
is non-imitative, ‘it is free o f the debate between idealisation and realism which preoccupied 
George Eliot, like many o f her contemporaries, in her criticism and in her own art’. See the 
précis o f  her 1973 George Eliot Memorial Lecture, ‘Music and the Visual Arts in the Novels 
o f George Eliot’, private copy held by The George Eliot Fellowship,
79 Dallas, Poetics, p. 55.
80 Gray, George Eliot and Music, pp. 6-7. Spencer’s article appeared in F raser’s Magazine 
56, 334 (October, 1857), 396-408.
81 Spencer, ‘Origin and Function o f M usic’, p. 405.
82 Spencer, ‘Origin and Function o f  M usic’, p. 406.
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being merely an enthusiastic amateur, Eliot had a deep interest in the 
philosophical and cultural significance of music, in contrast to Spencer’s 
shallow and materialist formulation.
Eliot’s essay is important in terms of its assessment of Wagner’s music. 
While not being naturally drawn to the music itself, Eliot nonetheless 
approves of Wagner’s theories of organic unity in opera:
In his operas there is a gradual unfolding and elaboration of that 
fundamental contrast of emotions, that collision of forces, which is 
the germ of tragedy; just as the leaf of the plant is successively 
elaborated into branching stem and compact bud and radiant 
corolla. The artifice, however, of making certain contrasted strains 
of melody run like coloured threads through the woof of an opera, 
and also the other dramatic device of using a particular melody or 
musical phrase as a sort of Ahnung or prognostication of the 
approach or action of a particular character, are not altogether 
peculiar to Wagner, though he lays especial stress on them as his
own. 83
Notwithstanding this appreciation of the evolutionary nature of 
Wagner’s music, Eliot considered that Wagner had not ‘the highest creative 
genius in music’, since ‘his musical inspiration is not sufficiently predominant 
over his thinking and poetical power’. Which is to say, that:
the highest degree of musical inspiration must overmaster all other 
conceptions in the mind of the musical genius; and music will be 
great and ultimately triumphant over men’s ears and souls in 
proportion as it is less a studied than an involuntary symbol. Of 
course in composing an oratorio or an opera, there is a prior 
conception of a theme; but while the composer in whom other 
mental elements outweigh his musical power will be preoccupied 
with the idea, the meaning he has to convey, the composer who is 
pre-eminently a musical genius, on the slightest hint of a passion or 
an action, will have all other modes of conception merged in the 
creation of music, which is for him the supreme language, the 
highest order of representation. 84
83 Essays, p. 104.
Essays, pp. 103-4.
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Delia da Sousa Correa, in an essay on Daniel Deronda, reads the 
musician Klesmer as a powerful representative of German Romantic 
aesthetics.85 She points out that Klesmer’s ideas are those of Liszt, whom 
Eliot knew well from her visits to Weimar, and who with the pianist 
Rubinstein (also a possible inspiration for the character), was responsible for 
promoting the music of Wagner. Da Sousa CoiTea also observes that when 
Klesmer condemns Gwendolen’s choice of a Bellini aria, he does so in terms 
which constitute a virtual ‘manifesto o f Romanticism’, as well as referring to 
the connection between musical and social evolution referred to in Eliot’s
essay;86
‘But you produce your notes badly; and that music which you sing 
is beneath you. It is a form of melody which expresses a puerile 
state of culture—a dangling, eanting, see-saw kind of stuff—the 
passion and thought of people without any breadth of horizon. 
There is a sort of self-satisfied folly about every phrase of such 
melody: no cries of deep, mysterious passion—no conflict—no 
sense of the universal. It makes men small as they listen to it’.87
While it is true that Klesmer’s role in narrative and thematic terms
represents a sustained attack on the state of English culture, and that he makes
a powerful case for Romantic aesthetics, it is clear that he is also presented as
a slightly ridiculous figure, and not without a shade of irony. (Even the fact
that the only position Klesmer is able to find is with a provincial family makes
the comparison to the highly successful and cosmopolitan Mendelsshon a
double-edged compliment.) I believe that this irony is also present in Eliot’s
famous response to Wagner’s operas, which for Eliot, with the notable
exceptions o f Fliegender Hollander and Tannhauser, are ‘deficient in melodic
inspiration’:
85 Delia da Sousa Correa, ‘George Eliot and the Germanic “Musical Magus’” , in John 
Rignall, ed., George Eliot and Europe (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1997), 98-112, pp. 98-100.
86 da Sousa Correa, ‘George Eliot’, pp. 102-3.
87 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, ed. by Barbara Hardy (London: Penguin, 1967), p. 79. 
Interestingly enough, even Wagner admired Bellini’s Norma, on account o f its unceasingly 
beautiful melodies.
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As to melody—who knows? It is just possible that melody, as we 
can conceive it, is only a transitory phase of music, and that the 
musicians of the future may read the airs of Mozart and Beethoven 
and Rossini as scholars read the Stabreim and assonance of early 
poetry. We are but in ‘the morning of the times’,88 and must learn 
to think of ourselves as tadpoles unprescient of the future frog. Still 
the tadpole is limited to tadpole pleasures; and so, in our state of 
development, we are swayed by melody. When, a little while after 
hearing Lohengrin, we happened to come to a party of musicians 
who were playing exquisitely a quartette of Beethoven’s, it was 
like returning to the pregnant speech of men after a sojourn among 
glums and gowries.89
Eliot is not being disingenuous when she states her preference for 
Beethoven; indeed, from what we have discussed above, it can be no surprise 
that Eliot should value the music of Beethoven above all else, just as it is no 
coincidence that Eliot should place wordless, instrumental music produced at 
the time of the early Romantics above the later productions of Romanticism, 
Wagner included. George Henry Lewes was never in any doubt as to the 
superiority of Beethoven, and was writing as early as 1843 on what he 
considered to be Beethoven’s unique genius: the fusion of Italian (southern)
88 Tennyson, ‘The Day Dream, L’Envoi’.
89 Essays, pp. 102-3. It is interesting to note that Eliot, though she was friendly with 
Wagner and his disciples, was uncomfortable with his anti-Semitism, and tried to influence 
his views on this matter through her correspondence with his wife, Cosima. Cosima’s father 
was Franz Liszt, whom the Leweses had met in Weimar in 1854. Though Cosima and Eliot 
seemingly had a lot in common (Cosima had scandalised society by leaving her husband 
and living with Wagner while carrying his child), Cosima must have known that the 
Leweses did not greatly care for Wagner’s music, and in addition, according to her diaries 
disapproved o f Lewes’s detailed account o f Goethe’s indiscretions in his famous biography 
o f the author, which Cosima had read just at the time she left her husband for Wagner. For 
her part, Eliot would not have been impressed by Wagner’s pamphlet Judaism in Music, 
which was reprinted in 1869. Geoffrey Skelton recounts an anecdote which appeared in 
Francis Hueffer’s H alf a Century o f  Music in England (1837-87), which, if true, sheds an 
interesting light on Eliot’s willingness to defend Jewish culture: “‘Your husband,” remarked 
George Eliot with that straightforwardness which was so conspicuous and so loveable in her 
character, “does not like Jews; my husband is a Jew.’” Despite the inauspicious start to the 
relationship, Cosima and Eliot apparently got on well, and Eliot wrote o f  her that she was ‘a 
rare person, worthy to see the best things, having her father’s (Liszt’s) quickness and 
breadth o f comprehension’ {Letters, VI, 368). See ‘George Eliot and Cosima Wagner: A 
Newly Discovered Letter From George Henry Lewes’, The George Eliot Fellowship Review  
13 (1982), 26-30.
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melody and sensuousness and German (northern) reflectiveness. For Lewes, 
the music of Beethoven constitutes both ‘feeling and thought’:
Beethoven’s music, though trembling with feeling, and piercing the 
heart with plaints of melody more tender and intense than ever 
burst from any other muse, has yet a constant presence of Titanic 
thought which lifts the spirit upward on the soaring wings of 
imagination.^^
This understanding of music is related to Eliot’s idea of the ‘truth to 
feeling’. Ludwig Feuerbach, with whose ideas Eliot once professed to be in 
complete agi'eem ent,9l held that music, and specifically melody, is analogous 
to feeling:
Who has not experienced the overwhelming power of melody? And 
what else is the power of melody but the power of feeling? Music 
is the language of feeling; melody is audible feeling—feeling 
communicating itself.92
For Eliot, feeling and sympathy, though they may not be translatable in
discursive terms, are yet central to her moral world, and hence the importance
of music as an analogue to the ethical and literary encounter with the w o r ld .93
Indeed, while it has become a critical commonplace to characterise Eliot’s
mode of what might be called ‘imaginative realism’ in terms of ‘truth to
feeling’, it needs to be recognised as having a philosophical basis and an
epistemological underpinning for her theory of the novel, and not just as a
vague literary principle which supposedly demonstrates Eliot’s reluctance or
inability to engage with philosophy.
But where can Eliot be placed in philosophical terms? We may be now
in a position further to flesh out an answer to this question, but it shall occupy
the rest of this chapter, and will require another examination of the
philosophical traditions of Kant and Spinoza that have occasioned in Eliot’s
90 [G. H. Lewes], Augustus Wilhelm Schiegef, p. 168.
91 Letters, II, 153. Eliot adds, however, that she would ‘alter the phraseology considerably’.
92 Feuerbach, The Essence o f  Christianity, p. 3.
93 Patricia Ann Gately, ‘A Transmutation o f  S e lf , p. 6.
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fiction a unique response. This response, though it speaks through the novel, is 
just as penetrating in its own away as the seemingly more coherent products of 
these competing philosophical traditions themselves.
Onora O’Neill argues that the categorical imperative is the basis of 
Kant’s philosophy in general. This is because it rejects all particularity and 
claims for human knowledge to know anything outside of its own possibilities 
of experience. Both ethics and the sublime are only known negatively. With 
Kant’s ‘Copernican’ turn we recognise that experience has certain epistemic 
conditions. Certainty is given only through the limit of the subject.94 
Although Kant was reacting in part against the ‘psychologism’ of the British 
empiricist tradition, this aspect of his thought could be seen to invite a 
‘transcendental psychologism’ of a similar kind.95 However, Henry Allison 
argues that in his subtle psychology and ‘dual conception of human 
subjectivity’, Kant can arguably be considered to have avoided the problem, 
one which nonetheless has preoccupied all post-Kantian philosophy.96 We 
saw in chapter three that Schleiermacher also sought to avoid the problem, 
through his hermeneutic programme and his emphasis on intersubjectivity. 
This formulation is important insofar as any given person’s experience must 
be the condition for all, although Schleiermacher’s Kantian schema is 
implicitly challenged by Eliot’s dislocation of the categories from the subject 
in general to social dialogue (see below). Significantly, for Kant, it will be the 
aesthetic which posits such universal agi'eement, thus prompting the early 
Romantics to valorise ‘literature’ as a mode of expression superior to the 
arcane and theoretical productions of the philosophers.97
94 Onora O’Neill, Constructions o f  Reason: Explorations o f K an t’s Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 20-4.
95 Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Humanism’, The Monist 55 (April, 1971), 182- 
207, p. 182.
96 Allison, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Humanism’, p. 183.
97 John R. Harris points out the link between Kant’s categorical imperative and his writings 
on religion and aesthetics. The categorical imperative ‘validates’ the concept o f the 
‘ultimate goodness towards which all actions tend’, which however continually frustrates in
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Novalis led the way, and beginning with his pioneering Fichte Studies, 
rejected the pretensions of philosophy to ‘truthful presentation’, and instead 
turned to poetry and fiction, both in terms of his literary theory and in 
practice.98 This rejection of the universaHsing pretensions of philosophy 
became a feature of the novel from the Romantic period onwards, and is the 
unifying feature of the novel genre as a whole, which from the first resisted 
the separate and rigidly defined conventions imposed on the so-called ‘realist’ 
novel by later critics. All novels are ‘realist’ in the sense that they reject 
generalities and universals, and attempt to concentrate on the particularities of 
experience as it is given; and whether that treatment tends toward 
‘subjectivity’ or ‘objectivity’, ultimately the protagonists in the novel genre 
are placed in some relation to a presupposed external temporal world (see
below).99
Eliot’s novels are no exception: everywhere they insist on the 
particularity of experience, and on the iiTclevance and dangers of theories and 
philosophical abstractions. 1^0 Eliot brought this out very strongly in her 
literary criticism. In a review of Charles Kingsley’s Westward Ho!, she 
acknowledges Kingsley’s rare gift, but berates him for his tendency to 
moralise and philosophise:
Poet and artist in a rare degree, his passionate impetuosity and 
theological prepossessions inexorably forbid that he should ever be
its inability to be grasped. Any reflection o f this kind necessarily requires an imaginative 
leap, -which is also o f course an ethical and aesthetic movement. ‘Kant, Christianity, and 
Literary Criticism’, Literature and B e lie f9 (1989), 72-9, p. 73.
98 O’Brien, Novalis, pp. 89, 106-7. O ’Brien’s subtle thesis locates Novalis in-between 
Kant’s postulation o f  the ‘thing-in-itself and Fichte’s absolute idealism. According to 
O’Brien, N ovalis’s main contribution to philosophy lies in his complex and at times 
strikingly modern semiotic theory. See also N ovalis’s Monologue (cited above).
99 Ian Watt, ‘Realism and the N ovel’, in S. P. Rosenbaum, ed., English Literature and  
British Philosophy (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1971), 65-85, pp. 69-72. Watt 
argues that the language o f the novel, as distinct from poetry, is mainly ‘referential’, and 
this ‘explains why historical and literary commentary are so much less necessary for its 
appreciation: the novel must supply its own footnotes’ (p. 82).
100 McCobb, ‘George Eliot’s Knowledge o f  German Life and Letters’, p. 84.
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a philosopher; he sees, feels, and paints vividly, but he theorizes 
illogically and moralizes absurdly. If  he would confine himself to 
his true sphere, he might be a teacher in the sense in which every 
great artist is a teacher—namely, by giving us his higher sensibility 
as a medium, a delicate acoustic or optical instrument, bringing 
home to our coarser senses what would otherwise be unperceived 
by us.!01
Kingsley is immediately compared to Carlyle, who despite all his faults, has 
‘that piercing insight which every now and then flashes to the depths of 
things’, and an ‘awfiil sense of the mystery of existence’, which colour even 
his most satirical and rhetorical w r i t i n g s .  1 ^ 2  Rather paradoxically, as it turns 
out, the mode of expression of the prose artist is seen as gesturing towards the 
same metaphysical heights that the Romantics considered had eluded the 
metaphysical efforts of traditional philosophy.
Eliot’s response through fiction to Kant’s ‘Copernican’ turn, which 
seemingly renders non-finite knowledge impossible, is crucial in ‘placing’ 
Eliot philosophically and ethically. The Copernican turn can be read as a 
critical manoeuvre that points out that what a thing is cannot be grasped 
independent of its way of being known: the very idea of knowledge as 
receptivity demands that we consider the reception of the thing. Therefore it 
makes no sense to speak of that which lies outside knowledge in the 
speculative manner of Spinoza (and Kant had what he would call the 
‘metaphysical’ pretensions of Spinoza specifically in mind). Reason might 
have a striving towards the infinite but this striving can only remain an Idea, 
because it is invalid to aim to know what lies beyond the conditions of 
knowledge. Having said that, we might want to consider that Kant’s definition 
of experience as knowledge (in the form of judgements) imposes formal 
structures and logical judgements on experience in general and therefore in a 
sense narrows the limits of experience. This of course led Kant to posit an
m i Essays, p. 126. 
m2 Essays, p .  127.
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outside to experience, and which resulted in the constant aporia that is found 
where Romanticism interrogates Kantian philosophy; that is, the relationship 
between our knowledge and the thing-in-itself, which although it cannot be 
knowable or described in discursive terms, must nonetheless be posited to 
allow being to ground itself, m3
Notwithstanding the above, it seems to me that Eliot expands the limits 
that Kant puts on experience, through pity, sociality, and narrative. Her 
response to Kant’s formal structures and categorical imperative is brought out 
forcefully in her essay on the poet Young:
The action of faculty is imperious, and excludes the reflection why 
it should act. In the same way, in proportion as morality is 
emotional, i.e., has affinity with Art, it will exhibit itself in direct 
sympathetic feeling and action, and not as the recognition of a rule.
Love does not say, T ought to love’—it loves. Pity does not say, Tt 
is right to be pitiful’—it pities. Justice does not say, T am bound to 
be just’—it feels justly, i 04
One of the Athenaeum Fragments that Schleiermacher was known to
have written, significantly tries to bridge the Kantian abyss between
knowledge and the thing-in-itself not with art, as might have been Schlegel’s
inclination, but the other subject. Schleiermacher is declaring that the
recognition of the other person is at once an aesthetic as well as a hermeneutic 
rl05process:
A human being should be like a work of art which, though openly 
exhibited and freely accessible, can nevertheless be enjoyed and 
understood only by those who bring feeling and study to it.m6
m3 O’Brien, Novalis, pp. 86-9. The Romantics’ use o f symbol over allegory is relevant 
here. Because the symbol ‘both signifies and also vitally participates in the idea which it 
represents’, it means that the art work, while like nature being ‘necessarily incomplete’, can 
nonetheless become ‘a true part or a living fragment o f the experience or idea it seeks to 
represent’. Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 10.
Essays, p. 379.
105 Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, p. 190.
m6 [Athenaeum] Fragment 336, Schlegel, ‘Lucinde ’ and The Fragments, p. 213.
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This hermeneutic process is intrinsically linked with history, which in some 
ways from the Romantics onwards replaces theology at least in the foreground 
of any search for origins or meaning. Hence all the various disciplines from 
anthropology to biology will ultimately be concerned with history, and any 
provisional answers will therefore need to be realised in narrative terms, to as 
it were validate their alternative story of origins. m7
This idea of an ineluctable striving for finality and totality through 
narrative can help place Eliot between Kant, whose position we can 
characterise very reductively as the critical limitation of experience as 
knowledge, and Spinoza, the speculative assertion of what lies beyond 
knowledge, ms Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant is very helpful. The Critique 
o f Judgement, which Deleuze hails as the ‘foundation of Romanticism’:
gives us a new theory of finality, which corresponds to the 
transcendental point of view and fits perfectly with the idea of 
legislation. This task is fulfilled in so far as finality no longer has a 
theological principle, but rather, theology has a ‘fin a l’ human 
foundation. From this derives the importance of the two theses of 
the Critique o f  Judgement: that the final accord of the faculties is 
the object of a special genesis; and that the final relationship 
between Nature and man is the result of a human practical
activity. m9
Kant’s aim is to establish some sort of ‘free accord’ between the various 
faculties— knowledge, ethics, art—which would legitimate the role of the 
subject as legislator, and thereby find some sort of harmony in the fact that
107 Peter Brooks, Reading fo r  the P lot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 5-6. 
m s Kant’s transcendental idealism needs to be distinguished from the ‘absolute’ idealism o f  
Hegel. Hegel rejected Kant’s ‘objective’ noumena, and ‘regarded the phenomenal as an 
embodiment o f the pure rationality o f the noumenal’. See John Cobb, Living Options in 
Protestant Theology, pp. 28-9.
i09  Gilles Deleuze, K a n t’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine o f  the Faculties, trans. by 
Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1984), pp. xii, 69. 
Deleuze interprets Kant to conform to his own philosophy o f  immanence very neatly: ‘We 
know that there are two types o f legislation, thus two domains corresponding to nature and 
freedom, to sensible nature and to suprasensible nature. But there is only a single terrain, 
that o f experience’ (p. 40). See also Yirmiyahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy o f  History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 119-21, 201-3.
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nature seems to be in accord with our subjective and autonomous 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . im T h i s  idea of harmony is not however able to ‘ground’ 
itself, as the upshot of this would be the very ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics that 
Kant has already rejected in respect o f Spinoza and others.! 11 Eliot responds 
to this challenge by dislocating the Kantian categories and formal structures 
from the individual subject, and negotiates what lies outside the subject 
through other persons. She does this by the immediacy and non-cognitive 
‘grounding’ of narrative:
But the consideration of molecular physics is not the direct ground 
of human love and moral action, any more than it is the direct 
means of composing a noble picture or of enjoying great music.
One might as well hope to dissect one’s own body and be merry 
doing it, as take molecular physics (in which you must banish from 
your field of view what is specifically human) to be your dominant 
guide, your determiner of motives, in what is solely human. That 
every study has its bearing on every other is true; but pain and 
relief, love and sorrow, have their peculiar history which make an 
experience and knowledge above the swing of atoms.! 12
Both Kant and Spinoza attempt to think of totality as the condition for
being, whereas the ‘totality’ of Eliot’s narrative striving is the lived whole of
the social. Rather than seeing this totality in cognitive terms, as in the
philosophical paradigm, Eliot’s is an affective totality. In relation to Spinoza,
Eliot and Schlegel respond in differing ways to the philosophical paradigm,
and the comparison is suggestive. Schlegel’s takes up Spinoza’s philosophy,
but ignores his geometric demonstrations, and concentrates on his
imaginative, pantheistic view of the world where every particular stands in
relation to the w h o l e . E l i o t ,  by contrast, while she too is attracted by the
‘poetic’ side of Spinoza’s imagination, ultimately cannot countenance any
1 El Deleuze, K a n t’s Critical Philosophy, p. 69.
111 Bowie, Romanticism, p. 60.
11^ Letters, VI, 98-9.
113 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 163. See also Friedrich Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, pp. 
84-7.
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viewpoint which attempts to think or postulate a totality from the aspect of 
eternity as the condition for being, as this conflicts with her humanism which 
is intersubjective, social and affective:
I do not find my temple in Pantheism, which, whatever might be its 
value speculatively, could not yield a practical religion, since it is 
an attempt to look at the universe from outside of our relations to it 
(that universe) as human beings. As healthy, sane human beings we 
must love and hate—love is what is good for mankind, hate is what 
is evil for mankind. For years of my youth I dwelt in dreams of a 
pantheistic sort, falsely supposing that I was enlarging my 
sympathy. But I have travelled far away from that t i m e .  114
We may continue to place Eliot in relation to the early Romantics with
the suggestion that the early Romantics do not transgress the Kantian critical
limit in the way that Eliot does, in her intimation of what lies beyond
knowledge and reason. A letter of 1841, written just after Eliot’s ‘conversion’
to agnosticism, demonstrates the idea of an ineluctable striving for a totality
which however can only be ‘known’ fleetingly and provisionally:
1 fully participate in the belief that the only heaven here or 
hereafter is to be found in conformity with the will of the Supreme; 
a continual aiming at the attainment of that perfect ideal, the true 
Logos that dwells in the bosom of the One Father. [...] Goodbye, 
and blessings on you, as they will infallibly be on the children of 
peace and virtue. 115
114 Letters, V, 31. Heine’s response to Spinozism is not without interest. Somewhat 
dubiously, he names Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as Spinozists, and claims that all his 
contemporaries, ‘perhaps without knowing it, are looking through the eyeglasses that 
Baruch Spinoza polished’. Heine tried to synthesise Hegel and Spinoza, and thought o f  
Goethe as ‘the Spinoza o f poetry’. He wrote that ‘the early philosophy o f  Spinoza has shed 
its mathematical shell and now flutters about in Goethe’s poetry’. It is interesting to note 
that Heine pronounced God to be dead well before Nietzsche, preferring to feel that divinity 
resides in man. See Yirmiyahu Yovel, ‘Heinrich Heine and the Message o f Pantheism’, 
Jerusalem Quarterly 35 (Spring 1985), 101-11, p. 106. Heine’s influence on Eliot is beyond 
the scope o f this study, but it definitely warrants further investigation.
115 Letters, I, 125-6. The religious language should not, I think, be taken literally. The 
‘Supreme’ and ‘Father’ and other anthropomorphic terms are more than likely metaphors 
for undeviating deterministic sequence, on which Charles Bray based his The Philosophy o f  
Necessity. Given that the letter was written to Mrs Pears, who was Bray’s sister, it seems 
likely that Eliot would use Bray’s terminology. Howard R. Murphy argues that Bray’s book 
and Charles Hennell’s Inquiry Concerning the Origins o f  Christianity (London, 1838) were
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This intimation beyond knowledge and reason is invariably connected to 
other persons: ‘Speculative truth begins to appear but a shadow of individual 
minds, agieement between intellects seems unattainable, and we turn to the 
truth o f  feeling  as the only universal bond of union.’116 And while any 
glimpse of truth or awareness of the absolute will perforce be fragmentary and 
provisional, it will be similarly predicated on intersubjectivity and social 
experience:
Poor hints and sketches of souls as we are—with some slight 
transient vision of the perfect and the true—we had need help each 
other to gaze at the blessed heavens instead of peering into each 
other’s eyes to find out the motes there. 117
Jacobi, in his reaction to Kant and Fichte, attempted a way out of the 
‘infinite regress’ (see above) by stressing the circularity involved in all claims 
to knowledge, but at the same time admitting the possibility of ungrounded 
‘truth’. The Mill on the Floss continually problematises this notion of truth. 
On the one hand, Maggie is patently ignorant of the deterministic processes 
that underpin the narrator’s ethical ideas, being
unhappily quite without that knowledge of the irreversible laws 
within and without her which, governing the habits, becomes 
morality, and, developing the feelings of submission and 
dependence, becomes religion (381).118
indeed influential on Eliot, but rather than causing an instant conversion, they merely 
‘stimulated her to verbalise doubts that had been maturing in her for several years’. ‘The 
Ethical Revolt Against Christian Orthodoxy, p. 814. And see also, E. S. Shaffer, ‘Kubla 
Khan ', p. 230.
116 Letters, I, 162.
117 Letters, I, 276. For Feuerbach, the absolute is nothing other ‘than the essence o f human 
nature itself. Further, he regards it as an historical inevitability that man will one day 
confess ‘that the consciousness o f  God is nothing else than the consciousness o f the 
species’. The Essence o f  Christianity, p. 270. In the light o f such passages, it is no surprise 
that the left-Hegelians (Feuerbach and Strauss particularly, both o f whom Eliot translated) 
influenced Marx to such a degree.
118 This is very close to Schleiermacher’s idea o f religion as a ‘feeling o f absolute 
dependence’ (see above, chapter three).
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On the other hand, even knowledge of these ‘irreversible laws’ form part of 
‘that complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking knowledge which we call truth’ 
(579), which seems to undercut the consolatory tone of the conclusion of the 
novel (see below, chapter f i v e ) .  119
The notion of the possibility of ungrounded truth was developed by the 
early Romantics, and their particular focus was the work of art, which they 
claimed could generate truths that are ontologically prior to the ‘grounded’ 
claims of science and philosophy. Novalis and Schlegel sought nothing less 
than a union of poetry and philosophy, because for them, philosophy is not 
‘free’ while it seeks a ‘ground’ and is divorced from p o e t r y .  120 
Schleiermacher’s negotiation of Kant and Spinoza, as we saw in the last 
chapter, is particularly interesting, because his work can be seen as an attempt 
at a reconciliation of these two competing traditions, which has important 
implications for the philosophical placing of Eliot. Schleiermacher’s use of the 
faculty of intuition {Anschauung)— Si key Kantian term, as well as having 
resonances for Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge—provided him with the 
theoretical apparatus tentatively to bridge the gap between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal worlds. Where Schleiermacher differs from the other 
Romantics, though, is in his emphasis on the intersubjective nature of this 
facility, which brings the religious, hermeneutic and aesthetic realms into 
close correlation. 121
It should be noticed in passing that the theory of art and philosophy that 
we have been discussing applies not only to the early German Romantics but 
to Coleridge and Wordsworth as well, and is related to the idea of poetry as a 
recognition of an anteriority that has affect but resists cognition. 122 Eliot
119 John Rignall, ‘Metaphor, Truth and the Mobile Imagination in The M ill on the Floss', 
The George Eliot Review  24 (1993), 36-40, p. 37.
120 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 194.
121 Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, pp. 195-6.
122 As is well known, Wordsworth had a continuing profound influence on Eliot. John Beer 
argues that Wordsworth’s conceptions o f duty and affection ‘offered a point o f stability’ as
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herself seems to express this idea in her response to Goethe, as well as to 
Thomas à Kempis’s The Imitation o f  Christ, which is so central to the ethics 
of The Mill on the Floss:
I am writing to your dear Husband as well as to you, and in answer 
to his question about Goethe, I must say, for my part, that I think he 
had a strain of mysticism in his soul,— of so much mysticism as I 
think inevitably belongs to a full poetic nature— I mean the 
delighted bathing of the soul in emotions which overpass the 
outlines of definite thought. I should take the ‘Imitation’ as a type 
(it is one which your husband also mentions), but perhaps I might 
differ from him in my attempt to interpret the unchangeable and 
universal meanings of that gi eat book. 123
This idea of poetry as anteriority that resists cognition is particularly 
suggestive for the Romantics, given that this anteriority is known only from its 
loss, or ex post facto. Where Eliot differs though, from early Romanticism in 
general, is over the question of community and intersubjectivity. 124 This 
would explain her preference for the novel form rather than the lyric. The 
novel became the genre of modernity, it being no accident that Schlegel used 
the word itself in the original French, roman, to name the Romantic 
movement itself. 125 As far as Eliot is concerned, this also means that it is not 
art in general— as an intimation of the forming of form—but art that addresses 
history, community and the social which becomes important:
A Form being once started must by & by cease to be purely 
spontaneous: the form itself becomes the object and material of 
emotion, & is sought after, amplified and elaborated by
Eliot rejected orthodox Christianity. Through Wordsworth, Eliot was able to reconcile a 
Kantian emphasis on duty with ‘her own ideal o f  sympathy’. Providence and Love: Studies 
in Wordsworth, Channing, Myers, George Eliot, and Ruskin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 189-90. Coleridge was an early influence, although Eliot somewhat lost 
interest in him as a thinker later on, possibly due to Lewes’s suspicion of Coleridge’s 
plagiarisms. See McCobb, ‘George Eliot’s Knowledge o f  German Life and Letters’, p. 63.
123 Letters, VI, 89.
124 Although the early Romantics did have the notion o f ‘Gesellschaft’, which is a kind o f  
intersubjectivity, a shared cultural background that connects the reader with the artist. See 
Wheeler, Literary Criticism, p. 26.
125 Friedrich Schlegel, L ucinde’ and the Fragments, Translator’s Introduction, p. 19.
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discrimination of its elements till at last by the abuse of its 
refinement it preoccupies the room of emotional thinking; & 
poetry, from being the fullest expression of the human soul, is 
stai-ved into an ingenious pattern-work, in which tricks with 
vocables take the place of living words fed with the blood of 
relevant meaning, & made musical by the continual
intercommunication of sensibility & thought. 126
The early Romantics’ notion of the literary has important resonances for 
Eliot’s thought, not least their predilection for fragments, which by definition 
resist closure and reflect the striving for a totality that can never be realised. In 
this sense they constituted an important preparatory exercise for the novel to 
come. 127 However, I am suggesting that Eliot goes beyond the Kantian 
critical limit and is positive, by stressing feeling, narrative, and 
intersubjectivity, which combine to give force to the peculiar mode of the
novel. 128
As we saw earlier, there was a potential way out of Jacobi’s ‘infinite 
regress’, involving the notion of literature and particularly music ‘saying the 
unsayable’. Jacobi invoked a non-discursive concept of ‘truth’, albeit as a 
regulative idea, which connected to the early Romantics’ non-representational 
approach to language. However, despite this approach, the early Romantics 
were not extreme epistemological relativists: they were positive in their 
holistic and hermeneutic approach to the impossibility of a final ground. The 
quest for truth is ever renewable, and has for the early Romantics an ethical
126 ‘Notes on Form in Art’, Essays, p. 436.
127 Wheeler, Literary Criticism, pp. 8-9. One o f the early results was F. Schlegel’s Lucinde 
(1799), which, in its seeming incompleteness and resistance to a single interpretation, could 
be said to contain its own literary theory.
128 Raymond W illiams’s conception o f the novel as striving for totality, and his 
mobilisation o f  Eliot’s novels, is relevant here. See ‘George Eliot’, in his classic The 
English Novel from  Dickens to Lawrence (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984), 75-94. Where 
Eliot may part company with the early Romantics is in her irony. Although her use o f irony 
can be usefully compared to the self-deprecating, ‘Socratic’ irony o f  the Romantics, she 
stops short o f  making the whole world ironic. This is because she feels she must ultimately 
take a decision o f  Kantian responsibility, and recognise that there is a hierarchy o f  
philosophical positions, and that not all viewpoints are equal and non-differentiated. As we 
shall see below, at some point irony must stop.
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rather than an epistemological focus, which as we saw is where the 
importance of Schleiermacher lies for Eliot. In this respect, Eliot’s novels, 
with their constant dynamic between philosophy and literature, are right in 
line with the early Romantic project.
This is an appropriate juncture to signal how Lacoue-Labarthe negotiates 
the Kantian sublime. Because Lacoue-Labarthe sees writing as a form of 
origin, the sublime is an intimation of the unlimited or Absolute only ever 
given through the limit. Therefore he is, in this sense, hyper-Kantian.129 But 
Kant himself referred extensively to the soul (albeit negatively), and pre- 
Kantian ethics concerned itself with the feeling which surpassed the limit. 
This feeling was not just negative, and the same could easily be said of Eliot. 
It is not just through critical procedure that ethics is given but has to do with 
cultivation offeeling. She transgresses the Kantian critical limit by positing an 
intimation beyond knowledge and reason (which as we saw is related to 
Schleiermacher’s conception of GefkiXl).^^^ While the Romantics tend to 
accept the Kantian limit and posit the sublime as beyond representation, Eliot 
has a more Spinozistic sense that whatever limit or condition there is would 
also be included within the totality, it would not be radically anterior. A
129 See PhilHpe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f  Philosophy, ed. by Thomas Trezise 
(Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1993). Although Lacoue-Labarthe’s Kantian 
antecedents are unmistakable, Thomas Trezise argues that Lacoue-Labarthe is the latest in a 
tradition o f deconstructers (Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger) who suggest that ‘meaning [...] 
does not lie in a principium, such as the principle o f negation or identity, by which one 
could assure in advance the closure o f  interpretation’. Lacoue-Labarthe is ‘one o f the very 
few philosophers o f  our or any day for whom the alternatives o f  knowledge and its 
frustration or power does not form the ultimate horizon o f thinking— one o f the few who 
affirm the “failure” o f philosophy as the very possibility o f thought’ (editor’s introduction, 
pp. xiv, xvii). Similarly, Derrida does not regard Lacoue-Labarthe’s programme as 
necessarily negative. He writes: ‘Lacoue-Labarthe does something entirely different. He 
does not propose to restore, rehabilitate, or reinstall “the subject”; rather, he proposes to 
think its desistance by taking into account both a deconstruction o f  the Heideggerian type 
and that about which he thinks Heidegger maintained a silence.’ This ‘silence [...] is not 
without relation to the ineluctable’. Jacques Derrida, ‘Desistance’, trans. by Christopher 
Fynsk, introduction to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, 
Politics, ed. by Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 
17, 22.
130 See Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, pp. 188-90.
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further consequence of this approach is that there would now be different 
modes of limit; that is, ways of relation between the self and the world. Eliot 
is thus, through narrative, staking out a position in-between the sublime as 
liminal and the organicism of the Spinozistic totality. Seen in this way, Eliot’s 
novels are a positive response to the impasse that can be recognised in the 
Romantic location of ethics in the non-cognitive, pre-semantic absolute, and 
hence the importance Eliot places on narrative, sociality, and pity.
Henry Allison’s distinction between Kant’s empirical realism, in which 
one experiences the empirical world as real and lived; and transcendental 
idealism, which asks how the real is given as real is relevant here. 131 This is 
useful because it allows us to reconcile the ‘transcendental’ and Kantian 
aspects that we have been discussing, with the ‘natural history’ flavour and the 
‘realism’ of Eliot’s early n o v e l s . 132 Her well documented views (following 
Ruskin) on the desirability of ‘real and concrete’ as opposed to ‘ideal and 
eclectic’ a r t ,  133 which are everywhere articulated in her essays and earlier 
letters, can be assimilated, and we find that, contrary to received wisdom, 
there is no necessary tension between these polarities. 134 As we shall see 
below (chapter five). The Mill on the Floss relies heavily on Darwinian ideas 
and on nineteenth-century science, and it needs to be stressed that Eliot insists 
on a world existing independent of our perception of it, even as she 
problematises the whole notion of representation. 135 in this sense, the fact that 
Eliot asserts the givenness of the world of appearances thus makes her a ‘naive 
realist’, philosophically speaking.
131 Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Humanism’, pp. 203-7.
132 By this I mean that we can accept that we experience a world outside us (empirical 
realism), and  that this experience has subjective conditions (transcendental idealism).
133 Letters, II, 362.
134 See K. K. Collins, ‘Questions o f  Method: Some Unpublished Late Lsseiys', Nineteenth- 
Century Fiction 35 (1980), 385-405, p. 385.
135 Sally Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentary’, The M ill on the Floss, ed. by Sally 
Shuttleworth (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 490.
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One modern critic who seems to be trapped in what may be termed a 
‘linguistic monism’ is J. Hillis Miller, who in a characteristic turn of phrase, 
claims that ‘we make things what they are by naming them’, meaning that 
words (‘signs’) do not represent objects in the external world, but are 
somehow constitutive of the very things themselves. 136 This in itself is 
unremarkable, but Miller goes too far when he ascribes this poststructuralist 
position to Eliot, adducing, one presumes, the following passage from Eliot’s 
Journal as proof of this tendency:
I never before longed so much to know the names of things as 
during this visit to Ilfracombe. The desire is part o f the tendency 
that is now constantly growing in me to escape from all vagueness 
and inaccuracy into the daylight of distinct, vivid ideas. The mere 
fact of naming an object tends to give definiteness to our 
conception of it—we have then a sign that at once calls up in our 
minds the distinctive qualities whieh mark out for us that partieular 
object from all o t h e r s .  1^ 7
It seems to me that Miller is stretching Eliot’s prose to the limit here,
presumably for his own ideological purposes. Surely, pace Miller, Eliot is
referring to a world and within it objects which are presumed to exist
independent of our perception or representation of them. Eliot’s letter was
written while on a botanic expedition with Lewes, before she wrote her early
‘natural’ histories. The Mill on the Floss i n c l u d e d .  138 Eliot’s attention to
meaning (her givenness) is far different from, and much richer than. Miller’s
rigorous but ultimately empty formalism. Her Spinozism demands a wonder
and attention to the world, together with a semiotic firstness: the world is not
blank substance there to be represented, but (in almost Peircean fashion)
136 J .  Hillis Miller, ‘Optic and Semiotic hi M iddlem arch’, in George Eliot, ed. by Harold 
Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), 99-110, p. 109.
1 3 7  L g r t e r j ' ,  I I ,  2 5 1 .
138 Lewes was researching his Sea-Side Studies: Ilfracombe, Tenby, Scilly Isles, and Jersey 
(Edinburgh, 1858). See Haight, p. 207. To be fair, however, Miller’s so-called ethics o f  
reading is about reading and narrative p e r  se, and strictly speaking not about any specific 
text. Miller’s formalism dictates that the task o f  interpretation is to render every text open.
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demands its own representation or ‘narrativises’ i t s e l f .  139 xhis is the ironic 
limit of Eliot’s narrative—the fate that eludes narrative projection and order. 
Here at the limits of representation is also the sublime in the non-Kantian
sense. 140
The modern (and we would have to say Kantian and Derridean) 
definition of Enlightenment is the freedom from any positive or empirical 
determination of the self in the recognition of the se lfs ethical autonomy. 
Seen in this manner, ethics is purely formal and cannot be derived from any 
given law, but is always the freedom of law-giving and decision. I have been 
suggesting that Eliot doesn’t want to go this far, because she does not see the 
self as being of a different order from that of worldly givenness. This explains 
her emphasis on social formation, narrative development, pity, and what 
exceeds self-knowledge. We can identify this with a post-Kantian Spinozism, 
a refusal to see the self as epistemologically autonomous, an insistence that 
there is no ‘Copernican’ turn which locates knowledge within the subject. 
Because Eliot rejects Kant’s Copernican turn, and refuses to see the self as 
epistemologically autonomous, she is ‘positive’ in that she posits a domain 
beyond knowledge that may be intuitable by the self, in contrast to the 
negativity of the Kantian formulation.
Kant describes his own project of transcendental idealism as opposed to 
transcendental realism. Against Spinoza and others he insists that the 
conditions for experience are ideal and could not be perceived in the world. 
He criticises both Spinoza and pantheism in the Critique o f  Pure Reason by
139 I refer to C. S. Peirce (1839-1914), the American ‘pragmatic’ philosopher.
140 See also Rosemarie Bodenheimer’s fascinating study o f Eliot’s letters and fiction. 
Bodenheimer argues that Eliot’s narrators ‘provide, within the controlled representations o f  
fiction, the human yet larger-than-human perspective that can give voice to a multiplicity o f  
interpretations within a single discourse. [ ...]  This refusal o f  singleness, which makes 
almost every critical interpretation a story o f  lesser complexity than the one George Eliot 
tells, is her primary mode o f  depicting a world where “true representation” is impossible’. 
The Real Life o f  M ary Ann Evans: George Eliot, Her Letters and Fiction  (Ithica: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), p. 101.
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arguing for the necessary limits of perception, thus establishing a noumenal 
realm which one cannot experience. 141 At the same time, Kant regards the 
immanence of Spinoza’s system as illegitimate. 142 However, for Eliot, it may 
well be the case that knowledge is of the world as it appears, but there is also a 
domain ‘beyond’ knowledge which conditions knowledge, which the self may 
feel or intuit. Eliot—through narrative and the connection between the literary 
and ethics—wishes to reduce the ontological distance between humanity and 
divinity (as in Spinoza). But at the same time she recognises that any 
philosophical way of knowing would merely belie the character of that 
divinity (as in Kant). Unlike both Spinoza and Kant, she is perhaps trying to 
reduce the epistemological distance as well. This is achieved with an emphasis 
on others, community, and ethics through human experience—not of supra- 
human absolutes. For Eliot, divinity already resides in other persons. 
Literature is the forum or mode of human sympathy, and this explains why 
reason drops out of her thinking. Kant’s anti-anthropologism means that he 
refuses to give human nature or reason a determinate or concrete character. 
Reason is self-determining and regulative, or critical. Eliot’s critique of 
Kant—as we saw when we discussed Scenes o f Clerical Life—is targeted most 
squarely at the emptiness and individualism of his formulation. In contrast, 
Eliot emphasises the positivity of human being and experience, as least as a 
medium for ethics if not its final cause.
Eliot, then, like Spinoza, and unlike Kant, can be characterised as a 
transcendental realist, but of a different form. This would mean that the 
transcendental conditions for experience are not just within the subject (as 
Ideal), but can be experienced as real (through others). For Eliot it is through 
narrative that we see the world, selves and others through their forming—
141 Allison, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Humanism’, p. 207.
142 See Raising the Tone o f  Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, ed. by Peter 
Ferves (Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), for Kant’s critique o f  
metaphysics and eschatology.
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rather than as given forms. Unlike Lacoue-Labarthe’s approach, this forming 
is social, collective and narratorial rather than formal and poetic. This 
‘forming’ is related to Bildung (see below, chapter five). For Kant the world is 
given according to the categories of the transcendental subject. On the usual 
reading of the aesthetic in German idealism, art is seen as the way in which 
the subject can reflect upon these forms/categories that form the world. Art is 
a way of seeing the conditions of experience in their conditioning, forming, 
Bildung. But this assumed that there are transcendental conditions or a logic. 
But what if, for George Eliot, the way the world was formed did not have to 
do with a subject but with intersubjective socially and historically formed 
modes? Then the way the world is given would not be due to transcendental 
categories but the historical sedimentation of art and n a r r a t i v e ,  i  4 3
143 Gillian Beer makes a similar point when she argues that in The M ill on the Floss Eliot 
rejects the usual Bildungsroman conventions. George Eliot (Brighton: Harvester, 1986), pp. 
98-9.
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V
Bildung, Hermeneutics, and Darwinism
In this chapter I shall discuss the idea of The Mill on the Floss as a 
Bildungsroman, or development novel, which was an important genre for the 
early Romantics, especially in terms of their response to the perceived 
classicism of Goethe. What George Eliot does with the gem'e, and how 
ultimately it is found inadequate for her needs will be linked to Eliot’s notion 
of a non-teleological idea of evolution and a non-linear notion of history, 
which will establish connections between Bildung, hermeneutics, and 
Darwinism. Eliot’s response to Darwinism, and her understated but significant 
contribution to the intense debate about whether natural selection is the 
mechanism for evolution, together with her critique of Herbert Spencer’s 
positivist interpretation of evolution, will be connected with her turning from 
science and philosophy to art, fiction, and history, and the ideas of the Jena 
Romantics.
In a letter written during the composition of The Mill on the Floss, Eliot 
insisted:
that at present my mind works with the most freedom and the 
keenest sense of poetry in my remotest past, and there are many 
strata to be worked through before I can begin to use artistically 
any material I may gather in the present. 1
Many critics have observed the strong autobiographical element of The Mill
on the Floss, and read the work as a type of Bildungsroman, variously
discussing the ways in which Eliot departed from the traditional conventions
of the genre.^ Few critics, however, have explored what drew Eliot to the
1 Letters, III, 128-9.
2 That the novel is self-consciously autobiographical is clear, especially when one considers 
that Tom and Maggie were born in the same years as Eliot and her brother Isaac. See 
Haight, p. 5. Beryl Gray argues that M aggie’s sensibilities to music are Eliot’s own, and that 
the novel ‘offers George Eliot’s most directly personal revelation o f  her own musicality’.
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genre in the first place, notwithstanding the fact that ultimately she found it 
unsuited to her needs. Any discussion of the Bildungsroman must start with 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, with which Eliot was very familiar, and indeed it is 
probable that she contributed some of the literary criticism to Lewes’s justly 
famous (and still extremely readable) Life o f  Goethe (1855).3 One such 
passage may well have been Lewes’s discussion of Wilhelm Meister, in which 
he defends the ‘vacillations’ of the main character, on account of Goethe’s aim 
of ‘showing how some eharacters change, obedient to every external 
influence’:
The metamorphoses of Wilhelm would have been impossible with a 
character such as Egmont. This seems so obvious, that one is 
surprised to find critics objecting to the vacillating character of 
 Wilhelm, as if it were a fault in art. It would be as reasonable to
object to the vacillations of Hamlet.4 
Lewes goes on to suggest that Wilhelm Meister, though it describes ‘a world in 
which we see no trace of the preacher, not even a glimpse of his surplice’, is 
an extremely moral work, one which depends on the ‘insight and experience’ 
of the reader, as much as on any final moral to which one may be ‘pointed’.5
George Eliot and Music, p. 13. However, in her edition o f the novel, Beryl Gray warns that 
the autobiographical elements are still shaped by Eliot the mature and successful novelist, 
and should thus be approached with caution. The Mill on the Floss, ed. by Beryl Gray 
(London: Everyman, 1996), p. xxiv.
3 E. A. McCobb points out that many o f the works that Eliot lists as having read during her 
stay in Berlin (while Lewes was researching his book) are ‘precisely those which Lewes had 
not previously treated in his earlier articles on Goethe’. Interestingly enough, one o f  
Lewes’s obscure works is entitled The Apprenticeship o f  Life (London, 1850), and is 
obviously influenced by Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. ‘George Eliot’s Knowledge o f German 
Life and Letters’, p. 33. The Apprenticeship o f  Life was published only in serial form in The 
Leader, commencing in 1850. Rosemaiy Ashton observes that Lewes ‘had not the heart to 
carry beyond eleven uneven chapters’, and quotes a modern critic who describes the work as 
‘a collapsed Wilhelm M eister'. G. H  Lewes: A Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 73, 
75.
 ^G. H. Lewes, Life and Works o f  Goethe (London, 1855), p. 206-7.
3 Lewes, Goethe, pp. 211-2. Lewes was responding to Novalis’s description o f the work as 
‘artistic Atheism’ (Novalis, Schriften, II, 367).
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This discussion has a remarkable similarity to Eliot’s own essay on the 
novel, although she characteristically adds her own doctrine of sym pathy:6
Everywhere he brings us into the presence of the living, generous 
humanity—mixed and erring, and self-deluding, but saved from 
utter corruption by the salt of some noble impulse, some 
disinterested effort, some beam of good nature, even though 
grotesque or homely. And his mode of treatment seems to us 
precisely that which is really moral in its influence. It is without 
exaggeration; he is in no haste to alarm readers into virtue by 
melodramatic consequences; he quietly follows the stream of fact 
and of life; and waits patiently for the moral processes of nature as 
we all do for the material processes.^
For Eliot, Bildung is broadly ‘culture’, and the ‘subtlest essence’ of culture is
‘sympathy’.8 This idea of personal development and culture, which had
attracted the Victorians of the previous generation, and which had been
stimulated by the effects of the Industrial Revolution, would have been deeply
resonant for Eliot.^ Also, Eliot would have noted the subtle shift in Goethe’s
conception of the Bildungsroman in the two parts of Wilhelm Meister. The
first part {Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre) is more representative of the usual
model, following the young Wilhelm’s personal development as he tries to
interpret the world through life and art. The second part {Wilhelm Meister’s
Wanderjahre), while still conforming to the organic model, is more concerned
with man in his relation to the rest of society, and the processes of history and
intersubjectivity. It is at this juncture that Goethe’s debt to Rousseau is fully
revealed. 1 ^
 ^Thomas Pinney, Headnote to ‘The Morality o f  Wilhelm M eister\ Essays, pp. 143-4.
"I Essays, pp. 146-7.
 ^Essays, p. 317.
9 W. H. Bruford, The German Concept o f  Self-Cultivation: ‘Bildung’ from  Humbolt to 
Thomas Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. viii. E. S, Shaffer 
complains that ‘the neglect, the dismissal, o f  Goethe’s overarching achievement in Wilhelm 
M eister and its influence on the English novel is one o f the scandals o f  our criticism’. 
'Kubla Khan pp. 12-3.
Bruford, Bildung, pp. 40, 98, 104.
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The first part of Wilhelm Meister features a discussion of the distinction 
between novel and tragedy: in the novel, Chance has an important role to play, 
although it must only be invoked in accordance with the dispositions of the 
characters; in tragedy there is only place for Fate, which alone can create 
tragic situations.i i A. S. Byatt argues that in The Mill on the Floss, Eliot, ‘not 
with complete success’, combines the Goethean epic novel (Byatt is thinking 
of Elective Affinitiesf'^ with Greek tragedy. Byatt goes on to argue that there 
is a qualitative difference between the early ‘natural histories’ up to and 
including The Mill on the Floss, and the later books such as Middlemarch, 
which are as it were, ‘more “interior” ’. This is true, but it is only a difference 
of degree, and, as Byatt points out. The Mill on the Floss is formally different 
from both the later, arguably greater works, and also Adam Bede, which 
preceded it. Byatt recognises the novel’s poetry and ‘fortuitous freedom’, 
which compensate for its seeming lack of formal unity. H Eliot however, while 
she accepted that she was so ‘beguiled’ by the childhood chapters that the 
tragedy was not ‘adequately prepared’,i4 never gave any indication that she 
ever felt the novel lacked unity as such. Indeed, seen in the light of the early 
Romantic conception of the novel as a mixed genre, the achievement of The 
Mill on the Floss is not in spite of, but because of its formal anomalies.
Schlegel hailed Goethe, along with Dante and Shakespeare, as ‘the great 
triple chord of modern poetry’, 13 and in his influential review of Wilhelm 
Meister, proclaimed that by virtue of Goethe’s novel, the genre had now
11 Carlyle’s translation, 2 vols. (London, 1858), bk. 5, ch. 7.
12 Goethe, Elective Affinities, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). 
Book six, chapter six o f The M ill on the Floss, ‘Illustrating the Laws o f Attraction’, is a 
reference to Goethe’s novel, which Eliot ‘read and admired’. Eliot also admired the novels 
in a similar ‘Goethean’ vein by George Sand, Jacques (1834), and Consuelo (1842). See 
Rosemary Ashton’s excellent biography, George Eliot: A Life (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1996), p. 236.
13 A. S. Byatt, Editor’s Introduction, pp. 36-40.
Letters, 111,317.
13 Quoted in Behler, Literary Theory, p. 168.
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become once more a poetic one, despite its prosaic and realistic manner of 
presentation. This was due to its ‘narrative rhythm’, its ‘hermeneutic 
inexhaustibility’ and its ‘special kind of unity’, a quality that had been missing 
since Cervantes. 16 And of the novel genre, the Bildungsroman has the special 
quality among novels of being the most ‘realist’ as well as most ‘self- 
conscious’, given that the object of their representations is nothing other than 
the ‘self-positing consciousness of the human’. 12 Thus the Bildungsroman is 
aware of ‘the experiential framework of practical reality’, but also ‘the 
creative potential of the human imagination and reflectivity’. 1^  And further, it 
reveals not only the Bildung or self-forming of the hero (and it is normally a 
male protagonist) of the tale, but also fosters the development of the reader 
who is engaged with the hermeneutic demands of the text.l^
However, the early Romantics had an ambivalent response to Goethe, 
and although they recognised the ‘romantic’ qualities of Wilhelm Meister, in 
line with their fluid definition of modern (‘romantic’) literature, they also 
perceived an eighteenth-century classicism which, despite the novel’s poetry 
and irony, could not ultimately be subsumed under their concept of absolute 
poetry.20 Novalis and Schlegel continued the development of the genre, and
16 Behler, Literary Theory, pp. 169-7, 174. Behler writes; ‘From a formal point o f view, this 
progressive unfolding manifests itself in Goethe’s innovative technique o f narration, which 
operates with foreshadowings o f  the events, correspondences, mirroring o f  characters and 
contrasting figures, and thereby creates a type o f poetic unity which is never fully present 
and resides in a constant progression’ (p. 171). The focus o f this unity is, as Schlegel says in 
his review, ‘the irony which hovers over the entire work’. F. Schlegel, ‘On Goethe’s 
Meister’, quoted in Behler, Literary Theory, p. 172.
H  Marc Redfield, Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman' 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 55.
1  ^ Martin Swales, The German Bildungsroman from  Wieland to Hesse (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), p. 5, cited in Redfield, Phantom Formations, p. 55.
19 Stephen Prickett, ‘Fictions and Metafictions: Phantases, Wilhelm M eister and the Idea o f 
the Bildungsroman', in William Reaper, ed., The Gold Thread: Essays on George 
MacDonald (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 109-25, pp. 116-7. Prickett also 
points out that this anticipates modern reader-response theories.
20 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 178. Stephen Prickett notes that, somewhat paradoxically, 
Wilhelm Meister is considered by modern readers to be a Romantic novel. Origins o f  
Narrative, p. 191.
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both produced ‘romantic’ novels, respectively, Heinrich von Ofterdingen 
(published posthumously in 1802) and Lucinde (1799). Although both novels 
ostensibly follow the conventions of the Bildungsroman, they were written 
partly in response to the perceived classieism of Wilhelm Meister, and differ 
sharply in certain respects from the model that Goethe’s novel provided, even 
though they were written with the consciousness of the enormity of Goethe’s 
achievement in mind. Schlegel wanted Lucinde to reflect his romantic theory 
of the novel, but he went back to the original Greek definition of theory 
(theoria), which means ‘intellectual intuition’. Thus, for the reader to have an 
‘intellectual intuition’ of the ‘theory’ of the novel, it would not be ‘theory’ as 
such, but the totality of the novel itself that would enable this to be 
represented.21 The central section of Lucinde is entitled ‘Apprenticeship for 
Manhood’, and in this sense the novel starts in the middle (appropriately 
enough for Romantic philosophy). The end of the novel ‘dissolves into 
nothingness’22 as though to insist on the impossibility of final interpretation, 
or at any rate, the novel’s resistance to determinate meaning.23 Thus Lucinde 
is at most variance with the model of the Bildungsroman and perhaps in this 
sense the novel provides a more appropriate model for Eliot’s reformulation of 
the genre in The Mill on the Floss than Wilhelm Meister.
So in what way did Eliot differ from the model offered by the 
Bildungsroman? One of the distinctive features of the genre is its emphasis on 
the main protagonist’s gradual development over time. It should be no 
surprise, then, that the philosophical and scientific concept of determinism, 
which was still a relatively new idea in Eliot’s time, should find resonanees in
21 Behler, Literary Theory, p. 290,
22 Hans Eichner, 'Lucinde', in Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, 24 vols. (München: 
Schoningh, 1958-), V, xvii-lxx, quoted in Behler, Literary Theory, p. 293.
23 Rosemarie Bodenheimer argues that The M ill on the Floss attracts a proliferation o f  
readings ‘because the text offers not only a story about a divided character but a narrative 
divided against itse lf . The Real Life o f  M ary Ann Evans, p. 287n.
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the organic and developmental form of the Bildungsroman.'^^ Eliot could be 
said to move ‘beyond’ determinism in her use of the genre, even as she 
subscribes to the doctrine, in the sense that in the ease of Maggie the usual 
developmental seheme is ‘reversed’: at the end, Maggie is ‘rescued’ from the 
uncompromising ‘realities’ of determinism, and allowed a freedom (albeit 
only in death) which Eliot denied her other heroines, from Dinah to 
Dorothea.25 Eliot rejects Novalis’s aphorism, ‘character is destiny’, insisting 
that human beings are also eausal agents, and that because of life’s 
contingencies, each of our personal histories ‘is hardly to be predicted, even 
from the completest knowledge of characteristics’:
For the tragedy of our lives is not created entirely from within. 
‘Character’—says Novalis, in one of his questionable aphorisms— 
‘character is destiny’. But not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, 
Prinee of Denmark, was speculative and irresolute, and we have a 
great tragedy in eonsequence. But if his father had lived to a good 
old age, and his uncle had died an early death, we can conceive 
Hamlet’s having married Ophelia and got through life with a 
reputation of sanity notwithstanding many soliloquies, and some 
moody sarcasms towards the fair daughter of Polonius, to say 
nothing of the frankest incivility to his father-in-law (514).
Thus Maggie’s ‘destiny’ is ‘hidden, and we must wait for it to reveal
itself like the course of an unmapped river: we only know that the river is full
and rapid, and that for all rivers there is the same final home’ (514-5).
However, Maggie’s destiny hardly unfolds in a smooth developmental
trajectory: for all the ‘apparent’ Bildung, Maggie’s character is surprisingly
‘static’; Maggie is ‘sunk in the inchoate eddies of living’, and does not
progress in the manner of the Bildungsroman hero, either morally or in
character terms. This paradoxically is a source of the novel’s ‘truthfulness’.
24 Gillian Beer, ‘Beyond Determinism: George Eliot and V irginiaW oolf, in Mary Jacobus, 
ed.. Women Writing and Writing About (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 80-99, pp.
81, 87. Beer points out that the word ‘determinism’ first appears in the OED as late as 1846. 
23 Beer, ‘Beyond Determinism’, pp. 87-8.
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which ultimately refuses in spite of itself to contradict Novalis’s warning 
about the ‘unchanging nature of human character’.26
However, Eliot’s novel does insist that despite ‘character’, external 
eonstraints and social conventions are powerful forces which can shape 
individual destinies. This is in contrast to the usual form of the Bildungsroman 
with its individualistic concentration on the unfolding of character.27 Thus 
environmental and soeial factors are shown in their effect on Maggie. But not 
just Maggie; Tom also is shown to be just as much the product of social and 
gender stereotypes. Tom represents a similarly inverted model of the 
Bildungsroman'. his ‘eoncentration of purpose’ is a long suicide, just as 
Maggie’s ‘increasing instability and oscillation’ become her suicide. Thus the 
masculine and feminine versions of the Bildungsroman ‘constitute’ the novel, 
‘even as they deconstruct each another’.28 But the main focus (and one which 
has enabled the diversity of feminist approaches to the text) is on Maggie, who 
not only cannot escape the conventions of St. Ogg’s, but with her choice 
towards the end of the novel (‘marriage or death’) brings the reader up against 
the very limits of realism. There is no ‘meaningful future’ for Maggie, and 
thus the failure of ‘realism’ necessitates that its conventions, along with 
Maggie herself, are swept away by the flood.29 in a sense this can be the only 
‘eonclusion’ to a novel which questions the progressive, linear structure of the
26 Barbara Hardy, Particularities: Readings in George Eliot (London: Peter Owen, 1982), 
pp. 69-74.
27 Boumelha, ‘George Eliot and the End o f Realism’, p. 27.
28 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 121.
29 Boumelha, ‘George Eliot and the End o f Realism’, pp. 28-9. Susan Fraiman makes a 
similar point when she discusses ‘the novel o f  development [...]  in terms o f conflict and 
uncertainty, o f  dissenting narratives, that break away and stray beyond the bounds’ o f  
traditional formulations o f  the genre. She notes that our understanding o f the genre is largely 
derived from Carlyle’s appropriation o f Goethe. Unbecoming Women: British Women 
Writers and the Novel o f  Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 6. 
See also Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentary’, p. 493. David Carroll, in much the most 
intelligent discussion o f the problematical ending o f the novel, observes that Maggie is ‘at 
this point disentangled from the complications o f  the web-like circumstances o f George 
Eliot’s fictional realism’. George Eliot, p. 138.
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realist novel, together with its emphasis on the unified, ordering psyche which 
unproblematically interprets the w o r l d ; 30
Such things could have no perceptible effect on a thoroughly well- 
balanced young lady with a perfectly balanced mind, who had had 
all the advantages of fortune, training and refined society. But if 
Maggie had been that young lady, you would probably have known 
nothing about her; her life would have had so few vicissitudes that 
it could hardly have been written; for the happiest women, like the 
happiest nations, have no history (494).
Eliofs conception of history, while still (reluctantly, and with more than 
a shade of irony) acknowledging the imperatives of progress, is cyclical rather 
than linear in its insistence on the particular suffering and loss which belongs 
to ‘martyr or victim’ at every given historical period, who while reacting 
against the narrowness and limited conceptions of their forebears, are 
nonetheless rooted in the past which ineluctably shapes their present lives;31
I share with you this sense of narrowness; but it is necessary that 
we should feel it, if we care to understand how it acted on the lives 
of Tom and Maggie—how it has acted on young natures in many 
generations, that in the onward tendency of human things have 
risen above the mental level of the generation before them, to 
which they have been tied by the strongest fibres of their hearts.
The suffering, whether of martyr or victim, which belongs to every 
historical advance of mankind, is represented in this way in every 
town and by hundreds of obscure hearths (363).
Eliot’s non-linear notion of history characteristically deals with the 
particular and the concrete, and dismisses as irrelevant such abstract notions as 
geological time, when compared to the intersubjective experience of what is to 
be human:
As to duration, and the way in which it affects your views of 
the human history, what is really the difference to your
39 Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentaiy’, p. 495.
31 O ’Brien observes a similar conception o f history in Novalis: ‘Sheer progress is a 
narrative fiction: it results from the necessity o f temporal succession (which moves forward 
only in great circles) within the constraint o f  linear narration.’Time ‘moves cyclically, with 
an oscillation o f “growth and decline’” . Novalis, p. 233.
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imagination between Infinitude and billions, when you have 
to consider the value of human experience? Will you say that 
since your life has a term of threescore years and ten, it was 
really a matter of indifference whether you were a cripple 
with a wretched skin disease or an active creature with a mind 
at large for the enjoyment of knowledge and with a nature 
which has attracted others to you?
Difficulties of thought and acceptance of what is without 
full comprehension belong to every system of thinking. The 
question is to find the least i n c o m p l e t e . 3 2
Perhaps we could tentatively characterise Eliot’s conception of Bildung 
and history as being interactive and dialogic rather than individualist—a self­
self Bildung as opposed to the typical self-world that is displayed in Wilhelm 
Meister. Eliot explores this notion in a letter responding to a request from 
Emily Davies for support in the founding of Girton College, which 
incidentally reflects her ambivalent and seemingly contradictory attitude to the 
‘Women Question’.33
We can no more afford to part with that exquisite type of 
gentleness, tenderness, possible maternity suffusing a woman’s 
being with affectionateness, which makes what we mean by the 
feminine character, than we can afford to part with the human love, 
the mutual subjection of soul between a man and a woman—which 
is also a growth and a revelation beginning before all history.34
This conception of Bildung relates to Eliot’s overcoming of the
subjectivism of Romanticism and Kantianism. Maggie demonstrates a
particular modality of becoming (Spinozistic), where each character does not
just develop towards itself, but has its own particular Verhalten\ that is, the
intellectual, social, emotional, artistic and metaphysical forms of expression.
32 Letters, VI, 100.
33 E liofs complex exploration o f gender in The M ill on the Floss and other works has been 
much discussed, but see especially; Mary Jacobus, ‘Men o f Maxims and The M ill on the 
Floss', in George Eliot, ed. by K. M. Newton (London; Longman, 1991), 83-98; Beer, 
George Eliot, Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentary’; Nancy L. Paxton, George Eliot and 
Herbert Spencer: Feminism, Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction o f  Gender (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991); and Laura Comer Emery, George E lio t’s Creative 
Conflict: The Other Side o f  Silence (London: University o f California Press, 1976).
34 Letters, IV, 468.
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which differ according to the particular social and historical telos?^ The 
corollary of this idea is that there is no telos in general but an expressionism in 
the Spinozistic sense.36 But this mode of becoming is also, in an implicit 
challenge to both Spinoza and Kant, a development towards others, which in 
turn connects with Eliot’s capacity for narrative pity as well as her 
appropriation of Aristotelian ethics (see below, chapter six).
Eliot’s formulation also throws up the connection between Bildung and 
hermeneutics. The development of personality is intrinsically linked to the 
process of understanding, and this process requires, like a seed, ‘nurture and 
gi'owth’, and takes place over time.37 The seed is just one of many scientific 
and biological metaphors that Eliot uses to evoke not only human progress and 
development, but also the attendant losses that come with any ‘historical 
advance’, where certain members of society cannot withstand the internal and 
external pressures of both genetic dispositions and social change.38 While the 
price of Maggie’s struggle for adaption is spiritual ‘disharmony’ and 
ultimately death,39 Mr Tulliver is so ««adapted that his life story is not a 
‘development’ in any meaningful sense at all:
Certain seeds which are required to find a nidus for themselves 
under unfavourable circumstances have been supplied by nature 
with an apparatus of hooks, so that they will get hold on very 
unreceptive surfaces. The spiritual seed which had been scattered 
over Mr Tulliver had apparently been destitute of any
33 See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem o f  Metaphysics, 4th ed., trans. by Richard 
Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). The concept o f  Verhalten is not 
dissimilar to Lewes’s concept o f the ‘General Mind’, which ‘is both the thought and 
experience o f a people o f  a particular social and historical period’. Richard A. Currie, 
‘Lewes’s General Mind and the Judgement o f  St. Ogg’s: The M ill on the Floss as Scientific 
Text’, Victorian Newsletter 92 (Fall 1997), 25-7, p. 25.
36 See Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, pp. 321-2.
37 Prickett, Origins o f  Narrative, pp. 197-8.
38 Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, p. 237-8.
39 Bernard J. Paris, ‘Toward a Revaluation o f  George Eliot’s The M ill on the F loss’, 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction XI (1956-57), 18-31, pp. 18, 31.
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corresponding provision, and had slipped off to the -winds again 
from a total absence of hooks (366).
The whole ‘texture’ of Eliot’s novel, in its concentration of metaphor and 
‘alternative visions’ of reality, means that the reader will respond to the 
histories of Tom and Maggie in a different way, perhaps valuing Maggie’s 
‘feminine’ mode of imagination, and wider vision, rather than Tom’s limiting 
and narrow patriarchal attitudes.40 Eliot’s novel shows Tom and Maggie’s 
struggles to adapt to their environment, and particularly Maggie’s efforts to 
find an interpretative ‘key’ to the world;41
she wanted some key that would enable her to understand and, in 
understanding, endure, the heavy weight that had fallen on her 
young heart. If she had been taught ‘real learning and wisdom, such 
as great men knew’, she thought she should have held the secrets of 
life; if she had only books that she might learn for herself what wise 
men knew! (379)
Maggie’s hermeneutic quest takes her through poetry, literature, and 
even music, but all are found to be inadequate, proving at best to be delusive. 
She even misinterprets the serene mysticism of Thomas à Kempis, thinking 
that his doctrine of self-renunciation (or any doctrine, for that matter) will 
provide this ‘key’, only to find when it is too late, that
we have no master key that will fit all cases. The casuists have 
become a by-word of reproach; but their perverted spirit o f minute 
discrimination was the shadow of a truth to which the eyes and 
hearts are too often fatally sealed: the truth, that moral judgements 
must remain false and hollow, unless they are checked and 
enlightened by a perpetual reference to the special circumstances 
that mark the individual lot (628).
Maggie eventually learns the ‘true’ message of Thomas à Kempis: that there is
no ‘final interpretative key, that there is always a discrepancy between inner
and outer, and that this form of suffering is the meaning of renunciation’.42
40 Uglow, George Eliot, pp. 131-2.
41 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 108.
42 Carroll, George Eliot, p. 131.
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Maggie’s new knowledge enables her to renounce Stephen by invoking the 
demands of pity and faithfulness, but her choice is at once one of ‘moral 
heroism’ and ‘self-destruction’.43
The idea of Bildung and the corresponding quest for understanding and 
origins, cannot be understood without noticing Eliot’s reaction to that 
extraordinary search for origins, Darwin’s The Origin o f  Species, which was 
published in November 1859, when Eliot was half-way through the writing of 
The Mill on the FlossM  Much has been made of Eliot’s luke-warm reaction to 
the work:
it makes an epoch, as the expression of his thorough adhesion, after 
long years of study, to the Doctrine of Development. [...] The book 
is ill-written and sadly wanting in illustrative facts. [...] This will 
prevent the work becoming popular, as the ‘Vestiges’ did, but it 
will have a great effect in the scientific world, causing a thorough 
and open discussion of a question about which people have hitherto 
felt timid. So the world gets on step by step towards brave clearness 
and honesty! But to me the Development theory and all other 
explanations of processes by which things came to be, produce a 
feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the
processes.43
This somewhat understated reaction is surely due to the fact that Eliot had 
accepted, albeit with strong qualifications, the idea of evolution many years 
before, as a result of her reading of Goethe, Lamark, and Robert Chambers, 
whose Vestiges o f  Creation (1844) became a popular c l a s s i c . 4 6  Also, as de 
facto managing director of the Westminster Review, Eliot had, for a woman of 
her time, unprecedented access to the progressive intellectual circle that was 
established around Chapman’s publishing h o u s e . 4 7  Nine years before
43 Bodenheimer, The Real Life o f  M ary Ann Evans, p. 102.
44 G. S. Haight, 'The M ill on the Floss', p. 343.
45 Letters, III, 227, and see also Letters, III, 214 & n.
46 Haight, 'The M ill on the Floss', p. 348; Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, p. 238-9; Paxton, 
George Eliot and Herbert Spencer, p. 15.
47 Indeed, the Prospectus for the Westminster, which Eliot wrote for Chapman, stresses a 
shared belief in optimism and the ‘Law o f  Progress’, and the early issues contain articles by
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Dai*win’s publication, Eliot, in an essay which dealt with the relation of ‘the 
law of consequences’ to human development, could use geological metaphors 
inspired by Charles Lyell’s uniformitarian Principles o f  Geology (1830-33), 
which served as the philosophical and scientific basis for all Darwin’s w o r k ; 4 8
A correct generalization gives significance to the smallest detail, 
just as the great inductions of geology demonstrate in every pebble 
the workings of laws by which the earth has become adapted for the 
habitation of m a n . 49
Also, one tends to forget that Lewes, among other things, was a 
naturalist and biologist, and was contributing to scientific journals on the 
development theory in the years before Darwin’s publication. In the Life o f  
Goethe (1855), Lewes claims Goethe, another polymath, as the founder of the 
modern discipline, 30 which had become the philosophical basis for all other 
areas of study and human experience:31
It is worthy of remark that the study of Development is quite a 
modern study. Formerly men were content with the full-statured 
animal—the perfected art—the complete society. The phases of 
development and the laws of growth were discarded, or touched on 
in a vague, uncertain manner. A change has come over the spirit of 
enquiry. [...] In Geology, in Philosophy, in History and in Art, we 
are all now bent on tracing the phases of development. To 
understand the grown we try to follow the growthA'^
But what is the ‘mystery’ under the processes that interested Eliot more
than the theory itself? Gillian Beer argues that Eliot identifies this ‘mystery’ in
Spencer outlining his theory o f Evolution. See Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin 
(London: Penguin, 1991),p. 393; and see Haight, p. 97.
48 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Tempo and Mode in the Macroevolutionary Reconstruction o f  
Darwinism’, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 91 (July, 1994), 6764-71, p. 6764.
49 Essays, p. 31.
3^ Byatt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 17-18.
31 It is interesting to note that Jena, Goethe’s own university, and the centre for the early 
Romantics, in turn became the centre for Darwinism in Germany— Darwinismus— led by 
Ernst Haeckel, a pantheist o f  evangelical upbringing. See Desmond and Moore, Darwin, pp. 
538-9.
32 Lewes, Goethe, quoted in Byatt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 17-18.
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her early work with ‘origins’, even though she ‘never entirely does away with 
a sense of some slumberous and unchanging mystery outside—or as she puts 
it—“under” process’. Beer goes on to claim that in The Mill on the Floss Eliot 
tries ‘to destabilise the idea of origins’, because it is probable that she, 
following Lewes, ‘perceived the theistic and patriarchal indications of 
Daiwin’s idea of “the one form”’.33 We shall examine Lewes’s contribution to 
the debate below, but it is clear that given Eliot’s non-linear conception of 
history, and the concomitant insistence on the unrealisable nature of the 
hermeneutic imperative, we would need to locate the focus of Eliot’s quest not 
on ‘origins’ but in ‘the mystery of the human lot’ (363), the one area of 
‘knowledge’ not amenable to theory or abstractions:
I feel every day a greater disinclination for theories and arguments 
about the origin of things in the presence of all this mystery and 
beauty and pain and ugliness, that floods one with conflicting
emotions. 3 4
In the above letter to Sara Hennell, Eliot goes on to refer to an article by 
Herbert Spencer in the Westminster Review, which according to Eliot 
exhibited ‘more feeling in it than we generally get in his writing’. Spencer and 
Eliot conducted an invisible but relentless debate, in the pages of their 
respective mediums, on the consequences of the theory of evolution by natural 
selection (see below). To Eliot’s evident approval, Spencer had gone so far as 
to acknowledge that ‘the sincere man of science [...] alone tmly sees that 
absolute knowledge is impossible. He alone knows that under all things there 
lies an impenetrable mystery’.35
33 Beer, ‘Beyond Determinism’, pp. 87, 91. In discussing Eliot’s letter {Letters III, p. 227), 
Nancy L. Paxton unaccountably seems to read ‘tragedy’ for ‘mystery’. George Eliot and  
H erbert Spencer, p. 92.
34 Letters, II, 341.
33 Herbert Spencer, ‘Progress: Its Law and Cause’, Westminster Review n. s. 11, 2 (April, 
1857), 445-85, p. 485; Letters, II, 341 & n.
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Eliot continually uses animal and evolutionary metaphors to highlight the 
limitations of the characters, from the ‘emmet-like Dodsons and Tullivers’ 
(363), to the narrow Mi* Stelling, who could no more be expected to 
understand the ‘delicate and difficult business’ of education, ‘than an animal 
endowed with a power of boring a whole through rock should be expected to 
have wide views on excavation’ (241). This idea of narrowness, of extinction, 
and of being poorly adapted to the environment has social and historical 
analogues, and Eliot ironically invokes the language of the sociologist 
(Spencer?) and the naturalist (Darwin?) to suggest loss, tragedy, and the 
ravages of time: 36
Therefore it is that these Rhine castles thrill me with a sense of 
poetry: they belong to the grand historic life of humanity, and raise 
up for me the vision of an epoch. But these dead-tinted, hollow- 
eyed, angular skeletons of villages on the Rhone, oppress me with 
the feeling that human life—very much of it—is a narrow, ugly, 
grovelling existence, which even calamity does not elevate, but 
rather tends to exhibit in all its bare vulgarity of conception; and I 
have a cruel conviction that the lives these ruins are the traces of 
were part of a gross sum of obscure vitality, that will be swept into 
the same oblivion with the generations of ants and beavers (362).
It is as well to make clear that by the 1850s, while the idea of evolution
was controversial, it was at least widely if dimly understood. It was however
Darwin’s theory of the mechanism for evolutionary change, natural selection,
that occasioned a huge debate at the time Eliot was writing The Mill on the
Floss. T h i s  was due not only to the fact that Darwin’s theory threatened to
undercut both Natural Theology and a Lamarckian ‘progressive’ evolution, but
36 However, compare Alan W. Bellringer, who argues that ‘despite the constant stream o f  
allusions to the dangers o f  nature in The M ill on the Floss, the narrator’s own superb, 
intelligent, knowledgeable voice, embracing, in beautiful studied prose, geography, history, 
science, the arts and philosophy, by its even patient, amused, female tone counteracts the 
pessimism with an implicit claim to advancement and survival’. George Eliot (London: 
Macmillan, 1993), pp. 58-9.
3? J. W. Burrow, Editor’s Introduction to Charles Darwin, The Origin o f  Species (London: 
Penguin, 1968), pp. 40-1.
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also its implication that man might be related to the apes, and was not 
necessarily the crowning glory of a separate creation. That this debate was 
held in ignorance of the science of genetics accounts for the difficult reception 
of a theory which, Darwin himself admitted, could not account for the fact of 
random variation on which the mechanism of natural selection is 
established.38 Indeed, natural selection was only widely aceepted as the 
meehanism for evolution in the 1950s as the centenary of the publication of 
the Origin o f  Species approached.39
Gillian Beer, in Darwin’s Plots, claims that Eliot did not at once grasp 
the implications of natural selection, and that it was not until the late 1860s 
and the 1870s that she ‘hilly assimilated the implications of evolutionary 
i d e a s ’ . 6 0  The problem with this view is that, as far as evolution and natural 
selection are concerned, it implies that Eliot was living in an intellectual 
vacuum before the publication of the Origin. Although Darwin was 
understandably jealous of his theory, he did give out very broad hints to 
selected individuals in his circle, and actually went public on his theory on 1 
July, 1858, at a meeting of the Linnean Society, some eighteen months before 
the work’s actual publication.61 Lewes and Eliot were abroad at this time, but 
they arrived back at Richmond in September of that year,62 and in the unlikely
38 J .  w. Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 37, 41. Burrow points out that Gregor Mendel 
could have provided the answer, but his work was ‘ignored and virtually unknown’ (p. 47). 
See also Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford; Oxford University Press 1976; 1989), 
p p .  33-4.
39 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Darwinism and the Expansion o f Evolutionary T heoty', Science 216 
(23 April, 1982), 380-7, p. 380. Gould reminds us that ‘evolution’ should be distinguished 
from ‘Darwinism’. Dai-winism views natural selection as ‘the primary directing force o f  
evolution, in that it creates fitter phenotypes by differentially preserving, generation by 
generation, the best adapted organisms from a pool o f random variants that supply raw 
material only, not direction itself. Natural selection is a creator; it builds adaptations step by 
step’ (p. 381). See also Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 32-3.
60 Gillian Beer, D arw in’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction (London: Ark, 1983), pp. 157-8.
6Î Desmond and Moore, Darwin, p. 470.
62 Haight, p. 265.
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event that they had not heard of Darwin’s theories before then, it would be 
astonishing if they had not heard of them at this time.63 Herbert Spencer and 
John Chapman, the rest of the Westminster circle, and, one presumes, Lewes, 
were in the months leading up to publication, engaging in the Victorian 
equivalent of what can only be described as spin-doctoring, drawing up the 
battle lines in the so-called ‘gorilla’ debates, which centred on the work of the 
naturalist, Richard Owen.64 As a pillar of the scientific establishment, Owen 
was looked to by the theologians to find in the gorilla evidence of the gap 
between ape and man, some sort of ‘Creative leap’ that would guarantee the 
special status of man in creation.65 Eliot read his On the Gorilla (1859), and in 
The Mill on the Floss was able gently to satirise Owen’s comparison of the 
human and primate hand:
‘Your big thumb—w hafs that Bob?’ said Maggie.
‘That’s what it is. Miss’, said Bob, quickly, exhibiting a 
singularly broad specimen of that difference between the man and 
the monkey (3 7 7 ).66
I believe that Eliot felt a great deal of sympathy with Owen’s wish to retain
the dignity of humankind, but at the same time felt that the evidence for
transmutation— and the mechanism of natural selection as the chief agent of
evolutionary change—was too compelling to be ignored.
63 The Leweses met Spencer on 28 January, 1859, and talked about ‘matters personal and 
philosophical’ (Haight, p. 271). They were to fall out with Spencer in June, blaming him for 
betraying Eliot’s secret o f  authorship, when he failed to contradict Chapman when the latter 
asked Spencer directly whether Evans was the author o f Adam Bede (p. 292).
64 Desmond and Moore, Darwin, pp. 451, 464-6. Owen was a close friend of the Leweses. 
In 1855, Lewes went to Owen for help with his scientific studies, and later dedicated 5'e«- 
side Studies (1858) to him. Eliot gave Owen an inscribed copy o f Adam Bede (Haight, pp. 
241, 273). Desmond and Moore argue that as early as 1857, Owen must have known that 
Darwin was writing on transmutation, to which Owen was scientifically and ideologically 
opposed {Darwin, p. 451).
63 Desmond and Moore, Darwin, p. 452.
66 See Richard Owen, On the Gorilla  (1859), p. 9: ‘Man’s perfect hand is one o f  his 
peculiar physical characters; that perfection is mainly due to the differentiation o f the first 
from the other four digits and its concomitant power o f opposing them as a perfect thumb’. 
Quoted in Byatt, ‘Explanatory N otes’, The M ill on the Floss, p. 680n.
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Evolution and natural selection (and we must add sexual selection) thus 
became dominant themes in Eliot’s novel. As Rosemary Ashton points out, the 
passage cited above about evolutionary ‘seeds’ and corresponding ‘hooks’ 
(366) could almost have been written by Darwin himself, such is the uncanny 
correspondence of fictional metaphor and scientific ‘fact’.6? Not only does 
Tulliver’s lack of adaptive capability dramatise the dark side of natural 
selection, but Tulliver himself actually dabbles in the process when he chooses 
Mrs Tulliver, the result of their union being a strange ‘crossing’ of inheritance: 
Maggie becomes a Tulliver, and Tom a Dodson, and this combination ensures 
Tulliver’s downfalh^S
‘It seems a bit of a pity, though’, said Mr Tulliver, ‘as the lad 
should take after the mother’s side istead o’ the little wench. That’s 
the worst on’t wi’ the erossing o’ breeds: you can never justly 
calkilate what’ll come on’t. The little un takes after my side, now: 
she’s twice as ’cute as Tom. Too ’cute for a woman, I ’m afraid’, 
continued Mr Tulliver, turning his head dubiously first on one side 
and then on the other. ‘It’s no mischief much while she’s a little un, 
but an over ’cute woman’s no better nor a long-tailed sheep—she’ll 
fetch none the bigger price for that’ (59-60).
As Eliot was to say later: ‘But natural selection is not always good, and
depends (see Darwin) on many caprices of very foolish animals’.69
I believe that Eliot understood the full (materialist) implications of
Darwin's ‘dangerous’ idea much more acutely than Herbert Spencer, who
hijacked the notion of evolution to fit in with the grand Victorian conflation of
67 Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, p. 238. Ashton goes on to make the curious claim that Eliot 
‘fictionalizes’ the Origin ‘without being directly influenced by i f .
68 Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, p. 201. Although it may seem dubious to 
suggest that Tulliver actually engages in natural selection himself, we should recall that the 
first chapter o f  the Origin uses the practice o f  artificial selection in pigeon breeders and 
makes an analogy to the process o f natural selection in nature. In an acute observation, Peter 
Brook obseiwes that ‘the nineteenth-century novel [...] will play out repeatedly and at length 
the problem o f transmission, staging over and over again the relations o f fathers and sons 
(and also daughters to mothers, aunts, madwomen, and others), asking where an inheritable 
wisdom is to be found and how its transmission is to be acted tow ard'. Reading fo r  the Plot, 
pp. 27-8.
69 Letters, IV, 377.
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‘progress’ and ‘development’.70 Spencer was a thoroughgoing Lamarckian, 
believing that the driving force of evolution was inherited, directly acquired 
characteristics, which had the effect of getting rid of the unfit, an anti- 
Darwinian theory in the sense that it only gives a place to selection as an 
‘executioner’, and not as ‘creator’.71 Thus, for the man who coined the phrase 
‘survival of the fittest’, which Darwin (somewhat ill-advisedly) was later to 
adopt in place of ‘natural selection’, progress was an inevitable result of this 
process of specialization and gradual perfection, both in physiological and 
psychological terms. It also happily fitted in with the prevailing notions of the 
division of labour, fuelled by the spirit o f optimism that still radiated out from 
the Great Exhibition right through the 1850s.72 Darwin himself said in the 
Origin'.
I believe [...] in no law of necessary development. As the 
variability of each species is an independent property, and will be 
taken advantage of by natural selection, only so far as it profits the 
individual in its complex struggle for life, so the degree of 
modification in different species will be no uniform quantity.73
That is to say, Darwin only ever spoke of an organism’s ‘adaptation’ to a
given environment, not of ‘progress’ according to ‘an absolute scale of
perfection’, a strong qualification to the theory which was overlooked or
70 Stephen J. Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections on Natural H istory  (London: Penguin, 
1980), pp. 36-7. Spencer, with characteristic immodesty, must have thought that Eliot’s 
novels reflected his model o f evolutionary progress, for he allowed them to be placed in the 
London Library, which he founded in 1840, and from which he had previously excluded all 
novels.
71 Gould, ‘Darwinism’, p. 381. Gould points out elsewhere that Paley and the natural 
theologians allowed a role for selection in ‘removing unfit individuals’, and thus ‘preserving 
[...]  the created type’. Darwin, o f  course, only claimed that natural selection was the most 
important among many factors, including Lamarckian ones. Stephen Jay Gould, ‘The 
Evolution o f  Life on Earth’, Scientific American (October, 1994), 63-9, p. 63. In answer to 
critics, Darwin made later editions o f  the work more ‘Lamarckian’, although modern gene- 
theory has rendered these revisions unnecessary. Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. 47.
72 Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. 33; Desmond and Moore, Darwin, pp. 393-5, 464, 
535.
73 Dai-win, The Origin o f  Species, p. 348.
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ignored both by Spencer and by the later ‘Social Darwinists’.74 Nevertheless, 
and somewhat paradoxically, Darwin’s idea of ‘the struggle for existence’, 
which he only meant metaphorically (see Origin, p. 116), gave ‘scientific’ 
credibility to Spencer’s own sociological theories, ones which equated 
evolution and development with inevitable progress.73
Diane Postlethwaite gives an excellent analysis of Lewes’s search for the 
‘Victorian Spinoza’, whom he found in Herbert Spencer, whose all-embracing 
synthetic philosophy was founded on the notion of developmental ‘progi'ess’. 
The result of physiological, social, and psychological progress would be to 
reconcile the freedom of the individual with the determined world of causality, 
and at the same time unite the two opposing ethical schools of Utilitarianism 
and the ‘moral sense’ of the followers of Shaftesbury, as well as, more 
ambitiously, the philosophies of Locke and Kant.76 Eliot herself had a ‘wild 
aspiration’ as a youth ‘to reconcile the philosophies of Locke and Kant’,77 but
74 Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 33, 35.
75 Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, pp. 43-5. And o f course Eliot’s ambiguous relationship 
to Positivism (as distinct from positivism) is well documented. From among the many, see 
especially, T. R. Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity: The Impact o f  Comtean Positivism on 
Victorian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Martha S. Vogeler, 
‘George Eliot and the Positivists’, Nineteenth Century Fiction 35 (1980), 406-31. K. K. 
Collins points out that although Darwin ‘rejected the notion o f some unitary, universal law 
o f progressive development, in Origin o f  Species he did reinforce this aspect o f social 
evolutionism’. Darwin’s ‘laws’ o f  natural selection were taken ‘as cosmic assurance that the 
fittest— in the sense o f  superlative— would survive, and this meant irresistible progress’. 
‘Questions o f Method’, pp. 403, 405. Collins’s analysis o f these late essays by Eliot brings 
out Eliot’s ‘distrust o f  system s’, and her foregrounding o f human actions before universal 
laws.
76 Diana Postlethwaite, Making it Whole: A Victorian Circle and the Shape o f  Their World 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 186-7, 207. Postlethwaite reminds us 
that Lewes, for one, had serious doubts about Spinoza’s ontology, but was able to find in 
Spencer’s The Principles o f  Psychology ‘a key to all mythologies, a ground for the Absolute 
that was based on sense experience; the grand Spinozistic synthesis o f  mind and body, 
rewritten in Baconian terms to fit a Victorian frame o f mind’ (p. 178). Postlethwaite goes on 
to discuss the characteristic Victorian concepts o f the ‘knowable’ and the ‘unknowable’, the 
ineluctable but ultimately unavailing search for ‘a meaningful order’ in the midst o f the 
‘tangled’ poetic and scientific ‘w eb’ o f  the world (pp. 218-9). This has an obvious resonance 
with my earlier discussion o f  E lio fs  hermeneutic quest (see above, chapter three).
77 Edith Simcox recounts this anecdote. See her ‘George E lio f, p. 780.
184
she later found herself temperamentally and ideologically unsuited to 
Spencer’s rigorous theorising and ‘system-making’, and was able even at the 
height of her infatuation with him to satirise his capacity for making empirical 
facts conform to his elaborate theories:
I went to Kew yesterday on a scientific expedition with Herbert 
Spencer, who has all sorts of theories about plants—I should have 
said a proof-hunting expedition. Of course, if the flowers didn’t 
correspond to the theories, we said, 'tant pis pour les fleurs\ ’78
We need to mention in passing that the prevailing ideas which linked 
evolution with progress found adherents in Owen and the theists, who 
although they rejected natural selection, eventually accepted rather unwillingly 
a form of evolutionary process which replaced Darwin’s ‘random’ variations 
with the preordained ‘selection’ of progressively beneficent variations, thereby 
ensuring a ‘creative’ hand in the direction of e v o l u t i o n . 79 Although Spencer 
was soon to offer an alternative to Darwin’s anthropomorphic terminology 
(see above), the theistic implications of selection were seized upon by Owen 
and others in the scientific and political establishment, who were able to retain 
a concept of design amid the succession of species which, while no longer 
thought to be fixed and immutable, were nonetheless controlled by some 
divine guiding principle, of which the law of ‘progress’ was but one 
manifestation. 80
G. H. Lewes, though one of Darwin’s early champions and a great 
populariser of evolution, was nonetheless concerned many years later about 
Darwin’s insistence on one or few starting points for life, as opposed to ‘the 
multiplicity of origins’. Lewes discerned in Darwin’s presumption ‘a lingering 
influence of the tradition of creative flat’, and claimed that the rejection of this
78 Letters, II, 40, quoted in Postlethwaite, Making it Whole, p. 182.
79 Desmond and Moore, Darwin, pp. 490-1, 545-7. Darwin, o f course, insisted that natural 
selection was ‘creative’, but not in the anthropomorphic sense.
89 Collins, ‘Questions o f Method’, p. 402.
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view would ‘remove [one of] the gi’eat obstacles to the general acceptance of 
Evolution’.81 Harriet Martineau, atheist, Westminster reviewer, and former 
lover of Erasmus, Darwin’s brother, at once understood and accepted the full 
materialist implications of the Origin, but was concerned about Darwin’s use 
of the word ‘creation’ in respect of the original ‘progenitor’ at the start of the 
evolutionary process. She assumed however, correctly as it turns out, that 
Darwin meant this and other ‘theological’ words
without reference to their primitive meaning. If so, they ought not 
to have been used: but the theory does not require the notion of a 
creation; and my conviction is that Charles D. does not hold it. 82
Darwin himself was worried about misconstruction, and it is worth
reminding ourselves that in an apparent effort to deter ‘progressivist’ or
‘theological’ interpretations of his theory, he did not use the terms ‘evolution’
and ‘survival of the fittest’ in the first edition of the Origin, preferring to rely
on more neutral terms such as ‘descent with modification’, ‘mutability’, and
‘natural selection’.83 I believe that Eliot, like Harriet Martineau, was quick to
pick up on the full materialist implications of the Origin. Eliot regarded
herself as a ‘meliorisf by temperament (see above, chapter three), and was
uncomfortable, just like Darwin (but unlike Darwin able to say it through the
oblique medium of fiction) about equating evolution and adaption with
inevitable progress and intrinsic improvement and adaptability.
Sally Shuttleworth shrewdly brings out the striking parallels between The
Mill on the Floss and Lewes’s The Physiology o f  Common Life, which were
being written at the same time. She argues that Lewes’s formulation of the
81 George Henry Lewes, ‘Mr Darwin’s Hypotheses’, Fortnightly Review  n.s. 4 (Nov., 
1868), 492-509, pp. 493-4.
82 Quoted in Desmond and Moore, Darwin, p. 486. Desmond and Moore point out that 
Darwin did come to regret the use o f  these expressions. He never did pronounce on the 
origin o f the first form or forms, and indeed it would have been beyond the scope o f  his 
study to do so. When Darwin used the word ‘creation’, he actually meant ‘“appeared” by 
some wholly unknown process’ (p. 720n.).
83 Burrow, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. 27.
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laws of the mind as being analogous to physical laws, an organic model whieh 
explored unconscious mental processes, resulted in a developmental model 
that was not necessarily progressive and linear, since latent mental processes 
could be seen to influence the present from the perspeetive of one’s remotest 
past.84 Shuttleworth goes on to argue that the Origin merely eonfirmed Eliot’s 
‘non-progressive’ conception of human history and development, and that 
despite her initial perceptions, Eliot was very quick to perceive the ‘negative 
implications’ of Darwin’s account of evolutionary processes, and would 
dramatise these implications in The Mill on the Floss.^^ Shuttleworth points 
out that whenever a reference is made to the ‘evolutionary distance’ between 
man and animal, ‘the gains seem of a rather questionable nature’. When 
compared to other animals in the evolutionary chain, Tom is aggressive and 
desires to be dominant, while Maggie for her part has a uniquely human 
capacity for suffering:86
But Maggie, gifted with that superior power of misery which 
distinguishes the human being and places him at a proud distance 
from the most melancholy chimpanzee, sat still on her bough, and 
gave herself up to the keen sense of unmerited reproach (100).
84 Shuttleworth, ‘Introduction’, The M ill on the Floss, p. xxiii. Shuttleworth points out that 
Lewes’s theories were an extension o f Comte’s theories o f the interaction o f organism and 
medium. In the essay referred to above, Lewes argued that ‘the struggle for existence’ is one 
‘among many factors’ in evolution, but does not explain all diversities. ‘It is only necessary 
to add that under conditions o f  development are included the nature o f  the organism and its 
relations to the external medium— in a word, the whole life-history’ ( ‘Mr Darwin’s 
Hypotheses’, p. 503). Rosemarie Bodenheimer argues that Eliot’s ‘primary morality lies in 
her sense that characters must embrace choices in the face o f relentlessly determining 
histories and circumstances’. The Real Life o f  M ary Ann Evans, p. 102.
85 See also Hardy, Particularities, pp. 68-9.
86 Shuttleworth, ‘Introduction’, p. xxiv. Shuttleworth makes an important distinction 
between the ‘progressivist model’ o f  Vestiges and the Origin, which in its emphasis on 
‘chance mutations [...] suggested that perfect adaptation at one time could rapidly become 
mal-adaptation in the future should environmental conditions change’ (p. xxiii). See also 
Shuttle worth’s indispensable account o f  Eliot’s work in relation to contemporary scientific 
developments: George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make Believe o f  a 
Beginning {CBmhYiégg-. Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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Eliot not only questions the real superiority of man over the animals, but 
adds a different dimension to the argument ignored by Spencer; namely that 
irrespective of the difference between man and the animals, any superiority 
evidenced by man over the animals will not be equally proportioned among 
the sexes, and that gender will be a determining factor in human development. 
Indeed, Eliot’s critique of Herbert Spencer’s ideas in The Mill on the Floss, 
while showing Eliot to be in general agreement with Spencer on the 
evolutionary basis of human character and development, demonstrates that she 
differed sharply as to what was the determining factor in sexual difference: for 
Spencer, it was biology; for Eliot, sexual differences were not only 
biologically determined but also culturally constructed. Eliot specifically 
targets Spencer’s theories of human development as helping to shape the 
patriarchal and misogynistic culture of the time, and implicitly challenges 
Spencer throughout the n o v e l . 87
The most striking and insistent criticism of Spencer refers to his belief 
that industrialization was an inevitable result of evolutionary ‘p r o g i ' e s s ’ .8 8  The 
industrialization of St. Ogg’s is represented by the mercantile values and 
laissez-faire economics of Stephen, values which no longer accord with the 
traditional virtues of thrift and honesty displayed by the Dodsons and the 
Tullivers, and which reveal themselves in the starkness of the choice offered 
Maggie towards the end of the novel. Stephen’s world is one where
good society, floated on gossamer wings of light irony, is of very 
expensive production; requiring nothing less than a wide and 
arduous national life condensed in unfragrant deafening factories, 
cramping itself in mines, sweating at ftirnaces, grinding, 
hammering, weaving under more or less oppression of carbonic 
acid—or else, spread over sheepwalks, and scattered in lonely
87 Paxton, George Eliot and Herbert Spencer, p. 71. Although Paxton is mainly concerned 
with Eliot’s critique o f  the cultural construction o f  gender, my own comparison o f Spencer 
and Eliot would not have been possible without her excellent study.
88 Paxton, George Eliot and H erbert Spencer, p. 87.
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houses and huts on the clayey or chalky cornlands, where the rainy 
days look dreary (385).
As we noted earlier, Eliot resisted the notion of inevitable progress, a 
progress that Spencer associated with the ‘outward’ laws of biology and 
sociology. Eliot responds to Spencer by continually invoking the ‘inward’ 
laws of faithfulness and m e m o r y . These inward laws trace a different 
trajectory from those outward laws which Stephen insists are ‘natural’, laws 
which Maggie in a moment of genuine heroism, and to obvious narratorial 
approval, is able to reject. Eliot’s valorisation of these inward laws— and 
might it be these that represent the ‘mystery [...] under the processes’ that 
Eliot referred to in her understated reaction to The Origin o f  Speciesl— and 
her rejection of Spencer’s crude biological determinism, find expression in 
Maggie’s epic resistance to Stephen’s patriarchal insistence on the 
‘naturalness’ of their relation, a relation that biology may well reinforce, but 
that memory questions:
‘Many things are difficult and dark to me—but I see one thing quite 
clearly—that I must not, cannot seek my own happiness by 
sacrificing others. Love is natural—but surely pity and faithfulness 
and memory are natural too. And they would live in me still, and 
punish me if I didn’t obey them. I should be haunted by the 
suffering I had caused. Our love would be poisoned. Don’t urge 
me; help me—help me, because I love you’ (571).
The collision of these inward and outward laws results in the inevitable
tragedy of the ending. Although the apocalyptic flood that brings about
Maggie’s death is widely seen as an artistic failure,90 i should like to insist
that the tragedy is both an artistic and philosophical necessity, one which
explores the tension between irreconcilable goods, and which reveals that
there is no place for Tom and Maggie in a world where will to system is
^9 Paxton, George Eliot and H erbert Spencer, pp. 83, 90.
90 See especially, Knoepflmacher, George E lio t’s Early Novels, pp. 219-20; Byatt, ‘Editor’s 
Introduction’, p. 38; Haight, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, The M ill on the Floss, ed. by Gordon S. 
Haight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. xvi; and Leavis, The Great Tradition, 
pp. 59-60.
189
primary and biological and social determinism is relentless. Of course, there 
are as many interpretations of the flood as there are critics, reading into the 
events everything from anal rage, to incest, to the flood as orgasm, and even to 
a jealous and possessive narrator/author killing off the strange dark beauty that 
she is unable to control. However, as Penny Boumelha argues, even if these 
interpretations are ‘correct’, they are nevertheless subsumed by the ‘sheer 
excess of the text’, which produces at the limits of realism an ending which 
resists the very form and ideological baggage of the realist novel, and reverts 
to pure fantasy.91
That said, we should remind ourselves that there are of course two 
‘endings’ to the novel, because while the flood is often treated as the novel’s 
conclusion, the real or at least alternative ending is the elegiac description of 
Philip’s return to the Red Deeps, which reaffirms the novel’s cyclical model of 
history and reveals in its open-endedness (and resistance to a single 
interpretation) the full extent of the novel’s hermeneutic inexhaustibility.92 
‘Endings’ always gave George Eliot trouble; although she considered them 
‘the weak point of most authors’, she insisted that ‘some of the fault lies in the 
very nature of a conclusion, which is at best a negation’.93 Similarly, Maggie 
is anxious about the ending of Scott’s The Pirate when she, being unable to 
finish the novel, ‘made several endings; but they were all unhappy’ (401). This 
idea of multiple interpretation is a paradigm for the whole novel, and, 
accordingly, the ambiguous narrative culminates in a flood which, far from 
being a contrivance, reveals the impossibility of an adequate interpretation and 
the incessant darkness and ineluctability o f the hermeneutic quest:
In the first moments Maggie felt nothing, thought of nothing, but
that she had suddenly passed away from that life which she had
91 Boumelha helpfully summarises the various critical responses to the flood. ‘George Eliot 
and the End o f  Realism’, pp. 29, 34n.
92 Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentary’, pp. 494-5.
93 Letters, II, 324.
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been dreading: it was the transition of death, without its agony— 
and she was alone in the darkness with God (650-1).
The narrative at this point also demands the suspension of ‘realism’,
whatever that might have come to mean, and a return to a pre-linguistic, or at
least non-verbal, childhood world, which alone can in some sense atone for the
losses of history, and provide a fleeting vision of a world where the power of
love and intersubjectivity can subdue the demands of the hermeneutic
imperative:
The whole thing had been so rapid—so dreamlike—that the 
threads of ordinary association were broken. [...]
It was not till Tom had pushed off and they were on the wide 
water—he face to face with Maggie—that the full meaning of what 
had happened rushed upon his mind. It came with so overpowering 
a force—such an entirely new revelation to his spirit, of the depths 
in life, that had lain beyond his vision which he had fancied so keen 
and clear, that he was unable to ask a question. They sat mutely 
gazing at each other: Maggie with eyes of intense life looking out 
from a weary, beaten faee—Tom pale with a certain awe and 
humiliation. Thought was busy though the lips were silent: and 
though he could ask no question, he guessed a story of almost 
miraculous divinely-protected effort. But at last a mist gathered 
over the blue-grey eyes, and the lips found a word they could utter: 
the old childish— ‘Magsie! ’
Maggie could make no answer but a long deep sob of that 
mysterious wondrous happiness that is one with pain (651, 654-5).
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V I
Conclusion: George Eliot and Aristotelian Ethics
I feel a greater disinclination for theories and arguments about the 
origins of things in the presence of all this mystery and beauty and 
pain and ugliness, that floods one with conflicting emotions. 1
From the foregoing I hope it is clear that in The Mill on the Floss George Eliot 
continues her move away from the epistemological pretensions (and mode of 
discourse) of science and philosophy and foregrounds art, narrative and 
history, and as we saw earlier, the ideas of the Jena Romantics. A further 
consequence of her approach will be that it will lead her to render ethics in 
what we can broadly call the Aristotelian tradition, which will be the issue 
explored in this final chapter. I will be suggesting that Eliot ‘overcame’ the 
Romantic impasse of the sublime by rendering ethics in a more Aristotelian 
sense, which sees ethics as a socially concretised practice, and sees virtue as 
valuable for its own sake and not for any external end. The Greek practice of 
fiction as a philosophical engagement—as opposed to the reflection or 
representation of a philosophical position—will be considered in relation to 
tragedy, narrative, and intersubjectivity. Following Martha Nussbaum, I will 
argue that it is pity, together with an awareness of the fragility of the other 
person, that enables the opening up of closed communities, and which 
ultimately sets Eliot apart from the philosophical systems of both Spinoza and 
Kant.
We can begin by way of the observation that most critics see the novel in 
general, and Eliot’s work in particular, as a reflection or substantiation of a 
philosophical position.2 The problem with this approach, however, is firstly 
that it ignores the idea that fiction is a philosophical engagement, and secondly
1 Letter to Sarah Hennell, 5 June, 1857. Letters, II, 341.
2 Seen in this way, Gillian Beer’s ’5 Plots is a classic o f  the genre. I hasten to add
that I am aware that this study itself is not totally immune from the critique which follows.
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that it fails to grasp the character of the literary utterance, where figures in the 
story engage with each other, showing the development of arguments and 
positions through the experience o f  others. Pierre Hadot, in his Philosophy as 
a Way o f  Life, re-reads Greek philosophy in just this manner, revealing that the 
ancient texts are first and foremost ‘spiritual exercises’, which have not only a 
‘moral, but also an existential value’. They attempt to enhance the totality of 
one’s being, rather than merely offer guides to ‘moral conduct’ or 
philosophical praxis.3 This reassessment of Greek philosophy is crucial for it 
allows us to view the engagement with texts, and the dynamic that operates 
between literature and philosophy (between which of course the Greeks held 
no rigid division) as a paradigm for the intersubjective relationship itself, 
which is ‘ethical’ in a very broad sense. The crucial figure in Hadot’s 
interrogation of Greek philosophy is the enigmatic figure o f Socrates, whose 
spiritual exercises were a
living call to awaken our moral consciousness. We ought not to 
forget that this call sounded forth within a specific form: that of 
dialogue. In the Socratic dialogue, the question truly at stake is not 
what is being talked about, but who is doing the talking.^
We have already discussed the importance of argument and dialogue in
Eliot’s work, and in particular we can recall Mrs Foyser and Dinah’s
‘Socratic’ dialogues in Adam Bede (see below, chapter three). For Eliot, the
importance is in the dialogue itself, in the constant challenging of positions.
This relates to Eliot’s convictions about the undesirability of lapsing ‘from the
picture to the diagram’, and of the nature of ‘aesthetic teaching’, which is
perforce the highest and most difficult calling for any author because it ‘deals
with life in its highest complexity’:
3 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way o f  Life, trans. by Michael Chase, ed. by Arnold I. 
Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 127.
4 Hadot, Philosophy, p. 89.
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Avowed Utopias are not offensive, because they are understood to 
have a scientific and expository character: they do not pretend to 
work on the emotions, or couldn’t do if they did pretend. I am sure, 
from your own statement, that you see this quite clearly. Well, then, 
consider the sort of agonizing labor to an English-fed imagination 
to make art a sufficiently real background, for the desired picture, 
to get breathing, individual forms, and group them in the needful 
relations, so that the presentation will lay hold on the emotions as 
human experience—will, as you say, ‘flash’ conviction on the 
world by means of aroused sympathy.5
It is often argued that the dialogues of Plato represent not the ideal of 
knowledge or wisdom, but the love of the path to a knowledge which never 
arrives, or is acceded to only at rare moments of intellectual transcendence. 
What the dialogue as a practice and a literary/philosophical genre can achieve 
is .seZ/^knowledge, which somewhat paradoxically comes about as a result of 
the dialogue with others, effecting a profound inner transformation.^ Hadot 
argues that over the centuries an ‘abyss’ has developed ‘between philosophical 
theory and philosophizing as living action’. He uses the analogy of the 
creative artist, whose work bears only a distant relation to the theory of art, to 
insist that the true, lived, philosophy of the ancients bears little relation to the 
theoretical and systematic discourse that became what we now know as 
philosophy once Christianity had taken over its practical aspects, reducing the 
discipline to a mere ‘handmaid of theology’. The goal of the ancients— and 
this includes the ‘theoretical’ Aristotle as well as Plato, together with the 
Stoics—was existential freedom: for them, ‘the act of living in a genuinely 
philosophical way thus corresponds to an order of reality totally different to
3 Letters, IV, 300-1. The ‘Avowed Utopia’ to which Eliot refers is the Positivist Frederic 
Harrison’s desire for a fully-fledged Religion o f  Humanity run on Comtean principles. 
Harrison wanted Eliot to be the ‘Poet o f  Positivism’, and although Eliot made it clear on 
numerous occasions that she was unwilling and unable to be so, it did not stop the Positivists 
from appropriating her poem ‘O May I Join the Choir Invisible’ for their secular liturgy. See 
Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, pp. 362-3; George Eliot, Collected Poems, ed, by Lucien 
Jenkins (London, Skoob Books, 1989), pp. 49-50. For Eliot’s relation to Positivism in 
general, see T. R. Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, pp. 30-9.
 ^Hadot, Philosophy, p. 91.
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philosophical discourse’7 Philosophy proper, as opposed to philosophical 
discourse, was a lived philosophy, already located within institutionalised 
practice. For the ancients, philosophy was
no longer a theory divided into parts, but a unitary act, which 
consists in living logic, physics, ethics. In this case, we no longer 
study ethical theory—that is, the theory of living and speaking 
well—we simply think and speak well. We no longer engage in 
theory about the physical world, but we contemplate the cosmos.
We no longer theorize about moral action, but we act in a conect 
and just way.^
Thus philosophy for the ancients presupposes an engagement with the 
community, and takes as a given the requirements of justice.9 This is perhaps 
the most important of the virtues (along with others such as courage, 
truthfulness and constancy), which were practised in pursuit of a common 
ethical goal of the good life, and which characterised the Athenian polis. This 
shared conception of the good life was not predicated on a universal or 
transcendental (Kantian) notion of the law, but on particular human goods 
which were defined by the practice of the virtues themselves and the ethical 
goal {telos) towards which each member of the polis would strive. iO The 
Aristotelian tradition stresses that virtue is essentially valuable for its own 
sake and not for any external end. Kant also tries to remove any external 
motivation for moral action, although rather than seeing virtue as an end in 
itself, his argument for ethics is predicated on the moral autonomy of the self­
determining agent. In contrast, the Aristotelian approach takes the
2 Hadot, Philosophy, pp. 107-8, 268-70. It is worth reminding ourselves in passing that 
Spinoza was profoundly influenced by ancient and particularly Stoic philosophy. I am 
thinking especially o f  Spinoza’s goal o f the third kind of knowledge and its capacity for 
individual transformation, his immanence, together with his unitary philosophical and 
political programme. This observation was made by Dr Peter Lynn during a discussion with 
the present author.
 ^Hadot, Philosophy, p. 267.
9 Hadot, Philosophy, p. 274.
19 Claire Colebrook, ‘Ethics, Positivity and Gender: Foucault, Aristotle and the Care o f the 
S e lf , Philosophy Today 42.1 (1998), 40-52, p. 44; Taylor, Aristotle, p. 91.
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intersubjective as a given, and not as a way of getting around the subject of 
philosophy as the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, as in Kant, 
Spinoza, and the Romantics.
There has been no more powerful modern advocate of this broadly 
Aristotelian approach than Alisdair MacIntyre, whose After Virtue is one of 
the most important books on moral theory to emerge in recent years. 
Following on from Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous essay on the virtues, 
‘Modern Moral Philosophy’,H MacIntyre argues that Christianity, Kant and 
the Enlightenment have bequeathed to modernity incoherent conceptions of 
morality, for they destroyed the teleological and immanent nature of ethics in 
favour of transcendental and universalising ethical prescriptions which 
Nietzsche in his own way was right to reject. However, MacIntyre is quick to 
stress that Nietzsche’s ‘victory’ was a hollow one, because in the process of 
destroying the entire Enlightenment project of rational conceptions of 
morality, he also rejected the whole Aristotelian tradition, the historical result 
being that modem conceptions of morality (and he specifically targets the 
Kantian and Utilitarian traditions) largely ignore this rich vein of pre-modern 
ethical thought. MacIntyre’s account of the virtues is particularly rich because 
he situates them within a ‘moral tradition’ (a tradition which in modernity 
survives only in fragments), such that the ‘internal’ goods of practices which 
make for the virtues, while being relational are not merely relativistic or 
necessarily bound by particular historical conditions, and can be shown to be 
part of a ‘core conception of the virtues’, one which any society might be able
to recognise. 12
A key aspect of this account of the virtues is that it stresses their relation 
to the idea of the good human life taken as a whole, which is to say that there
11 G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 33, 124 (1958), 1-19.
12 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in M oral Theory, 2nd ed. (London: 
Duckworth, 1985), pp. 117-8, 186-7.
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is an overriding telos in which the virtues cohere, and which serves to give 
meaning and authenticity to the narrative of any given human life. 13 The merit 
of this conception of the self is that it views a life as a ‘unity’, and not as the 
Sartrean individual characteristic of modernity whose ‘se lf is seen to be 
separated from his or her actions or ‘roles’. Crucially, what is recognised is 
that the unity of a life is a narrative unity, and as such has a beginning, middle 
and end, just as Aristotle had directed in his prescription for the drama in the 
Poetics This alternative conception of a self defined by the practice of the 
virtues, and in which a person’s life is an unselfconscious ‘narrative quest’, 
has been largely ignored by modernity. However, MacIntyre believes that 
enough vestiges of the Aristotelian model remain to enable this conception of 
the self to be restored as the principal feature of a renewed moral tradition. 13 
Some scholars, notably D. Z. Phillips, have however taken issue with 
MacIntyre, arguing that his account of Greek ethics is ‘too unified’, and that 
he mistakenly believes that ethics and morality can ultimately be made 
coherent. Phillips complains that MacIntyre ignores the competing tradition of 
philosophers such as Iris Murdoch, Stuart Hampshire and Peter Winch, who 
philosophise ‘against the stream’, often using narrative as a means of 
explicating complex moral issues which traditional ‘rational’ philosophy has
13 MacIntyre, TAer Virtue, pp. 202-03.
14 MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 204-05; Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Malcolm Heath 
(London: Penguin, 1996), p. 13. MacIntyre takes issue with Louis O. Mink, who claims 
(criticising Barbara Hardy) that narrative form is imposed on stories retrospectively, and 
cannot be so imposed on life. MacIntyre makes the obvious reply that in life there is a 
beginning (birth) and an ending (death), and points out that narrative form is prior to the 
narrative productions o f poets and novelists because the form itself issues from the life 
experiences that the artists are representing. See Louis O. Mink, ‘History and Fiction as 
Modes o f  Comprehension’, 1 (1970), 541-58; MacIntyre, ZAcr Virtue,
pp. 211-2; and Barbara Hardy, ‘Towards a poetics o f  Fiction: An Approach Through 
Narrative’, Aove/ 1 (1968), 5-14.
13 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 219. For a useful account o f MacIntyre’s project, and an 
attempt at a synthesis o f  MacIntyre and Habermas, see Sharon Mary Meager, ‘MacIntyre 
and Habermas in Conversation: Toward a Dialogic Narrative Approach to Ethics’ 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, State University o f N ew York at Stony Brook, 1991).
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failed to treat with subtlety and discrimination. This group of philosophers 
attack what Winch calls ‘the presumption of theory’, a presumption that 
Philips claims that even MacIntyre succumbs to when he asserts that an 
‘Aristotelian conception of human nature’ is superior, ‘and that this can be 
demonstrated philosophically ’. 1 ^
Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum in their own distinctive ways 
also question the presumption of theory and the limitations of traditional 
philosophy to deal with ethics and morality. Although they do not reject 
wholesale the value of the philosophical method, they have nevertheless come 
to be regarded as ‘a n t i - t h e o r i s t s 2 Bernard Williams, in Ethics and the Limits 
o f Philosophy looks to the ancient world to expose the limitations and 
theoretical pretensions of modem philosophy. He claims that the philosophy 
of the ancients was ‘less obsessional’ and ‘less determined to impose 
rationality through reductive theory’. For Williams, modern philosophy, 
especially that of the Kantian persuasion, dominated as it is by its illusory 
claims for a ‘community of reason’, is too detached from ‘social and historical 
reality and from any sense of a particular ethical life’. Philosophy itself 
unaided cannot answer the questions that it so eloquently poses: the answers, 
if there are any, can only come retrospectively by means of a process of 
‘reflective l i v i n g ’ . 9^
Martha Nussbaum, in The Fragility o f  Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, steers a course through the Kantian picture of 
the rational moral agent, to an extent immune to the incursions of luck, and the
16 D. Z. Phillips, Interventions in Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 50, 59, 61-62, 65. 
Phillips cites Winch approvingly: ‘philosophy can no more show a man what he should 
attach importance to than geometry can show a man where he should stand’. Peter Winch, 
Ethics and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), cited in Philips, p. 62.
17 Jean Porter, ‘Virtue Ethics’, in ^  Companion to Philosophy o f  Religion, ed. by Philip L. 
Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Cambridge, Ma. and Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 466-472, p. 
469.
1  ^ Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 197. 
19 Williams, Ethics, pp. 197, 200.
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alternative conception of the vulnerable human being, more or less totally 
susceptible to luck, and in thrall to the emotions and the appetites. Her 
approach to the work of the Greek tragedians and Aristotle is very suggestive, 
because in her reading the riskiness of life that the former dramatise and the 
latter describes, is not only part of the definition of what it is to be human, but 
indeed is what makes life valuable in a uniquely human way. Her central 
metaphor is that of the human being as a plant, growing towards the sky 
(human excellence), but always vulnerable to contingency and in need of 
nurture from without, qualities which cannot be altered without diminishing 
the very nature of what it is to be human. Nussbaum’s central question is just 
how much luck the Greek ethical thinkers thought it was possible or desirable 
to live with. The Greeks on the one hand strove for self-sufficiency and 
immunity to luck in the manner of the gods, but at the same time recognised a 
compelling beauty (which beguiled even some of the gods of the epics 
themselves) in the vulnerability and unreliability of the human condition.20 
Nussbaum recognises the ‘power’ in these competing attitudes to luck, arguing 
that they represent goods which are not commensurate, being always in 
tension and subject to the vicissitudes of life, which even the person of 
practical wisdom will not be able totally to mitigate.21
Nussbaum reads the Greek tragedians as presenting a far richer and more 
complex view of human life than their philosophical counterparts, and 
especially those of the later Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, who have 
largely dominated modern ethical enquiry. We can relate this to our earlier 
discussion of the Romantics, who located ethics in the non-cognitive pre- 
semantic absolute, or sublime. Nussbaum’s reading of Greek ethics enables us
20 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy {CamhrxdgQ: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-4. By ‘luck’, Nussbaum 
simply means contingent events that merely happen to a person, as opposed to events within 
a person’s control.
21 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 318-20.
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to overcome what we took be an impasse by regarding ethics as a concrete 
practice—Xo do with education, development, good fortune and worldly 
becoming. Thus ethics cannot be seen as a formal limit, a question of 
regulation or representation and law, or a negation of particularity; ethics is 
seen as relational, and to do with actualised social conditions, affections, and 
negotiation.^^
Eliot, while broadly Aristotelian in approach, takes the intersubjective 
not as a given but as being approached through literature and narrative, from 
which emerges point o f  view. This approach is an implicit challenge to 
Nussbaum, because Eliot is ‘in-between’ the idea of fiction as the immediate 
‘lived’ and unquestioning performance of life (as in Ancient Greece); and the 
idea that there might be a single philosophical position. So, contra Nussbaum, 
there is no general human position, and Eliot merely presents various 
philosophical positions lived as ways of life (see above, chapter two). In this 
way Eliot can be seen as broadly Aristotelian but at the same time observing 
the Kantian imperative which always asks the critical question of to whom and 
in what manner the world might be given:
‘O I  must g o \  said Maggie, earnestly, looking at Dr Kenn 
with an expression of reliance, as if  she had told him her history in 
those three words. It was one of those moments of implicit 
revelation which will sometimes happen even between people who 
meet quite transiently— on a mile’s journey, perhaps, or when 
resting by the wayside. There is always this possibility of a word or 
a look from a stranger to keep alive this sense of human 
brotherhood (554).
Dr Kenn, so evidently speaking for the narrator, is one of Aristotle’s 
phronimoi, a person of practical wisdom. Someone with these qualities can 
find the balance between the rigid Kantian ethical obligations and the un-
22 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 352.
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Kantian attention to subtle nuances of human behaviour and particulars.23 He 
needs to negotiate a middle way between the competing values of Maggie and 
Tom. Maggie is non-autonomous : she sees herself only through others:
T ’ve been a gi’eat deal happier’, she said at last, timidly, ‘since I 
have given up thinking about what is easy and pleasant, and being 
discontented because I couldn’t have my own will. Our life is 
determined for us—and it makes the mind very free when we give 
up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us and doing 
what is given us to do’ (397).
Maggie has an over sensitivity to nature, and even epistemologically, all her
knowledge and reading go back to particulars. Contrast this with Tom, who as
representative of the provincial capitalism of St. Ogg’s, uses nature
instrumentally, and reveals himself as a rigid Kantian (and a Dodson) in his
ethical deliberations:
Tom felt intensely that common cause with his father which springs 
from family pride, and was bent on being irreproachable as a son; 
but his growing experience caused him to pass much silent 
criticism on the rashness and imprudence of his father’s past 
conduct: their dispositions were not in sympathy, and Tom’s face 
showed little radiance during his few home hours. Maggie had an 
awe of him, against which she struggled, as something unfair to her
23 One o f  Eliot’s earliest published pieces, from t\\Q Coventry H erald  o f  5 February 1847, 
foreshadows this delicate balancing act so described: ‘The true philosopher [...] gathers his 
rules o f conduct, not from the suggestions o f  the appetite, not from the dictates o f  
expediency, but from the indications o f  man’s highest destiny, to be found in the faculties o f  
his nature which may be justly said to be more than human, since they might belong to 
conditions o f being far less limited than those o f  man. Self-renunciation, submission to law, 
trust, benignity, ingenuousness, rectitude,— these are the qualities we delight most to witness 
in the child, and these are the qualities which most dignify the man. The true philosopher 
[ ...]  feels that in submitting to the restraint o f a self-imposed law, he would be presenting 
humanity in its grandest aspect. But it isonly  the highest human state at which he aims— not 
anything superhuman. [...] He would be neither an angel, an anchorite, nor a saint, but a 
man in the most complete and lofty meaning o f  the name— a man to whom the “child is 
father” [Wordsworth, ‘My heart leaps up when I behold’], perhaps in more senses than the 
poet thought; and who is no degenerate offspring, but a development o f all the features 
impressed on that heaven-born parent.’ ‘The Wisdom o f the Child’, in ‘Poetiy and Prose 
from the Notebook o f an Eccentric’, Essays, pp. 20-1. In his headnote to this essay, Pinney 
reminds us that Eliot returned to this episodic and impressionistic form at the end o f her 
career, in Impressions o f  Theophrastus Such, with the effect that her whole career is 
enclosed by work which can be described as ‘moralia’. Essays, p. 13.
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consciousness of wider thoughts and deeper motives; but it was no 
use to struggle. A character at unity with itself—that performs what 
it intends, subdues every counteracting impulse and has no visions 
beyond the distinctly possible, is strong by its very negations (406- 
7).
Dr Kenn’s advice to Maggie echoes Tiresias’s advice to Creon at the end 
of Antigone, who in urging a flexible, ‘yielding’ approach to ethical 
deliberation, becomes not Creon’s opposite, but in some ways a middle way 
between the competing demands of Creon’s duty to the harmony of the polis 
and Antigone’s duty to fam ily .24 Dr Kenn’s deliberations have all Tiresias’s 
attention to the complexities and particularities of the world:
‘At present everything seems heading towards the relaxation of 
ties—towards the substitution of wayward choice for the adherence 
to obligation which has its roots in the past. Your conscience and 
your heart has given you true light on this point, Miss Tulliver; and 
I have said all this so that you may know what I wish about you— 
what my advice to you—would be if they sprang from my own 
feeling and opinion unmodified by counteracting circumstances’ 
(625).
But even the person of practical wisdom may falter when confronted with the 
narrowness and hypocrisy of the multitude, who look to the general and not 
the particular, and lack the capacity for minute discrimination and more 
importantly, pity:
It was naturally disappointing to Dr Kenn, after two years of 
superfluous incense from his feminine parishioners, to find them 
suddenly maintaining their views in opposition to his; but then, they 
maintained them in opposition to a higher authority, which they had 
venerated longer. That authority had furnished a very explicit
24 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 79-80. In an article on James’s The Golden 
Bowl, Nussbaum explores the connection between literature and moral philosophy, and 
suggests that Kant’s categorical imperative actually has un-Kantian consequences, by 
denying that at a deeper level, rigorous ‘ethical consistency’ can lead to the breaking o f  
certain commitments that should have been more binding than the original commitment. 
Most o f Nussbaum’s remarks about Maggie Verver, the heroine o f  The Golden Bowl, could 
just as well be applied to Maggie Tulliver; and it makes it all the more surprising that 
Nussbaum refuses to allow Eliot to be an Aristotelian in any sense. See her ‘Reply to 
Richard Wollheim, Patrick Gardiner, and Hilary Putnam’, New Literary H istory 15.1 (1983), 
201-8, pp. 205-6.
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answer to persons who might inquire where their social duties 
began, and might be inclined to take wide views as to the starting 
point. The answer had not turned on the ultimate good of society, 
but on ‘a certain man’ who was found in trouble by the wayside 
(637).25
St. Ogg’s is the world of ‘men of maxims’, and the narrator goes to great 
pains to criticise the narrowness and Kantian inflexibility of their conceptions, 
while at the same time offering an alternative Aristotelian model of the ethical 
deliberations of the person of practical wisdom, who does not expect to find a 
‘master key that will fit all cases’:
And the man of maxims is the popular representative of the minds 
that are guided in their moral judgements solely by general rules, 
thinking that these will lead to justice by the ready-made patent 
method, without the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination, 
impartiality, without any care to assure themselves whether they 
have the insight that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of 
temptation, or from a life vivid and intense enough to have created 
a wide fellow-feeling with all that is human (628).
Eliot had already distanced herself from the Kantian and Utilitarian
approaches to ethics in an early book review. Here she clearly places herself
within the Aristotelian tradition:
The notion that duty looks stern, but all the while has her hand full 
o f sugar-plums, with which she will reward us by-and-by, is the 
favourite cant of optimists, who try to make out that this tangled 
wilderness of life has a plan as easy to trace as that of a Dutch
25 ‘Kenn’ is not only a form o f the Scots word for ‘knowing’, but it is the name o f a local 
river. Rivers and water in the novel are not only important metaphors for tributaries o f  
knowledge, but are potent symbols o f  destiny and determinism. It seems to me possible that 
the character o f Dr Kenn is partly inspired by the seventeenth-century divine and author o f  
hymns, Thomas Ken, or Kenn (1637-1711), a former Bishop o f  Bath and Wells. A man of 
music and political principle, Ken is not much remembered now, although Manual fo r  
Winchester Scholars contains hymns (most notably ‘Praise God from whom all blessings 
flow ’) which are still sung in Protestant churches. Ken was relieved o f his bishopric after 
refusing to swear allegiance to the newly ascended William o f  Orange. British Authors 
before 1800: A Biographical Dictionary, ed. by Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft 
(New York: Wilson, 1952). Samuel J. Rogal notes that George Eliot refers to the ‘Good 
Bishop Ken’s evening hymn’ in Adam Bede, and the first chapter o f that novel closes with 
Adam singing lines from Ken’s ‘Morning Hymn’. See his ‘Hymns in George Eliot’s 
V\cX\on\ Nineteenth-Century Fiction 29 {\91A-15), 173-84, pp. 178-9.
203
garden; but it really undermines all true moral development by 
perpetually substituting something extrinsic as a motive to action, 
instead of the immediate impulse of love or justice, which alone 
makes an action truly m o r a l . 2 6
And in The Mill on the Floss, Maggie demonstrates an Aristotelian relational
ethics, when she rejects Stephen’s sophistry about the primacy of the ‘natural
law’ of passion that he disingenuously claims should bind them together, and
instead asserts the bonds of community and fidelity to the past:
‘It is not so, Stephen—I’m quite sure that is wrong. I have tried to 
think it again and again—but I see, if we judged in that way, there would 
be a warrant for all treachery and cruelty—we should justify breaking the 
most sacred ties that can ever be formed on earth. If  the past is not to 
bind us, where can duty lie? We should have no law but the inclination 
of the moment’ (601-2).
The approach to ethics we have been considering here links ethics with
narrative, and implicitly critiques formalism, whose rigid Kantian structures
cannot be responsive to the ethical nuances of the text or attend to the actual
process of understanding the text and the world.2? It can be said that narrative
came into its own with the Romantic preoccupation with history, which
foregrounded narrative as a means of explanation once the ‘certainties’ of
theology came to be questioned. With modernity came an acute consciousness
of our own ‘time-boundedness’, and narrative (that is, representations over
time) became the focus for a search for meaning which was as much a way of
negotiating ‘reality’ as i t  was a search for o r i g i n s . 2 8  Another way of
approaching this is to suggest that narrative is a way of exploring the various
ways in which subjects are formed and reformed (which in turn relates to the
earlier discussion of Bildung). Lyric poetry, with its singularity of voice, was
26 Essays, p. 135. In the headnote to this essay, Thomas Pinney suggests its relation to the 
doctrine o f renunciation as evinced in The M ill on the Floss.
27 Brooks, Reading fo r  the Plot, p. 36. This particular attention to the ethics (as opposed to 
the Ethics) o f  reading has marked the work o f  a whole generation o f so called narrative 
ethicists, o f  whom the most notable is Wayne Booth. See his The Company We Keep: An 
Ethics o f  Fiction (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1988).
28 Brooks, Reading fo r  the Plot, pp. xi-xii.
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always more indebted to Kantian ethics which always figured the other 
through the limit of any given voice. The novel, however, is a social genre 
with a number of voices and perspectives: only with the interaction of voice, 
point of view, the past and narrative does the moral view of the world emerge, 
in positivity of narration. This mode of narration (which will be discussed in 
relation to tragedy below) is predicated on the polyvocal interaction of 
different characters and their narratives. As we have already seen. The Mill on 
the Floss constantly questions the idea of an unproblematic negotiation with 
‘reality’, and the narrative constantly asserts the limits of meaning and
understanding:^^
Not a word was spoken by either of them as they walked along. 
Maggie was suffering in anticipation of what Philip was about to 
suffer, and dreading the galling words that would fall on him from 
Tom’s lips; but she felt it was in vain to attempt anything but 
submission. Tom had his terrible clutch on his conscience and her 
deepest dread: she writhed under the demonstrable truth of the 
character he had given to her conduct, and yet her whole soul 
rebelled against it as unfair from its incompleteness (446).
Taken as a whole, the narrative logic of Eliot’s novel indicates that a
shift in character is necessary to overcome a certain existential impasse. It is
narrative that is propelled by the limits of characters and the change that
comes about through their negotiation with each other. This of course
emphasises the ethical dimension to literature and narrative, but in such as a
way as to be contrary to the demands of the ‘ethics’ of reading of Hillis Miller
and the formalists, who as we noted earlier, will not ‘engage’ with the text in
an existential manner.
One of the ways in which The Mill on the Floss might be seen to
overcome the imperatives of Kantianism and formalism is in its approach to
gender. The manner in which Eliot negotiates the gender dichotomy as
evinced in the narratives of Tom and Maggie can be seen as an attempt to
29 Shuttleworth, ‘Critical Commentary’, pp. 490-91
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undermine social closure. Seen in this way, Eliot’s ‘feminism’ would be 
revealed in her insistence that ethical issues cannot be resolved by pre­
determined categories. Having said that, Eliot always maintained that there are 
deep ‘ontological’ differences between the sexes,30 and although this has 
earned the censure of some Anglo-American feminists, Eliot’s seeming 
conservatism has generated feminist readings of her work which are much 
richer and less reductive than simple assertions of the limits to women’s 
freedom that the novel either affirms or subverts.31
Luce Irigaray is useful for this study because of her concepts of 
intersubjectivity and the ‘sensible transcendental’. Jessica Benjamin describes 
intersubjectivity as a ‘viewpoint’ rather than a process, one in which
the individual grows in and through the relationship to other 
subjects. Most important, this perspective observes that the other 
whom the self meets is also a self, a subject in his or her right. It 
assumes that we are able and need to recognise that other subject as 
different and yet alike, as an other who is capable of sharing similar 
mental experience. Thus the idea of intersubjectivity reorients the 
conception of the psychic world from a subject’s relations to its 
object toward a subject meeting another subject.32
In An Ethics o f  Sexual Difference, Irigaray discusses the Socratic 
dialogues as the paradigm for intersubjectivity—a process of endless 
becoming, and a kind of ‘knowledge’ which is linked to love and beauty. This 
celebration of love and beauty is an attainment of the ‘sensible 
transcendental’, a ‘middle’ term which reconfigures the rigid dichotomies of
39 Shaffer, ‘Kubla K han’, p. 254. Eliot thought that the finest novels by women not only 
rank with the finest o f  all, but ‘have a precious speciality, lying quite apart from masculine 
aptitudes and experience’. Essays, p. 324.
31 For an excellent discussion o f  the language o f  the novel, see Jacobus, ‘Men o f  Maxims’. 
The reader may have noticed that in this study I have largely not addressed the wealth o f  
feminist scholarship concerning both Eliot, and the issue o f women in philosophy generally. 
My broad argument— that Eliot actively engaged in philosophy and did so through âliterary  
project— raises questions that would have such broad relevance for feminist scholarship that 
I have been unable to negotiate such issues within the limits o f  this study.
32 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds o f  Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problems o f  
Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 19-20.
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male/female and transcendent/immanent. It is, for women (and men, one 
presumes, at least in principle), a path to the contemplation of the ‘divine’.33 
Margaret Whitford argues that Irigaray’s sensible transcendental as ‘God’ is a 
reinterpretation of Feurbach’s thesis that ‘conceives and affirms a profoundly 
human relationship as a divine relationship’.34 Whitford sums up the need for 
a sensible transcendental, and points us to Irigaray’s interest in Greek tragedy, 
and Antigone in particular, which in her reading dramatises the split between 
the corporeal and the spiritual, and which only the sensible transcendental can 
repair:
A sensible transcendental is the condition of an ethics of sexual 
difference, necessary if the tale of Antigone is not to go on 
repeating itself If women are cut off from their own becoming, 
then they are ‘buried alive’ in our culture. Because of the split, 
women, as the body, represent sexuality, which is then cut of from 
the ideal or spiritual, and becomes a ‘lower’ function, that which is 
to be transcended in pursuit of the g o o d  3 5
Irigaray thus re-conceives sexual difference in terms of an intersubjective 
rapprochement that redistributes metaphysical binaries.36 The space of this 
rapprochement is figured using a variety of tropes, one of which is the 
envelope, which Irigaray uses in relation to S p i n o z a . 3 7  We can relate this to 
Eliot in the claim that what lies beyond reason and fmitude—which for Kant 
can only be known negatively—and which we characterised earlier as a 
‘mystical’ reformulation of Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, is for Eliot an 
infinite sublimity that is achieved not by recognition of the critical limit, but 
through the other person. This would be a ‘sensible transcendental’ and
33 Irigaray, ‘Sorcerer Love: A reading o f Plato, Symposium, “Diotima’s Speech’” , in An 
Ethics o f  Sexual Difference, pp. 20-33.
34 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 
1991), pp. 141-5.
35 Whitford, Luce Irigaray, p. 149
36 Irigaray, An Ethics o f  Sexual Difference, pp. 116-129.
37 Irigaray, ‘The Envelope: A Reading o f  Spinoza, Ethics, “O f God’” , in An Ethics o f  
Sexual Difference, pp. 83-94,
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incidentally would agree with Deleuze’s Spinozistic terminology of what he 
calls ‘transcendental e m p i r i c i s m ’78
Thus, for Eliot, even the Spinozistic modes of self-determination are only 
made possible in the presence of others, and this reveals the process of 
intersubjectivity as a means of direct communication: the power to touch ‘the 
domain of the existential’, as Hadot puts it.39 Hadot encapsulates the broad 
approach that we have been outlining: ‘as a matter of fact, ethics—that is, 
choosing the good—is not the consequence of metaphysics but metaphysics is 
the consequence of ethics.’40 One can begin to see why Martha Nussbaum 
puts Spinoza and Kant on the same side of the ethical tradition, namely, 
because of their common ideals of self-sufficiency, and, like Plato, a failure to 
make conceptual room for pity—which amounts to an awareness of the 
fragility of the other person.41
Eliot herself is critical of the closed understanding of certain 
communities, such as that of St. Ogg’s, which is represented by Stephen. This 
closure can only be opened by pity:
If that state of mind could have lasted, her choice would have been 
to have Stephen Guest at her feet, offering her a life filled with all 
luxuries, with daily incense of adoration near and distant, with all 
possibilities of culture at her command. But there were things in her 
stronger than vanity—passion, and affection, and long deep 
memories of early discipline and effort, of early claims on her love 
and pity; and the stream of vanity was soon swept along and 
mingled imperceptibly with that wider current which was at its 
highest force today, under the double urgency of the events and 
inward impulses brought by the last week (555).
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Athlone Press, 
1994), p. 161; and The Logic o f  Sense, trans. by Mark Lester, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 105.
39 Hadot, Philosophy, p. 285.
40 Hadot, Philosophy, p. 283.
41 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 385.
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Pity enables intersubjectivity, and is connected to the idea that luck can affect 
even the good person through no fault of their own, and so when we reflect on 
our own frailty in the face of similar unsolicited events, pity is the response 
that at once is the most ‘ethical’ of the tragic emotions.42 Dr Kenn and 
Maggie’s intersecting narratives dramatise the intersubjective relationship 
forged by pity and fellow-feeling:
Dr Kenn’s ear and eye took in all the signs that this brief 
confidence of Maggie’s was charged with meaning.
‘I understand’, he said; ‘you feel it right to go. But that will 
not prevent our meeting again, I hope—it will not prevent my 
knowing you better, if f  can be of any service to you’.
He put out his hand and pressed hers kindly, before he turned away.
‘She has some trouble or other at heart’, he thought. ‘Poor 
child! she looks as if she might turn out to be one of
‘The souls by nature pitch’d too high.
By suffering plung’d too low’ (554).43
Not only is there narrative pity for Maggie, she herself has pity for 
Phillip, who, notwithstanding his noble nature and tenderness, cannot hope to 
attain the state of eudaimonia, because of the ‘luck’ that has resulted in his 
disability.44 He thus needs to be, in the narrator’s words, ‘singled out for pity’, 
because his telos has been irrevocably frustrated:
He had not his full share in the common good of men; he could not 
even pass muster with the insignificant, but must be singled out for 
pity, and excepted from what was a matter of course with others.
Even to Maggie he was an exception: it was clear that the thought 
of his being her lover had never entered her mind (430).
42 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 383-85. See also Aristotle, Poetics, p. xxxi. 
Aristotle says that the person having undergoing the tribulations visited upon him or her by 
luck must not be extremely virtuous, only moderately so. A bad character would equally 
spoil the tragic effect, because pity requires an acceptance on the part o f  those observing 
that the events unfolded could just as easily have happened to them.
43 Eliot draws the verse from John Keble’s The Christian Year (Oxford: Parker, 1827), 
LXXXIV, St. Philip and St. James, verse 12.
44 Eudaimonia can roughly be translated as ‘happiness’, but any satisfactory definition 
would also have to include the properties o f health, prosperity, and blessedness, as well as 
generally living well according to the telos o f  one’s life. See MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 148.
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Aristotle even went as far as to suggest that ugly people could not share 
fully in eudaimonia, and should be pitied relative to their ugliness. However, 
they are to be pitied only because we recognise them as essentially the same as 
us, and not because they necessarily exhibit moral virtues or defects:
Do not think too hardly of Philip. Ugly and deformed people have 
great need of unusual virtues, because they are likely to be 
extremely uncomfortable without them: but the theory that unusual 
virtues spring by a direct consequence out of personal 
disadvantages, as animals get thicker wool in severe climates, is 
perhaps a little overstrained. The temptations of beauty are much 
dwelt upon, but I fancy they only bear the same relation to those of 
ugliness, as the temptation to excess at a feast, where the delights 
are varied for eye and ear as well as palate, bears to the temptations 
that assail the desperation of hunger. Does not the Hunger Tower 
stand as the type of the utmost trial to what is human in us? (430- 
1)45
Pity, as the most important of the tragic emotions is thus connected to Eliot’s 
notion of particularity and sympathy:
With that cry of self-despair, Maggie fell on her knees against the 
table, and buried her sorrow-stricken face. Her soul went out to the 
Unseen Pity that would be with her to the end. Surely there was 
something being taught her by this experience of great need; and 
she must be learning a secret of human tenderness and long- 
suffering, that the less erring could hardly know? (649).
Seen in this way, The Mill on the Floss can be seen as a challenge to the
organicism of Middlemarch, even though its composition predates the latter
work, widely considered to be Eliot’s masterpiece. But why has posterity
delivered the judgement that Eliot’s earlier novel is less great than
MiddlemarchP One answer might be to suggest that the organicism of
Middlemarch (even though it might itself be undermined) embodies the drive
45 It is tempting to wonder whether Eliot, painfully aware o f her own lack o f physical 
beauty, is cursing her own ‘luck’ at what nature had given her in that department. Herbert 
Spencer famously refused to marry Eliot on account o f her ugliness, and in an essay on 
‘Personal Beauty’ in The Leader (April 15, 1854), pp. 356-7, seems to be obliquely referring 
to Eliot’s prominent facial features to illustrate the difference between an ‘ugly’ and a 
‘Greek-like’ head. See Haight, p. 115.
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to system (take, for example, Casaubon’s ultimately fruitless search for the 
‘Key to all Mythologies’).46 The Mill on the Floss, however, has a major 
element where this drive to system is thwarted, where the ‘light irony’ that 
sustains the world of St. Ogg’s must stop, and where there is some aspect of 
self unaccounted for by the deterministic system.
While Eliot has a Spinozistic sense of totality, she is neither Spinozistic 
nor Kantian in the sense that the question for her is not one of conditions, and 
she does not have an epistemological focus. Her moral insight is not derived 
from the epistemological limit, and as we have seen she works against duty (in 
the Kantian sense) as the foundation of ethical life. Her commitment to a 
reformulated third kind of knowledge and her general view of nature are guilty 
of the Kantian paralogism, that is, the impossibility of knowledge beyond 
finite intuition. For Eliot, contra Kant, there is an order and value in nature 
which is not just the effect of reflective judgement. The division between the 
non-consequentialism of Kantianism—a law valuable for its own sake— and 
Aristotle’s consequentialism— a law in terms of the good life— is important 
here. Eliot seems to incorporate both positions: we never know what the good 
life is or what a law will do, and so we require some sort of universalism, but 
one that is perforce tempered by the limits of reason.
However, Eliot is a post-Kantian in the inescapable sense that she 
complements her ‘imaginative Spinozism’47 by an account of aesthetic 
experience. Eliot relies on the Romantic notion of the need to reclaim through 
art a lost ‘naturalness’, a theory of the imagination which, in contrast to 
Spinoza, ultimately views man as central.48 in this way art and narrative do 
seem to provide something like moral insight, and further, the exemplarity of
46 George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study o f  Provincial Life, ed. by David Carroll (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), bk. 1, ch. 7, p. 62.
47 John Jones describes Wordsworth in this way (see above, chapter three).
48 Hampshire, Two Theories o f  M orality  (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British 
Academy, 1977), pp. 91-94.
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narrative gives ethics a positivity which is precluded by the purely regulatory 
nature of the categorical imperative.49 Eliot shows a Kantianism in her lack of 
commitment to communitarian ethics: for her, communities (such as St. 
Ogg’s) are often sites where ethical questions are closed down and the 
‘opening’ is achieved through novelistic examination. This is a type of 
catharsis, which, according to Aristotle, is the function of tragedy, and which 
must invoke fear and pity if it is to be ethically illuminating.30 Thus Eliot, 
despite her extraordinary synthesis of Kant and Spinoza, remains ethically an 
Aristotelian:
And again, it is my way, (rather too much so perhaps) to urge the 
human sanctities through tragedy—through pity and terror as well 
as admiration and delights.31
MacIntyre argues that tragedy is a way a culture reveals its conflicts of 
virtues, which suggests (contra Kant) that ethics is not about categorical 
imperatives but difficult decisions between competing values according to 
forms of life.32 Nussbaum, similarly, sees tragedy as an exercise in the 
constitution of social value, and a demonstration that the good  (again, contra 
Kant) is not a definitional property contraposed to desire, but is negotiated in
49 Tobin Siebers has tried to rehabilitate Kant in the service o f narrative ethics, but in an 
Aristotelian context, arguing that K anf s own use o f narrative is inseparable from his 
practical philosophy. He claims that Kant did not reject ‘character’ or ‘virtue’; he just 
wanted to ground them in reason. Siebers goes on to complain that the early MacIntyre o f A 
Short History o f  Ethics misreads Kant because he had not yet developed his later interest in 
narrative. Kant ‘remains his nemesis, because he [MacIntyre] doesn’t perceive the 
connection between ethics/life and narrative form’. Tobin Siebers, M orals and Stories (New  
York; Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 98-103, 107, 112; Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short 
History o f  Ethics: A History o f  M oral Philosophy from  the Homeric Age to the Twentieth 
Century (London: Routledge, 1967). See also Hilary Putman, ‘Taking Rules Seriously— A 
Response to Martha Nussbaum’, New Literary History 15.1 (1983), pp. 193-200. Putman 
argues that Kantian and Aristotelian ethics need not conflict.
39 Aristotle, Poetics, p. 10. See also TdLy\ov, Aristotle, p. 109. Martha Nussbaum explains 
that the original meaning o f  the Greek word katharsis describes more a process o f  
simplification or clarification, ‘concerning who we are’, rather than moral purification or 
expurgation. The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 391.
31 Letters, IV, 301.
32 MacIntyre, 4/7er Virtue, pp. 143-44.
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terms of partial and fragile goods—which are valuable precisely because they 
can be lost and are finite73 Eliot made clear her prescription for tragedy:
A good tragic subject must represent a possible, sufficiently 
probable, not a common action; and to be really tragic, it must 
represent iireparable collision between the individual and the 
general (in differing degrees of generality). It is the individual with 
whom we sympathise, and the general of which we recognise the 
irresistible power. The truth of this test will be seen by applying it 
to the greatest tragedies. The collision of Greek tragedy is often that 
between hereditary, entailed Nemesis, and the peculiar individual 
lot, awakening our sympathy, of the particular man or woman 
whom the Nemesis is shown to grasp with terrific fbrce.34
In her essay on Antigone, Eliot characterises the essence of tragedy as the
‘antagonism of valid claims’, where there is ‘right on both sides’, and where
these claims are mutually exclusive, resulting in Creon’s ‘exasperation’ and
Antigone ’s ‘ defiant hardness ’ ;
Wherever the strength of a man’s intellect, or moral sense, or 
affection bring him to opposition with the rules which society has 
sanctioned, there is renewed the conflict between Antigone and 
Creon; such a man must not only dare to be right, he must also dare 
to be wrong—to shake, to wound friendship, perhaps, to hem in his 
own powers. Like Antigone, he may fall victim to the struggle, and 
yet he can never earn the name of a blameless martyr any more than 
the society—the Creon he has defied, can be branded as a 
hypocritical tyrant.3 5
For Eliot, the relationship between Antigone and Creon is a struggle between
the inward and outward laws which are in constant and inevitable tension, and
which at society’s current state of development cannot yet be harmonised:
Is it not rather that the struggle between Antigone and Creon 
represents that struggle between elemental tendencies and
33 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 5.
34 Cross, III, 44-5.
33 ‘The Antigone and its Moral’, Essays, 261-5, p. 265. Darrell Mansell argues that Eliot 
conforms to H egel’s definition o f  tragedy, as the conflict between two incompatible 
conceptions o f  the ‘good’. See ‘A Note on Hegel and George E lio f, The Victorian 
Newsletter 21 (1965), 12-5.
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established laws by which the outer life of man is gradually and 
painfully being brought into harmony with his inward needs? Until 
this harmony is perfected, we shall never be able to attain a great 
right without also doing a wrong.
As I suggested earlier, Eliot identifies more with Tiresias, the voice of 
Aristotelian ‘moderation and reverence’, and with the Chorus that draws the 
ultimate moral ‘that lofty words [...] are not becoming to mortals’. I t  is clear 
that while Eliot follows Aristotle’s basic prescription for tragedy, she rejects 
his premise that tragedy requires action ‘of a certain magnitude’,^^ and she 
therefore brings to the novel a thoroughly modern conception of the genre, one 
which combines natural history, determinism, and the Development theory, 
with the everyday events of the social and economic life of St. Ogg’s:59
The pride and obstinacy of millers and other insignificant people, 
whom you pass unnoticingly on the road every day, have their 
tragedy too, but it is of that unwept, hidden sort, that goes on from 
generation to generation and leaves no record—such tragedy, 
perhaps, as lies in the conflicts of young souls, hungry for joy, 
under a lot made suddenly hard to them, under the dreariness of a 
home where the morning brings no promise with it, and where the 
unexpectant discontent of worn and disappointed parents weighs on 
the children like a damp, thick air in which all the functions of life 
are depressed; or such tragedy as lies in the slow or sudden death 
that follows on a bruised passion, though it may be a death that 
finds only a parish funeral (275).
Thus Maggie is Antigone to Tom’s Creon, Maggie passive and self- 
denying in the face of social convention and the ravages of ‘luck’; and Tom, 
rigid and unyielding in his Kantian moral domain of seeming immunity to 
‘luck’. Many of the other characters define themselves in relation to ‘luck’. Mr 
Tulliver seems to have no immunity to luck whatever, and frequently has 
reason to curse his luck, as described in the terms of tragedy by the narrator:
Essays, p. 264.
Essays, p. 265.
58 Aristotle, Poetics, p. 14, In the novel, the narrator refers to Aristotle’s doctrine when 
Maggie pushes Lucy into the mud (book 1, chapter 10).
59 Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, p. 273.
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Mr Tulliver’s prompt procedure entailed on him further 
promptitude in finding the convenient person who was desirous of 
lending five hundred pounds on bond. Tt must be no client of 
Wakem’s’, he said to himself; and yet at the end of a fortnight it 
turned out to be the contrary; not because Mr Tulliver’s will was 
feeble, but because external fact was stronger. Wakem’s client was 
the only convenient person to be found. Mr Tulliver had a destiny 
as well as Oedipus, and in this case he might plead, like Oedipus, 
that his deed was inflicted on him rather than committed by him 
(198).
However, Tulliver does have some ‘luck’, when Tom is able to turn the 
family fortune around: “ ‘It’s a great thing when a man can be proud as he’s 
got a good son. I ’ve had that luck’” (456). More promisingly. Bob Jakin takes 
‘a hopeful view of his own luck’; but it is Dr Kenn who most fully achieves 
the Aristotelian balance between Kantian self-sufficiency, and the risks and 
rewards attendant with the demands of love and friendship
The great problem of the shifting relation between passion and duty 
is clear to any man who is capable of apprehending it: the question, 
whether the moment has come in which a man has fallen below the 
possibility of a renunciation that will carry any efficacy, and must 
accept the sway of a passion against which he had struggled as a 
trespass, is one for which we have no master key that will fit all 
cases. The casuists have become a by-word of reproach; but their 
perverted spirit of minute discrimination was the shadow of a truth 
to which eyes and hearts are too often fatally sealed: the truth, that 
moral judgements must remain false and hollow, unless they are 
checked and enlightened by a perpetual reference to the special 
circumstances that mark the individual lot (627-28).
It is clear that the conflict of the book is the conflict between the two
incompatible approaches to ‘luck’ that are embodied in the treatment o f Tom
and Maggie. Indeed, as Nussbaum points out in relation to the conflict
between Antigone and Creon, this conflict is inevitable, and cannot be
reconciled in a grand Hegelian synthesis.^^ This is because any approach
60 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 343. Nussbaum makes this point in relation to 
Antigone, not E liof s novel.
61 Contrary to Darrell Mansell’s argument in ‘A Note on Hegel and George Eliot’.
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which seeks to lessen conflict, also diminishes the intrinsic value of what 
made both positions distinctive in the first place. The paradox at the heart of 
this is that ‘the price of harmonisation seems to be impoverishment, the price 
of richness d i s h a r m o n y ’ . 6 2  The only approach one can take which does justice 
to the distinctiveness of the competing claims without diminishing the power 
of each, seems to be that of a Tiresias or a Dr Kenn. These characters show 
‘yielding’ and ‘flexibility’, together with a conception of practical reasoning 
that ‘accommodates’ itself to the world while recognising its richness and
complexities.63
Eliot, in response to critical censure at her treatment of Tom, stresses the 
nature of these incommensurable goods, which is the essence of tragedy:
As if it were not my respect for Tom which infused itself into my 
reader—as if he could have respected Tom, if f  had not painted him 
with respect; the exhibition of the right on both sides being the very 
soul of my intention in the story.64
However, although it is clear that Eliot asserts ‘the right on both sides’, it is
also obvious that on an ethical level the nanator expects us to admire Maggie
more than Tom, whose moral hardness is continually juxtaposed with
Maggie’s ‘relational’ ethics:
It came with the memories that no passion could long quench: 
the long past that came back to her and with it the fountains of self- 
renouncing pity and affection, of faithfulness and resolve. The 
words that were marked by the quiet hand in the little old book that 
she had long ago learned by heart, rushed even to her lips, and 
found a vent for themselves in a low murmur that was quite lost in 
the loud driving of the rain against the window and the loud moan 
and roar of the wind: ‘I have received the Cross, I have received it 
from thy hand; I will bear it, and bear it until death, as thou hast 
laid it upon me.’
62 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 75.
63 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 79-80.
64 Letters, III, 397. A critic had accused Eliot o f  holding Tom with ‘disdain’.
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But soon other words rose that could find no utterance but in a 
sob: ‘Forgive me, Stephen! It will pass away. You will come back 
to her’ (648-9).
Eliot shows forcefully the Aristotelian point that any life such as Tom’s—that 
is, devoted to the pursuit of self-sufficiency and the exclusion of ‘luck’ from 
the moral domain—is less rich than Maggie’s, notwithstanding her own self- 
denying and similarly inflexible ethical position. The fact that Maggie is 
willing to embrace the world of risk and mutability in the pursuit of the human 
values of love and friendship makes her in the last analysis ethically superior 
to Tom.65
Another bone of critical contention, one which has persisted well into 
this century, is Eliot’s rendering of Maggie’s great ‘mistake’, that is, her 
attraction to and near-elopement with Stephen. 66 Aristotle described the 
capacity for error (hamartio), which can bring about misfortune to the person 
who committed the error, even if he is undeserving of that misfortune.67 This 
capacity for error is even more pronounced in young people, who from lack of 
experience of the vicissitudes of life, generally have an openness or simplicity 
towards the world, which however comes with a tendency to excess. In the 
end, this ‘yielding and open posture towards the world’ is what gives the 
young person both the ‘fragility’ and the ‘beauty’ that are captured in the 
metaphor of the plant.68 Nussbaum notes that in many of the Greek tragedies, 
‘the good die young’. This however is not the result of divine intervention: it 
is a rather sad acknowledgment that this openness and trust towards the world 
brings with it the risk of ‘betrayal’ or ‘defilement’, a risk that in certain
65 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 63-7. Again, Nussbaum makes this point only 
in relation to Antigone and Creon.
66 Ruskin thought that Stephen and most o f the other characters in the novel were ‘simply 
the sweepings out o f  a Pentonville omnibus’. Fiction, Fair and Foul V, in The Works o f  
John Ruskin, ed. by E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols. (London: George 
Allen, 1908), XXXIV, p. 377.
67 Aristotle, Poetics, p. 21.
68 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 337-39.
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circumstances becomes too great to be sustainable. And in these circumstances 
the tragic protagonist cannot ‘close o ff  the risks of the world without a 
commensurate loss in v a l u e . 6 9  Seen in this way, perhaps the much-maligned 
flood that brings the tragic resolution to the novel is less capricious and far 
more meaningful than it is generally considered.
Certainly, Eliot’s defence of Maggie’s ‘mistake’ is strikingly similar to 
Aristotle’s description of the ‘tragic hero’, a character which had rarely been 
represented in English fiction before this time:?®
The other chief point of criticism—Maggie’s position towards 
Stephen—is too vital a part of my whole conception and purpose 
for me to be converted to the condemnation of it. If  I am wrong 
here— if I did not really know what my heroine would feel and do 
under the circumstances in which I deliberately placed her, I ought 
not to have written this book at all, but quite a different book, if 
any. If the ethics of art do not admit the truthful presentation of a 
character essentially noble but liable to great error—error that is 
anguish to its own nobleness— then, it seems to me, the ethics of art 
are too narrow, and must be widened to correspond with a widening 
psychology.? 1
Aristotle also stressed that the tragedy would be heightened—that is, evoke 
fear and pity—if as a result of this error, misfortune or harm is brought upon 
people close to the tragic hero. It is plain that Eliot followed this precept also, 
in view of the pain and suffering inflicted on Philip and Lucy as a result of her 
one tragic error.
On account of the overriding consideration that the tragedy must invoke 
fear and pity, Aristotle did not specify any rigid conventions for plot 
construction (although he did not like plots resolved by the dei4X ex machina). 
He felt that as long as the tragic events followed as a reasonably probable 
consequence of what had gone before, then that was acceptable. However,
69 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, pp. 419-20. 
?® Bennett, George Eliot, p. 116.
?1 Letters, III, 317-18.
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even though the unity of the plot is important, events which are ‘contrary to 
expectation’ are also desirable because they evoke astonishment {thaumaston). 
Aristotle goes on to suggest that the connection between the tragic event and 
what precedes it can be a little contrived as long as it evokes fear and pity, as 
this is what is ultimately important. To this end, Aristotle prefers the credible 
impossible to the incredible p o s s i b l e . ?2
The suggestion that Eliot was following Aristotle’s prescription for the 
tragic drama prompts one again to consider the ending in a different light. 
Although Eliot admitted that the ‘tragedy is not adequately prepared’, due to 
her being ‘beguiled by love of my subject in the first two volumes’,?3 she 
never accepted that the manner of the tragedy was itself misjudged. The 
resolution of the problem—though that resolution is death—is more than 
adequately foreshadowed throughout the work, and more importantly, it is 
foreshadowed in such as a way as to not only be ‘connected’ to the preceding 
events, but also to cause ‘surprise’.?4 Thus, according to Aristotle’s model, the 
ending is not only ‘contrary to expectation’, but also ‘connected’, thereby 
heightening the ‘emotional impact’ of the plot.?5
It is at this point of tragic resolution through death that we find the 
fictional and the autobiographical uncannily mirroring each other. In the novel 
Philip refers to Maggie and Stephen’s ‘mistake’, which:
proceeded from only one side of your characters, and belonged to 
that partial, divided action of our nature which makes half the 
tragedy of the human lot (633).
And shortly after embarking on her career in fiction, Eliot wrote:
I feel, too, that all the terrible pain I have gone through in past years 
partly from defects of my own nature, partly from outward things.
?2 Aristotle, Poetics, p. 41.
73 Letters, 111,317.
74 Aristotle, Poetics, p. 27.
75 Aristotle, Poetics, Translator’s Introduction, p. xxxix.
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has probably been a preparation for some special work that I may 
do before I d i e . 76
Unlike her fictional creation, Eliot did not die before she lost her innocence 
and unyielding nature, but at the same time Eliot finds in the possibility of 
death a way of bringing forth an answer to the fragility of human existence, an 
answer predicated on intersubjectivity:
We are very well now— after a fair share of cold and consequent 
headaches, and life is  very sweet to us though verging near to the 
valley of death—or perhaps because it is so verging, and the time 
together so unspeakably precious. Do not ever imagine us forgetful 
or ungrateful. You are part of the furniture of our souls— among the 
sacred things on the h e a r t h . 7 7
Shortly before her death, Eliot was visited by a Russian woman 
mathematician, Sofia Kovalovskaya, who recounts the story of an 
extraordinary conversation between the two women. Kovalovskaya remarked 
to Eliot that a feature of all her novels is that of ‘death always appearing as the 
general reconciler, untying all the knots tightened by human passions’. Eliot’s 
reply adds meaning to the tragic events of the novel, and throws a fleeting 
light upon the darkness and suffering at the root of the hermeneutic quest, in 
narrative as much as life:
‘There is some truth to what you say; but I ’d like to ask you one 
thing. Have you really not noticed that it actually happens that way 
in life? I personally refuse to believe that death is not more logical 
than one usually thinks. When a situation in life becomes more 
tense, when one cannot see a way out anywhere, when the most 
sacred duties conflict, then death appears, suddenly opening new 
ways about which no one had thought before, and reconciles that 
which had seemed irreconcilable. It has already happened so many 
times that faith in death has given me the courage to l i v e ! ’78
76 Letters. II, 343.
77 Letters, VII, 5.
78 Raymond Chapman and Eleanora Gottlieb, ‘A Russian View o f  George Eliot’, 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction 33, I (1978-9), 348-65, pp. 363-4.
2 2 0
The Mill on the Floss can be seen as tragic, both at the social and 
cosmological levels. In the novel we find a sense of the irreducibility of 
suffering which runs against both Kant and Spinoza. For Kant, ethics is 
ultimately a question of duty and choice with clear and rational imperatives; 
for Spinoza as long as we act in accordance with the power of our mode of 
existence there will be a general joy in accord with the system. However, 
whereas both Kant and Spinoza see ethics as ultimately coherent, what The 
Mill on the Floss shows is that there are radical ethical disjunctions which 
have to do with the singularity o f persons. But that is not all. Following 
Nussbaum’s theory of the fragility of goodness, any engagement with the 
world of human beings or the capricious world of contingency is a source of 
vulnerability, but, crucially, it is also what makes life v a l u a b l e . 7 9  The good, 
then, is not what lies beyond singularity in a realm of transcendent 
justification, but is precisely good because it is limited, fragile, and capable of 
loss.
By insisting on the recognition of partial and fragile goods, Nussbaum is 
critical of modern Utilitarian and Kantian approaches to ethics, which strive 
for ultimate conditions or general concepts of law. Eliot herself recognises the 
force of particular goods, but also demonstrates the way in which from these 
particulars we can extend our sympathy towards the ethical totality. This 
brings us back to the dispute between Spinoza and Kant about absolute 
knowledge. In Spinoza we find some sort of a comprehension of totality 
through the third kind of knowledge, whereas in Kant, while we have no 
knowledge of the totality, we are capable of forming an idea of what lies 
beyond human intuition. Indeed, the Kantian sublime is generated from just 
that pressing sense of the limits of human cognition. And so there is a broad 
opposition between Spinoza, who asserts the possibility of intuiting the
79 Nussbaum, The Fragility o f  Goodness, p. 353.
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absolute, and Kant, who allows us only to feel the impossibility o f such an 
intuition. Eliot ultimately decides this question narratologically, and through 
Aristotle creates a synthesis of Spinoza and Kant, in which the former enables 
an intimation of totality through narrative form, and the latter provides a 
cultivation of the idea of totality through art and literature.
The dispute between Spinoza and Kant is still being played out today. On 
the one hand there is the hermeneutic tradition, with its commitment to a 
negotiated XmÛï of narrative and art in the face of both the admission that there 
is no absolute truth, and also the concomitant fear of relativism. On the other 
hand we find the post-structuralists, who insist on the impossibility of 
remaining within any narrative context as long as the question of a truth that 
exceeds all content can be asked. The importance and relevance of Eliof s 
fiction for this dispute is that she not only affirms the emergence of concepts 
and truth from non-conceptual and random circumstances, but she also 
acknowledges the force of law or absolute striving. Seen in this way, Eliot is 
neither fully Aristotelian or Kantian, nor even fully Spinozistic. Rather, 
through her fiction she shows that all these ethical and philosophical 
problematics dominate human life.
It may well be that the participants in the contemporary version of this 
debate could learn from George Eliof s fictional interventions, if only they 
would be prepared to read her novels not simply as a form of nineteenth- 
century realism—whatever one might take that to be—but as a form of 
questioning, of the emergence of other voices, and of the givenness of the 
world.
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